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University of Pittsburgh, 2005 
 
 
This research project takes the position that there is a biological basis to social contract 
formation in business and to social contract dissolution.  Its stance is that individuals cannot 
escape the natural forces that govern these relationships, by rite that these forces have on the 
structuring of the neural architecture of the human brain.  While it is argued in this project that 
the neural algorithms in the brain are formed through evolutionary time to perform specific tasks 
that aided in the economizing activities of our ancestors, this structural design is not absolute.  
Rather, the neural circuits which formed in response to adaptive challenges facing our ancestors 
are susceptible to cultural influences, hierarchical arrangements, and organizational elaboration.  
So, although it is inescapable that biological forces shaped a fixed neural structure that guides 
and limits humans’ abilities in the present day, naturally formed cultural variables in 
corporations moderate the activation of these neural circuits in ordinary business social contract 
situations. 
This dissertation attempts to inform the business ethics field with insights from 
evolutionary psychology by examining business respondents’ behavior when confronted with a 
social contract situation that involves cheating.  En route to this goal, the research project 
empirically tests for the presence of cheater-detection/social-contract neural algorithms in a 
sample of business practitioners and undergraduate business students, as an extension of the 
research conducted by evolutionary psychologists, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby.  Based on 
the theoretical groundwork laid by evolutionary psychology and other natural science disciplines, 
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the study examined whether human brain circuits are structured to recognize one specific type of 
social relationship in firms— agency arrangements. 
Ultimately, this study’s central thesis is: Although corporate agents’ minds are 
biologically evolved to identify cheaters in social contract situations, the neural circuits 
responsible for detecting these breaches are influenced by organizational and cultural 
components that affect the individuals’ perceptions of the terms of the exchange.   Results from 
the main study empirically confirm that cheater-detection algorithms are present within a 
business population but that these “hardwired” circuits are moderated by cultural influences in 
business organizations.  Implications for organizations and ethical decision making are offered 
and discussed.   
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview and Statement of the Problem 
 
“Human beings exist wholly within nature as part of natural order in every respect.”—
Jane Jacobs, 2000 
 
 Business firms are an outgrowth of natural processes.  Their formation, maintenance, and 
survival are made possible by the physical, biological, and psychological machinery of nature.  
Corporations originated as a means to an end.  What may not be easily accomplished by 
individuals alone may be quite feasible when the efforts of several individuals are combined 
toward a single purpose or mission.    Throughout evolutionary time, individuals achieved goals 
by entering into exchanges with other individuals in their social group (i.e., tribe or band).   
Organizations serve a similar purpose by facilitating humans’ ability to economize in their 
natural world.  The very existence of business firms depends upon the anti-entropic tendencies of 
the agents who comprise the organization.  Individuals working in business organizations are 
driven by biological impulses and motivations which affect the way they interact with each other 
and respond to environmental forces.  “Their decisions and policies are molded…by complex 
environmental natural forces over which they exert little or no direct rational control…” 
(Frederick, 2004: 145).  Corporations sustain themselves by virtue of the persistence of the 
firm’s independent agents to cumulatively economize.  One way for a firm’s agents to 
economize effectively is to engage in social exchange relationships. 
Organizations are also described as a nexus of contracts, whether they take the form of 
written agreements or informal understandings (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).   For any 
organization to function properly, these binding agreements between two or more parties must be 
upheld.  They are a necessary feature of firms, without which achievement of organizational 
goals would be impossible (Robinson, Kraatz, & Rousseau, 1994).   The breaking of agreements 
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 between individuals is widely recognized in organizational life as a serious impediment to an 
efficiently operating organization (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Social contract theorists have also 
wrestled with this problem in organizational settings when breaches of social contracts between 
two parties are caused by either party’s dishonoring of the contract terms (Donaldson, 1989).  If 
individuals who form these agreements with each other in organizational settings are biologically 
equipped to interact contractually in a certain way, it is not difficult to believe that evolutionary 
forces are in part responsible for the formation and failure of relationships in firms. 
The international news is littered with reports of cheating behavior in business 
organizations.  This phenomenon, while not new by any means, recently has received more 
media attention and has exploded into a chronic feature of business relationships.  Certainly, the 
executives at Enron violated the social exchange relationships they had with their employees by 
telling them to hold on to their stock as they removed their own interests and watched their value 
diminish and employee pension funds become worthless.  Executives at companies like Tyco, 
Parmalat, and WorldCom also broke a similar social contract with their firms’ stakeholders when 
they falsely reported earnings at their respective companies for personal gain.  These examples 
are not isolated, nor are they representative of all the social exchange infractions taking place in 
the ordinary course of business interactions.   Cheating on social contracts can be found in many 
various business practices and may constitute an epidemic given the impact these unethical acts 
have on those affected.  Thus, it is important to examine social contract situations in business 
where cheating is taking place to understand why these breaches occur.    
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 1.2 Purpose and Research Questions 
 
“The motive of the drama of human life is the necessity, laid upon every man who comes 
into the world, of discovering the mean between self-assertion and self-restraint suited to 
his character and his circumstances.”—Thomas Huxley, Evolution and Ethics
 
This dissertation research project takes the position that there is a biological basis to 
social contract formation in business and to social contract dissolution.  Its stance is that 
individuals cannot escape the natural forces that govern these relationships, by rite that these 
forces have on the structuring of the neural architecture of the human brain.  While it is argued in 
this project that the neural algorithms in the brain are formed through evolutionary time to 
perform specific tasks that aided in the economizing activities of our ancestors, this structural 
design is not absolute.  Rather, the neural circuits which formed in response to adaptive 
challenges facing our ancestors are susceptible to cultural influences, hierarchical arrangements, 
and organizational elaboration.  So, although it is inescapable that biological forces shaped a 
fixed neural structure that guides and limits humans’ abilities in the present day, naturally 
formed cultural variables in corporations moderate the activation of these neural circuits in 
ordinary business social contract situations.   
An ongoing debate ensues in the evolutionary psychology field.  One side argues that the 
brain is composed of a fixed neural architecture that formed in prehistoric times to solve adaptive 
problems facing our ancestors.  Natural selection informed the design of these circuits, which 
have remained relatively unchanged since the Pleistocene period.  The other side argues that the 
neural circuits are malleable and are activated in and employed in a variety of ways dependent 
upon the symbolic interpretation of one’s own environment.   It is the posture taken in this 
dissertation that both perspectives warrant attention.  While neither view explicitly rejects the 
other, I argue that neither is complete without the other.   The former view, advocated by Leda 
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 Cosmides and John Tooby, allows room for cultural variation.  This dissertation takes the stance 
that a more comprehensive understanding of social exchanges in business contexts can be 
achieved by leaving the door open to the possibility that the neural algorithms in the brain are not 
stoic to the point of being unaffected by cultural influences (Ridley, 2003). 
This dissertation attempts to inform the business ethics field with insights from 
evolutionary psychology by examining business respondents’ behavior when confronted with a 
social contract situation that involves cheating.  En route to this goal, my dissertation research 
project empirically tests for the presence of cheater-detection/social-contract neural algorithms in 
a sample of business practitioners and undergraduate business students, as an extension of the 
research conducted by evolutionary psychologists, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby.  Based on 
the theoretical groundwork laid by evolutionary psychology and other natural science disciplines, 
I examined whether human brain circuits are structured to recognize one specific type of social 
relationship in firms— agency arrangements.  The agency problem—the dilemma of not having 
an agent behave in the way directed by the principal—“exists in all organizations and in all 
cooperative efforts—at every level of management in firms…” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 309).  
The agency relationship serves merely as an interesting, common organizational arrangement in 
modern-day businesses for this study and thus, is the study’s behavioral context.   
In this line of inquiry, the major research questions explored were: 
A. Is there evidence that the minds of individuals in a business population evolved to 
recognize social exchanges in a business context? 
B. Are social-contract algorithms among business students and practitioners activated in a 
manner consistent with research findings from the evolutionary psychology literature? 
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 C. What cultural variables could be responsible for moderating the activation of the social-
contract algorithms in a business population?   
Ultimately, this dissertation’s central thesis is: Although corporate agents’ minds are 
biologically evolved to identify cheaters in social contract situations, the neural circuits 
responsible for detecting these breaches are influenced by organizational and cultural 
components that affect the individuals’ perceptions of the terms of the exchange.   
 
1.3. Research Project Goals 
 
“…the initiators of the Scientific Revolution worked to clear away the passive impedimenta of 
old beliefs.  Breaking through the inertia of ages is no easy task, for incumbency brings 
enormous advantages…”—Stephen Jay Gould, 2003 
 
 The use of biology and the natural sciences as an explanatory tool for business behavior 
is not foreign to organizational literature (Pierce & White, 1999; Lovins, Lovins, & Hawken, 
1999; Petzinger, 1999; Jacobs, 2000; Lawrence & Nohria, 2002).  Arguably however, little 
conceptual integration has been accomplished in organizational theory.  Never before have the 
discoveries from evolutionary psychology been applied to business contexts; nor has a business 
population ever been tested using the assumptions and methodology from evolutionary 
psychology.  The first major goal of this dissertation is to introduce the Cosmides and Tooby 
approach to business and society.  Their work and research stream has been validated and 
respected in the evolutionary psychology literature for years (Dennett, 1995; Gaulin & 
McBurney, 2001).  It has been used to discover how individuals reason through social dilemmas 
involving cooperation, punishment, reciprocity, and cheating.  I believe their work can and 
should be extended to the business and society area.  I introduce their approach as a new way to 
view how moral choices are made in corporations.   
5 
 It follows that another potential outcome of this project is the connection of the social 
sciences with the natural sciences.  The intent is not to reject social science views on behavior, 
but rather, use insights from evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology to inform the 
Business and Society field.   Cultural variability is “data that can give insight into the structure of 
the psychological mechanism that helped generate it” (Cosmides, Tooby, & Barkow, 1992: 5).  
In other words, assumptions from the natural science view of human behavior are useful in 
explaining cultural phenomena in organizations like cheating in social contract situations.   
This research utilizes the Integrated Causal Model (ICM) as the conceptual foundation of 
human behavior, rather than the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM), which has been 
governing the social science disciplines for decades.  Essentially, the SSSM gathers its 
knowledge about human behavior and cultural phenomena from direct common human 
experiences (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).  The ICM takes a step back from social science-
dominated explanations of behavior and assumes that cultural phenomena are derived from 
natural manifestations of selection pressures acting upon our Pleistocene ancestors.  It recognizes 
that the human mind is composed of domain-specific modules that were selected evolutionarily 
to solve various adaptive problems.  One of these adaptive problems facing our ancestors was 
cooperation in social exchanges (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).   These social exchange 
mechanisms in turn, manufacture elements of human culture.  Thus, the model of human 
motivation is expanded in this dissertation from a rational choice view to one that reflects the 
social nature and biological impulses of human beings, as a strategy for finding consistency 
between evolutionary psychology and cultural explanations of behavior in the corporate world.   
Lastly, this project is an important step in expanding Cosmides and Tooby’s approach.  
Prior research in the evolutionary psychology field has only focused on situations that involve 
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 two direct exchange partners.  My project accepts the strong evidence from the numerous 
empirical studies conducted by researchers in evolutionary psychology and builds on those 
findings.  A major contribution of this study to the evolutionary psychology field is to introduce 
the agency-type arrangement to the social exchange.  To date, no work in the area has examined 
how a third party affects an individual’s ability to detect cheaters in business social contract 
situations.  Social contracting in business organizations often does not involve a direct one-on-
one exchange between two individuals.  Modern day organizational structures are likely to 
involve power differentials in the ranks of the firm that social contract rules are being evaluated 
by a third party who acts as an agent of the organization’s owner.  Our Pleistocene ancestors 
were also placed in social arrangements with power differences (Cummins, 1998).  While 
evolutionary psychology acknowledges the fact that these hierarchical relationships in social 
groups were familiar to our ancient predecessors, the field has not empirically tested the 
operation of neural algorithms related to social exchanges in this context.  Insights learned from 
my study can be applied to the existing breadth of knowledge accumulated in the evolutionary 
psychology field by taking into account the effects of an organization’s structure and culture on 
the activation of the brain’s neural algorithms.  As I test for the presence of social-contract 
algorithms in a business population, thereby seeing if Cosmides’ theory is applicable to the study 
of organizations, it is important to be aware of the influence of organizational culture on the 
sensitivity of neural algorithms to business-type social contract exchanges.  The personal and 
psychological perceptions of social contracting parties that moderate these circuits are explored 
in my work.    
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 1.4. Dissertation Outline 
  
The study is reported in seven remaining chapters.  Chapter 2 lays the broad theoretical 
groundwork of natural science approaches to human behavior and serves as the exposition to a 
more detailed discussion of evolutionary psychology and cognitive neuroscience in Chapter 3.  
Specifically, Cosmides and Tooby’s framework and main arguments are presented in the third 
chapter, followed by a critical assessment of their theory.  It is here that the cultural components 
of the evolutionary psychology approach are presented.  Chapter 4 moves from the conceptual 
analysis of evolutionary psychology into a discussion of the empirical methods and research 
designs employed by researchers in this area.  The Wason selection task is described, discussed, 
and criticized in this section.   In Chapter 5 the hypotheses for the main empirical study are 
offered, outlining the proposed relationships among the constructs.  The operationalization of the 
theoretical constructs into the independent and dependent variables used in the study is explained 
as well.  The next chapter details the methodology and research design employed in this 
dissertation.  My adapted Wason selection task instrument is presented.  A summary of this 
project’s two pilot studies and their results is given to demonstrate how the final revision of the 
scenarios emerged.  Chapter 7 provides an in-depth description of the results of the hypothesis 
testing.  Here the data are statistically analyzed with analysis of variance technique and 
subsequent Z-tests.   Finally, Chapter 8 discusses the results and interprets their meaning.  
Potential explanations of the data results include a discussion of methodological limitations, 
theoretical weaknesses, and intervening cultural influences.  Implications for business ethics 
research are proffered and propositions for future research involving insights from both 
evolutionary psychology and organizational theory are made.   
 
 
8 
 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 An appropriate starting point for this dissertation project is with an explanation of 
evolution itself; focusing first on the utility living organisms derive from evolution’s processes.  
The chapter begins with a discussion of the laws of thermodynamics, which provides the basis 
for understanding nature’s tendencies toward chaos and disorder.  The means for arresting 
physical reality’s constant drift to disorganization in the short-term are covered next with a 
discussion of the driving force behind evolution—natural selection.  Here, the basic background 
of evolutionary biology is presented.  The theory is described in terms of how physical features 
are formed through natural selection, but also in the context of other adaptive pressures facing 
our ancestors.  The chapter ends with a description of the specific adaptive challenges related to 
social exchange as a stepping stone to Chapter 3 on evolutionary psychology. 
 
2.1. Thermodynamics: Time’s Destructive Drift 
 
 “You cannot step twice into the same river, for other waters are continually 
flowing on.” –Heraclitus 
 
2.1.1. Natural Systems 
 
Life is in constant flux.  In open systems, there exists a continuous exchange of energy in 
the environment.  Transformation of energy from one form into another occurs in an ongoing 
cycle (Baskin, 1998).  The ebb and flow of energy transformation takes place in all living 
systems, all going in a single direction.  Through the arrow of time, all life forms drift toward 
their ultimate fate—death and disorder.  This is the end-state equilibrium for all species on the 
planet, including humans.  Despite this long-range prognosis, humans have become adept at 
staving off the inevitable through short-run management techniques that preserve order and 
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 sustain life. Paradoxically, the same processes that lead to death are the keys to ordered life as 
well. Business organizations are a natural manifestation of life’s anti-entropic tendencies 
(Frederick, 2004).  
The laws of thermodynamics are concerned with energy transformation.  Definitions of 
systems and their boundaries and the evaluation of energy flows in isolated systems make up the 
main foci of thermodynamics (Ruth, 1993: 51).  Attention in thermodynamics is typically on the 
interior, closed system.  “It is the purpose of thermodynamics to find general relations among the 
thermodynamic coordinates which are consistent with the principle of the conservation of 
energy…” (Zemansky, 1937: 23-24).  However, these closed systems are in constant contact 
with their environment.  Conservation of energy and the stabilization of coordinates are 
impossible in the long-term.  Organisms can change spontaneously or by dint of interaction with 
their external surroundings.  Technically, when no external force in the environment and no 
internal transformation of energy are taking place, the closed system is said to be in mechanical 
equilibrium.  This is a short-lived phenomenon in nature, indeed.  Rather, as time progresses, 
natural systems are subject to continuous change.  The transformation of energy by an organism 
from a useful form to a form which provides less utility for the organism leads to a state of 
change.  In closed systems, energy is wasted and lost to the environment.  While energy can 
never be completely destroyed, it dissipates and constantly transforms into different forms.  Over 
time, organisms drift toward an altered state.  
 
2.1.2. Entropy & Thermodynamic Equilibrium: The Second Law of Thermodynamics 
These natural processes as dictated by the laws of thermodynamics are irreversible.  
Neither the organism, nor the environment in which the organism exists can return to their initial 
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 states (Zemansky, 1937).  The procession from the organism’s original state to its final state is 
unavoidable.  The final state is thermodynamic equilibrium.  This is the point at which a system 
has exhausted all of its change potential.  The means to this end is the process of entropy.  
Entropy is “a quantity that relentlessly grows with dissipation and attains its maximum value 
when all the potential for further work is spent” (Coveney & Highfield, 1990: 151).  It represents 
the “transformation content” of physical processes.   The arrow of time is clearly pointing 
towards disorder, degradation, and thermodynamic equilibrium—the point at which all change 
ceases to occur, or when all energy has been transformed.  Thermodynamic equilibrium is the 
point when entropy has reached its greatest quantitative value in a given system.  Entropy, as 
expressed in the Second Law of Thermodynamics, is essentially what happens through time as 
all energy and matter evolves toward the end state equilibrium.  “Increasing entropy is a sign of 
the progression of time” (Coveney & Highfield, 1990: 149).  As closed systems interact with 
their environment, the relationship becomes disordered and dysfunctional.  Essentially, entropy 
represents a system’s capacity for change and continuously increases through time. 
The second law holds that “all physical processes are irreversible” because in open 
systems (like the ecosystem) some energy is always lost to the environment as heat (Coveney & 
Highfield, 1990: 148).  This energy cannot be retrieved.  Through evolutionary time, energy and 
matter move towards maximum disintegration (Frederick, 1995: 50). Energy and matter cannot 
be completely destroyed, however.  They are merely transformed into another state.  According 
to this law, physical systems move away from organized states to states of maximum disorder 
(Feynman, Leighton, & Sands, 1963).  As energy is lost to the environment, this degradation 
occurs. 
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 2.1.3. Organizations as a Temporary Solution: The First Law of Thermodynamics 
The principle of energy conservation applied to a thermodynamic system and its 
environment is the first law.  Based on this principle, the first law is broken down into two sub-
principles: 1) Energy cannot completely be created or destroyed and, 2) Energy in closed 
systems remains constant over time even though it metamorphoses into a different type 
(Zemansky, 1937: 50).  The First Law of Thermodynamics states that “energy will always be 
conserved in a physical process…” although it does get converted into different forms (Coveney 
& Highfield, 1990: 150).  The fact that living systems are able to continue to work and operate, 
despite processes dictated by the second law, suggests that a source of internal energy exists to 
sustain closed systems in the short-term.  Thermodynamics does not describe this source of 
internal energy but recognizes that it maintains systems.        
Put another way, living systems are able to self-create and renew themselves.  
Autopoiesis is the “capacity for self-reproduction through a closed system of relations” (Baskin, 
1998: 253).  All organisms, as types of closed systems, respond to changes in their environment 
by finding ways to regulate and manufacture sources of energy necessary to survive.  Along the 
way towards the end state equilibrium, life naturally staves off entropy in an ongoing battle of 
wills and wits.  Entropy has the will; life has the wits.  If entropy alone were to act upon living 
organisms, then life would not exist for long.  Life contradicts the second law by holding entropy 
at bay, albeit temporarily. Self-organization is the process underlying non-equilibrium 
thermodynamics which provides the means to which organized structures form in the midst of 
increasing disorder (Coveney & Highfield, 1990).  
Functional order as described in the first law does not spontaneously manifest itself, 
however.  Darwin recognized the fact that life forms are subject to forces which cause ultimate 
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 degradation.  He spoke of self-contained organization within individual members of a species in 
terms of the preservation and accumulation of variation.  “This improvement inevitably leads to 
the gradual advancement of the organization of the greater number of living beings throughout 
the world” (Darwin, 1859:122).  According to Tooby, Cosmides, and Barrett (2003), Darwin’s 
theory of natural selection was the solution to the thermodynamic problem outlined by the 
second law.  Physical systems are organized in such a way as to allow themselves to maintain 
and propagate.  When the order of some organisms is degraded, the chances of reproduction and 
maintenance over time decreases.  The closed system designs that effectively interact with a 
stable environment are the ones that are more likely to reproduce themselves.   
Thermodynamic systems analysis can be applied to machines, biology, or economic 
systems.  “An economy receives material and energy inputs from its environment and provides 
outputs to its environment” (Ruth, 1993: 48).  By virtue of the second law, efficiency of energy 
transformation is constrained on the growth of economic and ecological systems.  Entities must 
find ways to conserve energy and transform energy inputs into useful outputs.  One of those 
ways is discussed next. 
Economizing is the process of taking energy from one’s environment and transforming it 
into useful work (Frederick, 1995: 31).  It is essentially the natural process offsetting the end-
state equilibrium condition.  The second law allows for temporary interruptions of the entropic 
process, which is called economizing (Frederick, 1995: 38).   Temporary cycles in the rhythm of 
time allow for life to self-organize and develop ways to avoid the end-state equilibrium a little 
longer.  The particular form that economizing structures and behaviors take is dependent on the 
evolutionary process.  Natural selection informs economizing.  “Selection is the only known 
counterweight to the tendency of physical systems to lose rather than grow functional 
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 organization” (Tooby, Cosmides, & Barrett, 2003: 858).  Evolutionary biology demonstrates that 
organisms which adaptively fit their environment are favored by natural selection.  The best at 
staving off entropy by self-organizing, or economizing, will propagate its species.  Evolutionary 
biology is explained in more detail in the next section. 
 
2.2. Theories of Adaptive Function: Evolutionary Biology and Natural Selection 
2.2.1. Evolutionary Theory 
 Evolutionary theory, as originally conceived by Lamarck (1809) and Chambers (1844) 
and later developed by Charles Darwin (1859), describes a detailed process of how species are 
continually designed and developed.  Darwin himself referred to his theory as a doctrine of 
“modification” (445).  In his The Origin of Species, he implies that all living organisms, 
including humans, are designed through an accumulation of features over time.  He envisioned a 
tree of life, where as modifications in species accumulated through generations, a new branch 
grew to signify a different species altogether.  In this sense, Darwin believed his theory to be 
progressive—organisms further out on the tree of life were thought to be more complicated and 
more highly developed than organisms that appeared on the tree’s earliest branches (Hull, 2002).  
Scientific confirmation for evolution can be found in various disciplines in the life sciences 
including geology, paleontology, and genetics.  The evidence is strong and immutable that 
evolution through variation is the cause of the origin of species (Dennett, 1995).   
 Once Darwin demonstrated (through a vast collection of plant and animal specimens and 
arguments drawn therein) that species surely evolve, his attention turned to the mechanisms by 
which evolution is driven.  If every present day species is descendent from a common ancestor, 
then how did the changes occur?  To begin with, it must be understood that evolution is an 
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 adaptive theory.  In other words, “species exist because only certain arrays of forms are adapted 
to the environment they occupy” (Ridley, 1985: 93).   In order for a species to adapt to its 
surroundings, individual members and groups of members must be able to survive the conditions 
facing them.  Features of living organisms are the result of adaptations to the environment 
(Futuyma, 1979).  Herbert Spencer coined the term, “survival of the fittest,” which came to mean 
that only organisms capable of manipulating and exploiting their environment (often in direct 
competition with other species’ members) were able to sexually reproduce themselves and thus 
sustain the species (Hull, 2002).   Adaptation indicates a successful design for life at a certain 
moment in time. When physical traits are well-designed to increase the likelihood that its 
possessor survives the trials and tribulations of the environment, an adaptation has occurred 
(Ridley, 1985).  Specifically, the inanimate mechanism that Darwin deemed responsible for these 
gradual changes in the blueprints of species is natural selection. 
 This insight that all designs of living organisms are the product of a mindless process—a 
“blind watchmaker,” as Richard Dawkins called it (1976)—is critical to understanding how 
revisions in species have emerged over time (Dennett, 1995: 188).  Driven by changes in the 
conditions of life, natural selection is an active mechanism responsible for “profitable variations” 
in the designs of creatures (Darwin, 1859: 89).  Natural selection is essentially “design with 
modification.”  Darwin described the importance of natural selection by referring to the adaptive 
advantages which result from the process.   
“…as all the inhabitants of each country are struggling together with nicely balanced 
forces, extremely slight modifications of the same kind would often still further increase 
the advantage, as long as the species continued under the same conditions of life and 
profited by similar means of subsistence and defence” (1859: 89).         
 
 Natural selection crafts these modifications and ultimately, adaptations.  Over countless 
generations, the process designs organisms that are continuously better suited to cope with the 
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 current environment.  Each design modification serves a particular purpose, or function for 
coping with the surroundings.  These new designs are transferred from one generation to the next 
through sexual reproduction.  Useful traits to a species cannot be sustained by a species if its 
members do not reproduce.  So, more exactly, natural selection is the mechanism by which 
organisms create adaptations that allow them to reproduce themselves.  Gradual alterations in 
lines of descent on the tree of life are not possible without some form of reproduction (Williams, 
1997).  “Designs for reproduction are transmitted to offspring; other kinds of designs are not 
transmitted and therefore disappear” (Gaulin & McBurney, 2001: 22).     
In order to better understand what unique designs were favored by natural selection, the 
discussion now turns to those environmental conditions facing our ancestors in the Pleistocene 
Period—the period of natural history dating back 1.5 million to 11,000 years before the present.  
It was during this period that the last major glacial progression ended and Homo sapiens spread 
all over the globe.  The events of the Ice Age had a major impact on the distribution of species 
on the planet, as well as the major design features of the human species as a whole (Futuyma, 
1979: 115).  The study of the structures formed during this time period in human history is the 
mission of evolutionary biology. 
 
2.2.2. Evolutionary Biology 
Evolutionary biology “consists of the logically derivable set of causal principles that 
necessarily govern the dynamics of reproducing systems” and that are responsible for the 
properties that compose a living being (Tooby & Cosmides, 2000: 1186).  Evolutionary biology 
also identifies the principles that govern which kinds of organic features are selected for, and 
which are selected out.  The anti-entropic forces of evolution have designed a biological system 
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 for adapting to various problems our Pleistocene ancestors had to face.  Various environmental 
pressures that jeopardized survival faced our ancestors.  To deal with these adaptive problems, 
certain structures are selected for, which enable organisms to cope.  Thus, the form of the 
organism follows the function that that particular structure is designed by natural selection to 
serve.  In other words, evolution does not select for behavior.  Instead, it “only selects for 
mechanisms that produce a behavior or predispose” an organism to that behavior (Wilson, 1993: 
127).  Successful features are those which allow an organism to propagate.  Natural selection, 
evolution’s process for choosing the structures that solve adaptive challenges, engineers a fit 
between the design features of the organism and the function necessary for survival.   
 Evolutionary biologists work backwards by discovering and defining adaptive problems 
facing our ancestors and trying to deduce the physical structure needed to solve those dilemmas.  
Often times, there is more than one way to solve a dilemma, however.  “But the more precisely 
you can define the goal of processing—the more tightly you can constrain what would count as a 
solution—the more clearly you can see what a program capable of producing that solution would 
have to look like” (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000b: 1259).  This computational approach (Marr, 
1982) to information-processing problems provides “a task analysis defining what a…device 
does and why…” (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000b: 1259).  Essentially, modern evolutionary biology 
“constitutes…a foundational organism design theory, whose principles can be used to fit together 
research findings into coherent models of specific cognitive and neural mechanisms” (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 2000: 1186). 
One issue under debate in evolutionary biology concerns the level of analysis over which 
this natural selection occurs (Hull, 2002).  How is the mechanism of design modification realized 
in life forms?  The different levels of analysis under question are the gene level (building blocks 
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 level), the phenotype level (organism level), and the group level (tribes and kin).  My focus will 
be on the former two levels as discussed in the subsequent section.  Groups will be discussed 
later in the chapter when my focus switches to the adaptive challenges facing our ancestors from 
living in social groups. 
 A gene is the basic unit to natural selection.  Specifically, it is “any portion of 
chromosomal material that potentially lasts for generations to serve as a unit of natural selection” 
(Dawkins, 1976: 28).  Genes dictate the structure and function of the organisms which house 
them.  The organism is essentially a gene’s survival machine.  A gene’s survival depends on the 
efficiency of the bodies in which it lives.  Genes’ success in replicating themselves across future 
generations depends on the survival machine’s survival success.  Genes can live on indefinitely 
if they build successful survival machines, i.e., organisms, that can reproduce themselves.  The 
survival machine is programmed by natural selection to maximize the number of genes that 
survive.  Genes are in the business of programming structures and functions that fit and adapt to 
the survival machine’s environment.   
Evolution is best thought of in terms of gene competition.  Genes act for themselves; that 
is, they are programmed to replicate themselves.  Chemically, they are merely instructions that 
are able to be copied.  Genes have no direction or purpose, per se.  Their only function is to copy 
themselves (Dawkins, 1976), which is only possible if the host organisms (survival machines) 
survive the adaptive challenges facing them and are able to reproduce.  So, evolution is not 
technically at the organism level of analysis; it exists at the gene level—the building blocks of 
life.  Since genes do not “think” in terms of reasoning through situations, the term, “selfish 
gene,” popularized by Dawkins (1976), is only a metaphor for their static function and 
composition.       
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  Dawkins (1976) calls these survival machines which are the receptacle for the genes, a 
purposive machine.  This is not meant to sound deterministic because natural selection does not 
have an end-state “in mind.”  However, it does serve as another useful metaphor in that Dawkins 
claims the organisms act as if there was a grand purpose controlling their behavior.  
Consciousness evolved as a way of evaluating the discrepancies between desired states of 
existence and actual states.  Once a discrepancy, caused by entropic forces, acts upon the 
organism, the survival machine works harder to economize and overcome the gap.  Genes are the 
programmer for the organism.   
One cannot think of the gene as sole basis of evolution.  Though the groundwork (i.e., 
program) is laid out at the gene level of analysis, the survival machine, or organism, must 
survive the trials and tribulations facing it through the odyssey of life.  How do organisms 
survive in a social environment?  Dawkins admits that “kin selection and selection in favor of 
reciprocal altruism may have acted on human genes to produce many of our basic psychological 
attributes and tendencies” (p.191).  He feels that a discussion on evolution must go beyond the 
gene to include the meme, which is a replicator of human culture (See next section.).  Memes are 
essentially pieces of information that can be directly transmitted from person to person or 
generation to generation by way of culture, not the genes.  Dawkins ties the development of 
memes back to the gene.  To him, memes owe their manifestation to the programs dictated by the 
genes in the brain.  The study of memetics involves discovering what information and ideas are 
imitated from one generation to the next by the survival machines.  Any useful information to a 
person for overcoming adaptive challenges is passed down across generations and stored in the 
brain.  Memes are the vehicles through which culture is transferred in populations.  They are 
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 “instructions for carrying out behaviour, stored in brains and passed on by imitation” 
(Blackmore, 1999: 17). 
 A clever and useful way of viewing the evolutionary process in general is to think of it as 
an algorithmic design (Dennett, 1995).  Algorithms—the unit of analysis studied in this 
dissertation—are mechanical procedures or instruction manuals of evolution.  “An algorithm is a 
certain sort of formal process that can be counted on—logically—to yield a certain sort of result 
whenever it is ‘run’ or instantiated” (p. 50).  Algorithms are substrate-neutral according to 
Dennett—they operate at any level of analysis.  While they have distinct programs or formulas 
which guide the evolutionary process (natural selection), they can only produce similar results if 
they start at exactly the same initiating point.  This is an important point because it accounts for 
the fact that many different designs exist.  Intricate designs cannot be predicted from an 
algorithm, only the kind of pattern can be predicted (Blackmore, 1999: 12).  Specific neural 
algorithms will be discussed in detail in the following chapter as the discussion shifts to the 
procedures in the brain used for detecting cheaters in social exchanges. 
 
2.3. Adaptive Problem: Social Exchange 
 Some of the most important adaptive problems that faced our ancestors were to “navigate 
the social world” (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000b: 1259).  Social exchange is pervasive to human 
social life.  Social exchange is defined as “cooperation between two or more individuals for 
mutual benefit” (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989: 52).  In some capacity, social exchange occurs in 
every culture on the planet.   “Humans are disposed to be social” (Wilson, 1993: 125).  The 
reason for this innate behavior is because our ancestors were only able to solve some adaptive 
problems in their environment, collectively.   “Sociability dominates in man because individuals 
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 have evolved in ways that place their most self-centered instincts under some kind of higher 
control” (p.132).    
Humans biologically formed as hunter-gatherers who were used to life in small groups 
(Greenwood & Stini, 1977).  It was within these small groups that all exchanges took place.  
Humans’ mental capacities and physical capabilities evolved in this context for millennia.  “Our 
species spent over 99% of its evolutionary history as hunter-gatherers in Pleistocene 
environments” (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987: 280).  The conditions facing our ancestors over that 
period of time have more of an influence on the way humans are designed than do conditions in 
the modern industrialized age in which we live.  Only in recent evolutionary history did humans 
begin to interact in much larger groups.  What we must remember is that modern conditions 
could not possibly have had the time to manipulate the physical and mental structures of 
individuals.  We are currently a product of our evolutionary past, and that past was a very 
different world than it is today.  Natural selection principally allows design structures which 
offer reproductive value to organisms.  It zeroes in on an adaptive problem caused by our 
ancestral environment and addresses the problem with a particular structure.  One of the adaptive 
problems was how to interact with others (kin and non-kin) in small groups.  “The computational 
theory of social exchange suggests cognitive processes that govern human reasoning might have 
a number of design features specialized for reasoning about social exchange” (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1995: 1202).  (This theory will be covered in detail in the next chapter.) 
 
 
 
 
21 
 2.3.1. Altruism 
“As the reasoning powers and foresight…became improved, each man would soon learn from 
experience that if he aided his fellow-men, he would commonly receive aid in return”—Darwin 
(1871) 
 
 In biology, altruism occurs when a living being performs an act that benefits another 
being at the expense of the creature performing the act.  It is when someone behaves for the sake 
of someone else at a personal expense with no immediate observable benefit (Blackmore, 1999).  
With biological altruism, no conscious motive needs to underlie the behavior (Williams, 1966).  
This is quite different from philosophical notions of altruism, which are centered on the idea that 
individuals consciously behave to help others for the sake of the good of the act.  The implicit 
motive is based on the moral sensibilities of the person performing the act.  In classical 
economics, altruism was counterintuitive to the rationally self-interested human.  In evolution, 
altruism made more sense because of the purpose it served. 
 William Hamilton (1963, 1964) addressed the issue by examining individuals’ survival 
abilities in their environment.  He posited that altruism is not dispensed randomly but with 
reference to kin.  Individuals will discriminate against those organisms which do not appear to be 
close kin to the individual offering the altruistic act.  In the face of the concept “survival of the 
fittest” Hamilton argued that genes can only be spread if the gene benefits from a behavior.  It 
has little to do with whether the host of the gene benefits from a behavior.  So once again, the 
levels of analysis are the issue.  Altruistic tendencies proliferate in groups of individuals if the 
behavior is toward family members who may possess that altruist’s genes.  Thus, Hamilton 
developed his concept of inclusive fitness (1964), where the principles of survival and 
adaptability not only pertained to the individual person, but also to anyone in the group who may 
22 
 have similar genes.  Behavior that seemingly costs the altruist in some regard at the organism 
level may in fact benefit the altruist’s building blocks at the gene level of analysis.   
 Dawkins says that selfishness is good and altruism is undesirable at the gene level.  
Genes are in the business of programming structures and functions that fit and adapt the survival 
machine to its environment. A variety of behaviors will suffice for survival in many different 
circumstances.  The argument becomes focused on confusion over the level of analysis.  For 
instance, during sexual reproduction, genes compete for dominance in the formation of eggs and 
sperm (Dawkins, 1995).  Genes proliferate based on chance processes unless one gene mutates 
and biases its probability of being passed on.  This could greatly enhance the fitness of organism 
‘B’ at the expense of organism ‘A’ (Williams, 1997).  However, genes may also proliferate at the 
expense of other competing genes.  The mutant gene increases its frequency in the pool even if it 
does not have a positive effect on survival machine.  At the gene level, altruism cannot take 
place.  At the organism level, altruism in the form of kin selection and inclusive fitness is very 
much a part of human interaction.  Another type of altruism occurs naturally among individuals 
living in social groups.  That is discussed next. 
 
2.3.2. Reciprocal Altruism 
Beyond immediate kin, it makes sense from an evolutionary standpoint for social beings 
to maximize friendships and minimize antagonistic relationships with others with whom they 
interact in a social group (Williams, 1966).  Certain sentiments are useful for survival by 
regulating altruism.  Friendship, trust, and suspicion (among others) are important adaptations to 
our Pleistocene ancestors for navigating the social world.  Altruism, as demonstrated by kin 
selection, involves actually helping another individual who likely possesses similar genes.  It is 
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 also helpful to an organism to give other individuals further removed from a social group the 
impression that an altruistic act has been proffered (Wright, 1994).  Reciprocal altruism is 
“behavior that benefits another organism, not closely related, while being apparently detrimental 
to the organism performing the behavior” (Trivers, 1971: 35).  In certain circumstances, natural 
selection will favor altruistic behavioral tendencies because they benefit the living being 
performing the act.  Often, there is a time lag between the altruistic act and the return favor.   
If altruism is to evolve in our species, Trivers postulated that the cost must be small to the 
altruist and that there must be regular contact between recipient and provider.  Otherwise, 
altruism would have been selected out long ago since the costs incurred would have eliminated 
the altruistic organisms, thereby wiping out the trait within the species.  According to Trivers, 
reciprocity turns a single-iteration act (altruism) into long-range cooperative behavior between 
individuals.  Reciprocal altruism is very much a part of the human species.  It is ingrained in our 
behavior and responsible for influencing how we deal with each other in social exchanges of all 
kinds, including in business organizations.  Eons ago it may have started as kin selection but 
expanded to include others with whom our ancestors came into contact (Blackmore, 1999).  
Some theorists believe that norms of fairness and justice may be traced to this form of altruism 
(Ridley, 1996).  Certainly, there are ethical implications associated with this contention.  I will 
revisit these possible implications in the coming chapters. 
No discussion of reciprocal altruism is complete without mentioning the formal model of 
how cooperative strategies developed.  “Game theory is a branch of mathematics designed for 
studying situations where individuals have conflicting wants” (Gaulin & McBurney, 2001: 76).  
Assuming individuals are rationally self-interested, game theoretic models test what strategies 
people take when faced with distribution of benefits and harms.  One of the most famous games, 
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 the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Luce & Raiffa, 1957), has been frequently used by evolutionary 
biologists, economists, and anthropologists to analyze social interactions and selection theory 
(Bergstrom, 2002).  In this game, two players are charged with a crime.  They are separated and 
each told that they are to serve so many years in prison knowing full well that they indeed 
committed the crime.  When arrested they agree to cooperate with each other and not confess to 
the crime to the police.  Three alternative scenarios can happen in this game: the convicts can 
cooperate with one another by remaining silent to the police, both confess (defect from their 
prior agreement with one another), or one of them can confess while the other remains silent.  If 
they both cooperate, then the two convicts receive a minimum sentence.  If they both confess, 
then a moderately severe sentence is issued to both men (equally).  Finally, if one confesses and 
the other does not, the confessor gets off without any penalty while the crime partner (who 
remained silent) will serve a maximum sentence.  Obviously, the most rationally self-interested 
decision on the part of each player in the game is to defect (cheat).  “The important point is that a 
perfectly rational and selfish person will always gain by defecting” (Blackmore, 1999: 150).  
However, this statement is only true when the likelihood that the players will encounter each 
other again in the future is low or nonexistent.   
In a single-iteration game of this sort, people would rarely have the motivation to 
cooperate with one another.  Cheating on others in social contract exchanges would always 
benefit a selfish person when those players do not have a chance of interacting in future 
exchanges.  In terms of costs and benefits, a cheater confers no costs but accepts benefits, and a 
cooperator incurs a cost and confers of fraction of the benefit (Bergstrom, 2002).  Only in 
multiple-iterative games does cooperation evolve over time.  In repeated exchanges, cheaters will 
be avoided and cooperating souls will choose only to engage in social contracts with others who 
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 are willing to cooperate.  In other words, cheaters are punished by not having the opportunity to 
form alliances with others in the future since no one will contract with them again.   
Computer modelers have attempted to devise strategies for participants in multi-round 
games.  The most famous strategy, Tit-for-tat (Axelrod, 1984), describes the process of 
reciprocity in nature and provides insight into how cooperative behavior among “selfish” beings 
could have evolved through time.  Simply, Tit-for-tat mimics the behavior of the other player in 
the two-person, multi-round game.  If one person cooperated, the partner would cooperate; cheat, 
if the person observed cheating.  The evolutionarily stable strategy is the one that spreads 
through the population and dominates behavior.  In the computer models, Tit-for-tat was the only 
approach that expanded in numbers in the population. 
What does this tell us about reciprocally altruistic behavior in societies?  For one thing, 
cooperation evolved as a benefit to individuals or groups.  Altruism in this sense is not really 
altruistic at all in terms of consciously helping others because the underlying motivation is 
simply to benefit the self (Blackmore, 1999).  In the strictest biological sense at the gene level of 
analysis, altruism is individually instrumental.  That is all.  Again, by taking the perspective of a 
higher level of analysis, other explanations begin to appear.  Before I describe the neural 
processes that must be in place to facilitate cooperative behavior in humans, I will briefly discuss 
another possibility for altruism in human society.    
Susan Blackmore (1999) offers an explanation of how helpful, altruistic behavior can 
proliferate and become desirable in a population.  Generous behavior is spread through the 
population of a species via memes.  Her memetic theory of altruism is based on the fact that 
altruistic people are preferred by others in a group and those altruistic individuals are more likely 
to be copied or mimicked by others in the group.  Memes then become the mechanism by which 
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 altruism is transferred.  Since people are able to imitate the behavior of others and since altruistic 
behavior is desirable for successful social exchanges, the trait is spread.  Blackmore suggests that 
“the possessors of the best memes will have a survival advantage,” which (as I have shown 
earlier in this chapter) will increase the probability that those individuals will sexually reproduce 
(1999: 159).  Ultimately, this implies that genes and memes co-evolve and affect each other.  If 
we are to believe in this high level of interaction of evolutionary variables, then the nature versus 
nurture debate almost becomes a moot point.   
 
2.4. Nature-Nurture Debate 
 
“It’s time to drop the either-or dichotomy of nature-nurture and to confront just what this 
fusion of consciousness, cognition, culture, and biology that we call “human” is really 
all about.”—Niles Eldredge, 1995 
 
 Before proceeding to the literature review and theoretical background of evolutionary 
psychology in Chapter 3, a relevant issue to this project must be addressed.  The theory that is 
advocated and used in this dissertation very much hinges on the outcome of the nature-nurture 
debate.  Unfortunately, it is not a neat and clear-cut argument.  The resolution over which has a 
more significant influence on human behavior and the development of species is a hotly 
contested issue in the life sciences.  Chronically, the social sciences have been plagued by the 
restrictive idea that human behavior is the result of biology or culture (Greenwood & Stini, 
1977).  Dividing nature and nurture in this manner is an unrealistic way of viewing the 
influences on our behavior.  The common nature-nurture-dichotomy approach to understanding 
human behavior is inadequate and must be expanded.   
This dissertation does not entertain the notion that features of individuals are the result of 
either a biological factor or a cultural factor.  Rather, I argue that there is a high level of gene and 
27 
 environment interaction contributing to the fit of organisms to their environment (Gaulin & 
McBurney, 2001).  In the earliest stages of human evolution, culture and physical (and, mental) 
evolution went hand-in-hand (Eldredge, 1995).  About two million years ago, culture began to be 
a significant force over the pure physical and genetic factors governing ancestral human 
behavior.  Later in our species’ development, culture began to take on a more profound influence 
on how we dealt with our ecological environment.  Over time, these changes accumulated.  As 
our environment changed through the millennia, certain traits were less useful in adapting to the 
conditions.  Other traits achieved greater success depending on the ecological context as well.  
Environmental conditions mandated change, which was conferred by our species’ culture in 
addition to its genetic capacities.  “Biological and cultural evolution definitely are biased toward 
the…new, improved version of an existing structure, or cultural artifact, that simply works better 
than the preexisting version” (Eldredge, 1995: 36).   
Biological and cultural evolution operate concurrently on the species; the former 
progressing by the transfer of heritable traits from generation to generation through sexual 
reproduction, and the latter through the accumulated database of knowledge passed on through 
learned experience.  Both are powerful agents of change.  While biological evolution enables 
humans (and other species) to adapt to the environment, cultural evolution has become our 
particular species’ mode of adapting to the environment.   
To navigate and survive in a world of social interactions, our ancestors needed to adapt 
mentally to the new world order.  In the next chapter, I will outline the theory that explains the 
psychological mechanisms of human behavior.  Human social behavior (the focus of my study) 
is the product of perceptual cues from the environment and hardwired psychological mechanisms 
formed by natural selection through evolutionary time (Pierce & White, 1999: 843).  It is not a 
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 stretch to claim that the nature and nature controversy is beginning to be resolved.  The common 
ground discovered by both camps is the view that organisms and environment interact to a great 
degree.  Nature and nurture “play a duet rather than one directing the performance of the other” 
(Plomin, 1994: 40).  
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 3. COSMIDES’ SOCIAL CONTRACT ALGORITHM THEORY 
The driving theory of this dissertation, Cosmides’ social-contract algorithms theory, is 
presented in this chapter.  The chapter begins by describing the approach to psychology on which 
the theory is based—evolutionary psychology.  Generated by the assumptions and propositions 
of evolutionary biology, links are drawn from evolutionary psychology to the processes of 
natural selection and adaptation.  Then, an overview of the approach is offered before launching 
into a detailed description of Cosmides and Tooby’s theory of social-contract and cheater-
detection algorithms on which my study is based.  En route to discovering how people came to 
solve the adaptive problem of social exchange, I will explain how natural selection designed the 
human mind through an interaction of cultural and biological influences.  Alternative views of 
the mind’s design are acknowledged in this chapter as well, in an effort to broaden the 
perspective on social exchanges in business.  This view of evolutionary psychology will be 
useful to determine its viability as an approach for business ethics. 
 
3.1. The Integrated Causal Model of the Human Mind 
 To focus the remaining discussion on the formation and design of the human mind 
through evolutionary processes, a good starting point becomes defining the model of mind being 
advocated here.  It is orthodox in the social sciences to view the human brain as an amalgamation 
of various experiences, that environmental and social forces (i.e., culture) are primarily 
responsible for all of the content in the brain.  Tooby and Cosmides (1992) define this view as 
the Standard Social Science Model of human cognition.  In this view of the workings of the 
human mind, there exist a few general-purpose brain circuits which are perfectly malleable by 
content.  In other words, the brain is composed of content-independent brain algorithms which 
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 have no specific instructions as to how to accomplish certain tasks.   (The content of the brain 
domains will be discussed later in this chapter.)  In terms of the nature-nurture debate, advocates 
of the Standard Social Science Model side with nurture.  To resolve differences in the debate, I 
utilize the Integrated Causal Model, which seeks unification between the two camps by 
discovering universality of human behavior at the evolved psychological mechanism level, rather 
than in explicit cultural behaviors (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000a: 5). 
 The Integrated Causal Model recognizes that “the human mind consists of a set of 
evolved information-gathering mechanisms…which are produced by natural selection over 
evolutionary time in ancestral environments.  Many of these mechanisms are functionally 
specialized to produce behavior that solves particular adaptive problems, such as…cooperation” 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1992: 24).  Some of the content-specific specifications in the algorithmic 
design of the brain “generate some of the particular content of human culture, including certain 
behaviors” (24).  “On this view, culture is the manufactured product of evolved psychological 
mechanisms situated in individuals living in groups” (24).   
To understand the evolution of the human mind, the Integrated Causal Model is 
necessary.  The brain is formed by complex functional adaptations to the social environment in 
which our ancestors lived.  “Complex functional adaptations…require multiple genetic features 
to build a complex interdependent system in the phenotype” (Yudkowsky, 2002: 2).  Fitness 
depends greatly on the regularity of both the organism’s external environment and the genetic 
environment.  So, adaptations can only occur when a previous adaptation is genetically present 
consistently and when a certain external environment configuration exists over time.  In addition 
to speaking to the interaction of nature and nurture, this insight also gives the context for 
evolutionary psychology.  During the Pleistocene period, our ancestors were faced with adaptive 
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 challenges involving social interaction.  Over eons, this type of external environmental challenge 
remained largely unchanged allowing any genetic adaptations to spread through the population.   
It should be emphasized that the SSSM and the ICM come to two very different 
conclusions about the formation of the human mind.  The former views the mind as a veritable 
blank slate (Pinker, 2002), where the circuits of the brain simply absorb knowledge accumulated 
by culture, thereby erasing any specialized mechanisms for dealing with specific problems.  
Content populates the brain’s circuits only through external environmental experiences.  The 
competing ICM view claims that “the neurally based learning capacities of humans include 
specializations that evolved among our foraging ancestors to solve the specific adaptive 
problems posed by the statistical and causal structure of the ancestral world” (Lieberman et al, 
2002:1).  The specializations embedded in the neural architecture of the brain contribute to the 
generation of culture and that culture will cause a variance from the baseline behavior (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1992).  
The past explains the present according to evolutionary psychologists.  For the kind of 
cooperation between two individuals described in chapter 2 to evolve and spread in a population, 
the brain must evolve particular circuits responsible for performing specific tasks related to 
social exchange.  In evolutionary game theory, Tit-for-tat is considered an evolutionarily stable 
strategy because environmental and genetic conditions persisted long enough for the tendency to 
cooperate to proliferate throughout the human population.   
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 3.1.1. Revisiting the Level of Analysis Problem 
 To study human behavior using evolutionary insights, it is critical to resist the urge to 
draw a direct relationship between evolution and observed behavior.  Instead, evolutionary 
theory should be used “as a heuristic guide for the discovery of innate psychological 
mechanisms” (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987: 279).  Cosmides posits throughout her research that 
natural selection and evolutionary theory are not useful in drawing a typology of human 
behaviors.  The social sciences, on the other hand, tend to operate at this level of manifested 
behavior.  Thus, there is another way of looking at natural selection, through another level of 
analysis.  In no way does natural selection predict human behavioral outcomes.  In fact, natural 
selection very clearly demonstrates that human behavior will be highly variable.   Natural 
selection would not be possible if variation did not occur in species (Elderedge, 1995).  Since 
this variation occurs at the cognitive level of analysis as well, natural selection can also be 
observed in human brains.  While natural selection does not predict nor define function, it is a 
process that operates on variations of features, selecting for survival the particular forms that 
enable adaptations.  The variations that are selected out of a species are the ones that became 
obsolete in aiding the survival of the organisms.  So, to be accurate about the model of natural 
selection and its relationship to evolved behaviors, an extra step needs to be acknowledged.  
Proximate causation occurs at the psychological mechanism level of analysis (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1987).  Evolution leads to the formation of psychological mechanisms, which then leads 
to behavior.  Design features are examined by the theory; not specific behavior.  Evolutionary 
psychology is the approach that examines those evolved psychological mechanisms. 
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 3.2. The Evolutionary Psychology Approach: The Design of the Mind 
Evolutionary psychology is an approach or way of thinking about any field in the 
psychology paradigm, so that its basic tenets can be applied to sensation, consciousness, 
learning, motivation, social behavior, and cognition (Gaulin & McBurney, 2001).  It is a branch 
of biology governed by the principles discussed in the previous chapter.  The same natural 
selection processes that design the physical features of organisms’ bodies design the structure of 
the mind as well.  Physical forms evolved from the functions they serve for the organism who 
possesses them.  Essentially, evolutionary psychology is the integration of evolutionary biology, 
biological anthropology, and cognitive psychology (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).  The insights of 
evolutionary biology form the foundation of cognitive neuroscience to explain how the structure 
of the human brain evolved through time.   “By providing the functional engineering 
specifications to which human brains were built to conform, evolutionary biology” can help in 
understanding the cognitive architecture of the brain (Tooby & Cosmides, 2000: 1186).  
Essentially, the approach taken by evolutionary cognitive neuroscientists is to reverse-engineer 
the brain.  Since the design features of the brain are evident and available for observation, the 
strategy for understanding how the brain works comes from an investigation into the functions 
which the structure serves.   
Overall, the evolutionary psychology research program is interested in the broad array of 
problem-solving devices in the brain, each evolved by natural selection to perform exact tasks.  
In order to comprehend how these circuits operate and interact with one another, it is necessary 
to first understand what functions each circuit served our foraging ancestors (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1999).  The traits and structures we observe today needed to be advantageous to our 
ancestors for adapting to their environment.  Based on this key assumption, the first task of 
cognitive neuroscientists becomes deducing in what conditions our ancestors lived.  Cognitive 
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 neuroscience “is the study of the design of minds that were produced by the evolutionary 
process” (Cosmides & Tooby, 1995: 1202).   
 
3.3. How Do Humans Reason? 
 An ongoing debate in the psychology field is over how humans reason through dilemmas.  
More specifically, evolutionary psychologists have been deliberating over how to explain logical 
reasoning abilities in individuals.  Early on in the quest for insight into how people reason, 
researchers thought that adult individuals reason using formal logic procedures absent of context 
and deductive in nature (Henle, 1962).  Through repeated studies utilizing the Wason selection 
task (discussed in detail in the following chapter), the ability to reason through abstract formal 
logic problems have proven to be quite difficult for most individuals (Wason, 1966; Griggs & 
Cox, 1982).  Even with experience, reasoning through abstract, formal logic tasks, individuals 
cannot consistently perform the tasks with any proficiency (Manktelow & Evans, 1979).   Thus, 
the pursuit of knowledge about humans’ reasoning abilities stopped perilously short regarding 
formal logic procedures.   
 
3.3.1. Pragmatic Reasoning 
   Emerging out of this failure to account for individuals’ reasoning abilities through 
formal logic procedures and prior experiences, a new theory was offered.  While the 
aforementioned theories were based on deductive reasoning, where generalities are made from 
inferred knowledge about particular instances, this alternative view is inductive in nature.  Cheng 
and Holyoak (1985) proposed that logical reasoning comes from pragmatic reasoning schemas.  
They argue that our ancestors had to consistently discover practical solutions to everyday 
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 problems, and that the brain is structured according to the classes of goals that had to be attained 
for survival.  This is significantly different in a qualitative sense from the formal logic view, and 
also somewhat removed from what Cosmides and Tooby postulate (as we will see in the next 
section).  “The schematic structures that guide everyday reasoning are primarily the products of 
induction from recurring experience with classes of goal-related situations” (Cheng & Holyoak, 
1985: 414).  The schemas are made up of general rules sensitive to situational context and are 
sorted by desirable actions.  The set of rules derived from these practical schemas are believed to 
be useful in predicting outcomes in very specific situations (Markovits & Savary, 1992).  How 
people practically interpret environmental situations or dilemmas forms the basis of reasoning 
rules in the brain.  To survive, humans through evolutionary time had to be able to solve 
problems facing them, achieve objectives, and comprehend cause-and-effect relationships.  The 
schemas which enable these interpretations are universal to human brain structures.  This 
universality does not exist at the level of human behavior but at the level of phenotypic (i.e., 
organism) design. 
 Despite this universality across the species, pragmatic reasoning schemas are not the only 
type of algorithm responsible for reasoning, according to Cheng and Holyoak.  Additional and 
alternatively primed circuits can be activated within different social groups of people.  The 
authors “invoke content-dependent computational mechanisms to explain reasoning performance 
that varies across domains” as does Cosmides in her research (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000b: 1266).   
Cheng and Holyoak argue that human reasoning is a multi-faceted generalized skill that is 
flexible enough to be useful in a variety of situations.  Their only stipulation is that the schemas 
responsible for this reasoning are governed by the need to be pragmatic rather than abstractly 
“logical.”   
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  This competing theory solicits the belief that social contract rules are actually part of a 
larger category—permission rules.  Permission schemas operate under the premise that actions 
are dependent on preconditions.  According to permission rules, if an action is to be taken, a 
precondition must be satisfied first.  Although social contracts are discussed later, it is worth 
noting that social contracts are one form of permission rule but not all permission rules are social 
contracts.  Permission schemas reason through a wide class of problems that include social 
contracts and precaution rules.  Precaution rules, which also are a type of permission rule, deal 
with hazards and precautions.  If a certain hazard is present, then a particular caution must be 
taken.  The ability to detect violations of this type of rule certainly was critical to our ancestors’ 
ability to survive, as some hazards can be life threatening.     
 Pragmatic reasoning schemas “can provide access to patterns of deduction that may…be 
identical to those required by textbook logical rules” (Markovits & Savary, 1992: 134).  In other 
words, logical reasoning is a side effect in certain instances of the activation of these practical 
reasoning modules.  So, while studies have found that humans do not have an innate ability to 
reason through rules of formal abstract logic, logical reasoning is often a byproduct of the 
operation of these schemas.  The reason for this is that pragmatic reasoning schemas such as 
permission rules take the linguistic structure equivalent to a logical conditional.  According to 
Cheng and Holyoak’s theory, the activation of permission schemas will provide access to 
deduction patterns (acquired through experience) that also elicit the logically correct response of 
affirming the antecedent and falsifying the consequent.   
 In their research, Cosmides and her colleagues refute the claim that there is a broad-based 
type of circuit in the brain responsible for all kinds of social exchanges, which simultaneously 
can account for performance on logical reasoning tasks.  Using the Wason instrument (discussed 
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 in the next chapter), Cosmides favors a different theory about human reasoning.  She argues that 
the “human cognitive phenotype has many features that appear to be complexly specialized for 
solving the adaptive problems that arise in social exchanges” (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000b: 1266).  
Humans’ minds are representative of an orchestra of intermingling circuits each responsible for a 
different task.  The circuits are not general but quite specific in their function.  This competing 
hypothesis is that the functionally specialized inference system includes distinct algorithms 
designed for reasoning about precaution rules.   
 
3.4. Computational Theory of Social Exchange 
 This section describes the process by which the neural modules governing social 
exchange evolved.  The argument is built upon the basic principles of evolutionary psychology, 
which are outlined first.  Then, the discussion narrows to the particular problem of reasoning 
about social contracts.  Cosmides’ theory of social-contract algorithms describes the 
computational architecture in the brain designed to solve the specific adaptive problem of 
reasoning through social exchange relationships.   
 
3.4.1. Form Follows Function 
Through mutation (chance) and natural selection does evolutionary change take place.  
Natural selection organizes economizing functional features into the phenotype of a species 
(Dawkins, 1986).  Following the same form-follows-function logic of evolutionary biology, “the 
mind consists of a set of information-processing circuits that were designed by natural selection 
to solve adaptive problems that our ancestors faced…” (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000b: 1259).   To 
map the form of the neural algorithms in the brain, the specific functions the brain is designed to 
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 perform must be discovered first.  The basic explanatory system for cognitive neuroscience was 
developed by David Marr (1982).  He posited that information-processing circuits in the brain 
are designed to solve adaptive problems by virtue of their structure (Cosmides & Tooby, 1995).  
The physical structure exists by virtue of the set of programs that were naturally selected to solve 
a particular dilemma.  Thus, the level of analysis for cognitive neuroscientists is the functional 
level (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997).  These devices in the human mind must solve certain 
biological problems with great efficiency if the individual is to survive.  The individual circuits 
are each functionally designed to solve a particular adaptive problem that arises from the 
environment.   
 Natural selection in this sense becomes a feedback system where the most efficient and 
effective phenotype of the brain will proliferate through the population.  One of the greatest 
debates in all of evolutionary psychology is whether this phenotype is composed of domain-
specific circuits designed to solve particular problems, or domain-general ones, capable of 
solving a variety of tasks.  The Cosmides school advocates the former.  The argument follows in 
the next section.   
 
3.4.2. Specificity of Domains 
 As stated, the environment posed specific challenges for our Ice Age ancestors, all of 
which compromised their survival abilities.  Computational modules in the brain evolved that 
helped to solve those particular survival problems.  These circuits contain inference procedures 
and underlying assumptions “that embody knowledge specific to a given problem domain” 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 2000b: 1261).  The brain is made up of a great number of special-purpose 
mechanisms that are, in effect, designed to solve a vast array of problems facing humans 
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 (Chomsky, 1975).  Specificity of problem solving domains is advantageous to an individual over 
domain-independent systems because the more adept an individual is at a particular task, the 
more quickly and efficiently that individual can solve the problem.  Darwin claimed that the 
more critical the adaptive dilemma facing the individual, the more “intensely selection should 
have specialized and improved the performance of the mechanism for solving it” (Cosmides, 
1989: 193).   Different programs are necessary to solve various adaptive problems.  In certain 
domains, a computational mechanism will be activated, while in other domains, that same 
computational mechanism will remain dormant.  The brain will be able to solve more problems if 
it is encoded with a plethora of specialist reasoning mechanisms for various domains.   
 Modern behavioral scientists view the modules in the brain differently.  Following the 
Standard Social Science Model, this view holds that reasoning is conducted by content-free 
circuits that work in a variety of circumstances.  “Rational” algorithms are one type of content-
independent domain.  They “implement formal methods of inductive and deductive reasoning” 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 2000b: 1261) and reason through any problem across domains.   
If this view were true, and humans operated in a rational manner based on these content-
free, general purpose algorithms, then human minds would not contain any domain-specialized 
data that would be useful in some domains but useless in others.  The evolutionary psychologists 
do not discount the existence of inductive-reasoning mechanisms that contain particular rational 
rules, but they do contend that their activation is domain-specific (Brase, Cosmides, & Tooby, 
1998).  General purpose rationality is not enough to explain human reasoning. 
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 3.4.3. Social Contracts  
The first step toward characterizing the computational makeup of the mind related to 
social inferences is to formulate the information processing problems related to social exchange.  
Then, the design evidence for solving these information processing problems must be identified.  
For social exchanges, we have to figure out what has to happen if social contracts between two 
individuals are to be successful.   “The computational theory of social exchange suggests 
cognitive processes that govern human reasoning might have a number of design features 
specialized for reasoning about social exchange” (Cosmides & Tooby, 1995: 1202).  The 
evolutionary psychologists define the rules that compose the social contract from this social 
exchange logic.  “A social contract relates perceived benefits to perceived costs, expressing an 
exchange in which an individual is required to pay a cost to an individual in order to be eligible 
to receive a benefit from that individual (or group)” (Cosmides, 1989: 197).  From this, we can 
derive a grammar of social contracts which must be present for the neural modules in the brain to 
recognize the existence of this type of social exchange.   
What properties must a Darwinian algorithm (i.e., neural module) possess to effectively 
reason about social exchange?  The grammar of social contracts is simply the set of rules for 
forming a social contract with another person.  One of the assumptions is that the formulae for 
social contracts are expressed in terms of costs and benefits.  For inclusive fitness, our ancestors 
needed to calculate the costs and benefits of a particular social agreement to exchange.  Potential 
harms and utility of an exchange had to be accurately assessed in order for successful exchanges 
to take place (Cosmides, 1985).  Cooperation between two individuals can spread through a 
species as a strategy for solving adaptive problems when the individuals benefit from the 
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 exchange while incurring the lowest possible cost.  So, knowing the costs and benefits of the 
exchange becomes critical (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989). 
The neural algorithms responsible for calculating these costs and benefits have to be 
item-independent as well; that is, they should make these calculations in the context of costs and 
benefits to the participants for each exchange.  The costs and benefits are likely to change from 
context to context across social exchanges.  Before the proposed social contract arrangement 
takes place, it is also assumed that each contracting party will have certain expectations 
regarding their future worth and state.  Cosmides (1985) calls this the baseline or zero-level 
utility.  A benefit is something which causes a person’s utility to rise above the baseline level.  
For contracts to be accepted the benefit to the person must actually cause the person to be better 
off than s/he would have been without having entered into the arrangement.  On the other hand, 
costs are defined as any harm which decreases a person’s utility below the baseline.  To accept 
the offer, the cost incurred must be less than the benefit earned.  A well-formed social contract 
takes the form “If p then q.”   As I will demonstrate in the following chapter, Cosmides also 
demonstrated that logically correct responses only apply to social contracts constructed in a 
standard “If p not q” form.  The p in this case represents the benefit to the person entering into 
the agreement, and the q is the cost incurred.  Cosmides’ research lends support to the statement 
that in a switched social contract structure, in which the “cost paid” is the antecedent of the 
conditional rule and “benefit received” is the consequent, logical reasoning does not take place. 
Evolutionarily-formed algorithms must be adept at calculating these costs and benefits for social 
exchanges to take place (Cosmides, 1989). 
The above conditions represent a situation in which a person theoretically would accept 
an offer from another party.  It should be noted that a person would only be willing to make an 
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 offer if they expect not to confer the benefit by any other means.  This is a key assumption of 
Cosmides’ social contract theory.  The person must believe that s/he will not receive the benefit 
if s/he does not incur the cost with a potential partner.  Moreover, a person will not offer a social 
contract if they do not expect the benefit to be higher than the cost incurred, thereby raising 
personal utility above the baseline.  Thus, both parties must perceive that they will be better off.   
Social exchange is intercontingent in nature.  Social exchanges take the form of the 
conditional rule: “If person A provides the requested benefit to or meets the requirement of 
person or group B, then B will provide the rationed benefit to A” (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000b: 
1260).  Social contracts in the form “If p then q” document the “ways in which the behavior of 
one person is contingent upon the behavior of another person” (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989: 82).  
Social contracts only occur when both parties perceive an obligation and an entitlement.  Plus, 
these perceptions of obligations and entitlement are related through reciprocity.  One’s 
perception of obligation is equal to another’s perception of entitlement.  However, there is no 
mandate for the contracting parties to accept their entitlement.  Therefore, social contracts of this 
nature are not biconditionals (i.e. they do not take the form of “p if and only if q.”).  When the 
structure of the rule is in this form, it is considered a social contract.   
My dissertation utilizes Cosmides’ social-contract algorithm theory and tests its 
predictions in a business context on a business population.  Given the constraints on human 
evolution caused by social exchange problems, Cosmides and her colleagues posit that the 
cognitive architecture of the human brain has specialized, expert systems for reasoning about 
social interactions.  Her work in cognitive neuroscience is considered a theory of adaptive 
problems—the problem being social exchange.  For a computational theory of an information-
processing problem to be useful, the adaptive problem must be well-defined.  Cosmides limits 
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 her theory to the reciprocal exchange of costs and benefits between two contracting partners.  
She deals with situations that require cooperation for mutual benefit (Cosmides & Tooby, 
2000b).  Her social contract theory involves a task analysis of what the algorithms actually do 
when activated and why it is important for those algorithms to exist.   
 
3.4.4. Cosmides’ (1989) Social-Contract Algorithm Theory 
 
  Cosmides’ research challenges one of the primary assumptions of the behavioral 
sciences.  Contrary to the assumption that the brain is comprised of a limited number of domain-
general, content-independent circuits, she argues for domain-specific, content-dependent 
mechanisms designed to solve very specific adaptive problems.  Regardless of environmental 
conditions, the same phenotype of the brain exists in every human that serves the needs of the 
species.  This phenotype includes machinery that enables organisms to reason about social 
exchange.  Through her research stream, Cosmides developed the idea that reasoning about 
social exchange is controlled by social contract algorithms, which compute the information 
necessary to engage in and maintain mutually beneficial social relationships.   
 The research stream advocated by this group involves defining what abilities a person 
must have to enable social contracting.  Using Marr’s (1982) computational theory as the logic 
for their evolutionary analysis of social exchanges, Cosmides’ focus is on predicting what 
features the algorithms must have in order to successfully reason through social interactions.  
Following the cognitive neuroscience agenda, Cosmides attempts to identify and sort the 
modules in the brain into functionally specific units.  For social exchange, potential contracting 
partners must have the ability to recognize costs and benefits of the exchange.  When presented 
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 with a decision rule, the algorithms assess these harms and gains over the baseline.  In essence, 
they compute whether the contract is beneficial to the person overall. 
 For social exchange to evolve in a species, reciprocity must be the favored strategy (think 
Tit-for-tat).  Algorithms designed to enable individuals to reason about social exchange would 
then favor relationships that were cooperative.  Social contract algorithms would also need a sub-
routine mechanism designed to detect defectors from the agreed upon reciprocal arrangement.  
Individuals who cheat on a contract are distrusted in future social exchange relationships.  Thus, 
“human social contract algorithms must include procedures that allow us to quickly and 
effectively infer whether someone has cheated, or intends to cheat, on a social contract” 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1989: 84).  Cheating is simply a violation of the conditional rule of the 
social contract, either implied or explicit.  Cheating involves not paying a cost when the 
exchanged benefit was taken.  From the first-person perspective, an individual has been cheated 
when s/he pays the cost but does not receive the agreed upon benefit and vice versa.   
 The cheater detection subroutine operates on an inference procedure for identifying 
potential cheaters.  Evolutionarily speaking, it was important for our Pleistocene ancestors to 
efficiently and quickly detect cheaters on social exchanges so as to exclude or punish that person 
in future exchanges.  Punitive sentiments toward a cheating party involve not contracting with 
that party in other encounters (Price, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2002).  Those contractors who 
accepted a benefit would need to be observed to discover if they paid the required cost.  By the 
same token, contractors who did not pay the required cost would need to be observed to see if 
they unjustly accepted the benefit.  A person looking for cheaters from contracting partners can 
ignore individuals who do not take benefits as well as those who pay the cost because those 
people are not causing direct harm.   
45 
 3.4.5. Cosmides’ Theory: A Refinement 
 Another view of human reasoning architecture was offered by Gigerenzer and Hug 
(1992).  These evolutionary psychologists do not refute Cosmides’ theory but refine her 
approach.  Gigerenzer and Hug claim that Cosmides did not go far enough to break down the 
structure of the modules.  In her early research, Cosmides claimed that the variance in her 
findings was caused by the activation of social-contract algorithms alone.  Gigerenzer and Hug, 
on the other hand, posit that cheater-detection reasoning is something different from social-
exchange reasoning and the algorithms are distinct.  Their position is based on the premise that 
in social contracts, a person’s perspective is important in the ability to detect cheaters (a factor 
ignored in Cosmides’ (1989) theory).  When there is a possibility of cheating on a social contract 
by a person’s contracting partner does the algorithm get triggered.  It is not enough for a person 
to recognize a social contract situation to detect a potential cheater.  The social-contract 
algorithms are activated when a social contract arrangement has been entered.  But cheater-
detection algorithms are separately activated only when the situation warrants the detection of 
cheaters.  The contracting partner must have the opportunity to cheat in order for these circuits to 
work.  Originally, Cosmides thought social contract reasoning in general accounted for the 
cheater detection effect.  Gigerenzer and Hug (1992) empirically studied social contract 
situations with varying respondent-role perspectives.  Only the situations where respondents 
were asked to place themselves in the perspective of the party that could be cheated did the 
respondents correctly identify the cheaters.  “If a person represents one person in a social 
contract, and the other party has a cheating option, then a cheater-detection algorithm is activated 
that searches for information of the kind ‘benefit taken and costs not paid’ by the other party” (p. 
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 165).  This research does not support Cheng and Holyoak’s domain-general stance on human 
reasoning.     
 In the process of retooling the Cosmides and Tooby approach to human reasoning based 
on Pleistocene-formed circuits, Gigerenzer and Hug made an unexpected discovery.  A group of 
their research subjects did not use social-contract or cheater-detection reasoning in the Wason 
selection task.  Instead, they used general-purpose formal logic in their reasoning.  This group 
came from a mathematics and natural science educational background and tended to reason using 
the skills learned in those courses.  It appeared that the ancestrally formed modules were 
moderated by cultural forces, or education in this case.  The authors concluded that human 
reasoning is a hybrid of formal reasoning and domain-specific reasoning.  They believed that 
“there is a continuum between these poles of content-independent formal theories of 
propositional logic and content-dependent theories such as Darwinian algorithms adapted to 
specific domains” (p. 169).  Our Pleistocene minds play a major role in the way we reason in 
modern times but do not tell the whole story.  As I suggest later, although the structure of our 
minds was in great part formed during the Pleistocene Era, the cumulative effects of culture 
through evolutionary time also played a major part in shaping our minds. 
 
3.4.6. Deontic Reasoning 
 Another factor in our ancestors’ survival involved the structure of social groups in which 
they lived.  Evolutionary psychologist Denise Cummins (1998) refined Cosmides’ approach even 
further.  Cummins recognized that our forefathers and mothers operated in a social world that 
was organized on power differentials.  Social hierarchies existed even before dawn of “Man.” 
Common to social life among even non-human primates is the formation of dominance 
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 hierarchies (Stone, 1997). Hominid apes demonstrated power-differential relationships. Today, 
social hierarchies are seen in chimpanzee groups (deWaal, 1996).   Dominance evolved in these 
species because often dominant primates had more success obtaining resources such as food and 
sexual mates.  It is not a stretch to imagine that early humans also had to navigate around a 
socially differentiated world.  Based on this premise, “special reasoning architecture evolved 
(among apes and humans) to handle problems that are repeatedly encountered by individuals 
living in dominance hierarchies, problems that directly impact survival rates and reproductive 
success” (Cummins, 1998: 30).  Deontic reasoning involves knowing what you may or may not 
do in a social arrangement.  Permissions and obligations often arise out of rules created by 
people in positions of power.  Those higher up in the hierarchy create conditional rules of 
acceptable behavior for subordinates.   
 Cummins argues that group norms develop from these social dominance practices.  The 
norms set by the group (i.e., culture) include the obligation and permission rules set up in the 
social contracts.  To maintain reciprocally altruistic behavior, social order rules developed in 
various cultures.  Cheating behavior would be scorned and punished.  The group norms and 
reciprocity checks essentially protected the group from deviant behavior which would adversely 
affect the group’s ability to propagate.  Groups that survived over the years and were able to 
reproduce realized that their long run best interests were realized if they protected themselves 
from selfish behavior on the part of a few individuals (Ridley, 1985).  None of this is 
inconsistent with Cosmides’ position.  In fact, Cosmides acknowledges that in social exchanges, 
phrases in the conditional rules “should be interpreted deontically” (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000b: 
1262).   
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 3.5. Conclusion 
 This chapter has reviewed the alternative views of human reasoning based on the notion 
that certain modules in the brain evolved to solve adaptive problems efficiently.   The extreme 
foil to this position is that the brain is a blank slate and that “the human mind has no inherent 
structure and can be inscribed at will by society or ourselves” (Pinker, 2002: 2).  This view is 
generally accepted by social scientists and philosophers.  The fact that political philosophers like 
Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau believed that humans’ behavior can be influenced and changed by 
a powerful entity made it convenient to believe that peoples’ minds are easily manipulated by 
experience and culture. The blank slate view allows for unencumbered learning, which served as 
the basis for the belief that society could be changed for the better.  For business ethicists, this 
view is very attractive and promising.   
 Pinker, however, argues that that view is seriously flawed.  His position stands more on 
middle ground.  He believes genes are a factor in the development of culture, that genes are 
critical in determining our abilities to some extent. “Differences in intelligence, scientific genius, 
sexual orientation, and impulsive violence are not entirely learned” (Pinker, 2002: 44).  The 
human mind is not a tabula rasa.  It can be molded and influenced by environmental cues and 
cultural factors, but the basic neural machinery is common across people in every culture on the 
planet by virtue of a natural selection process that enabled our species’ need to perform specific 
adaptive functions through evolutionary time.   
 Cosmides admits that in order for an individual to adapt, that individual’s information-
processing circuits must be ecologically rational (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997).  This means that 
the neural mechanisms must “embody principles that allow adaptive problems to be solved with 
reliability, economy, and precision” (p. 138).  For this ecological rationality to exist, the brain’s 
slate cannot be blank.  Additionally, the more one looks at Cosmides’ view of the brain’s 
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 evolved architecture, the more easily one can negotiate it with the alternate view (Cheng and 
Holyoak, 1989).  Adaptation meant being able to understand one’s environment.  This includes 
being able to understand group norms, cause-and-effect relationships, and social hierarchies.  
Arguably, these are pragmatic goals.  If we begin to picture the brain as an intricate web of 
interacting neural circuits, evolved so as to operate in concert toward a single goal—survival—
then perhaps it is not as difficult to respect the profound dependence nature and nurture have on 
one another.  Both are unavoidable.   
 Perhaps both evolutionary psychology camps are right.  When certain conditions are 
present, individuals have demonstrated reliable and consistent abilities to reason through social 
contracts and detect cheaters (as I will show empirically in the next chapter).  At the same time, 
humans can demonstrate this ability across a variety of situations and contexts.  Humans are able 
to ingest environmental cues and decipher the rules in a particular context.  Gary Marcus (2004) 
calls it a paradox.  Despite the structural richness of the human mind, there is evidence of an 
incredible amount of neural flexibility.  However, “Not every gene, nor every brain connection, 
can be modified by experience” (p. 99).  Learning is possible through the links between 
experience and gene expression.  What we learn is governed by the gene mechanisms in our 
minds and by culture.   
 Now that the concepts from evolutionary psychology have been described, and 
Cosmides’ theory of social contracts has been outlined, it is time to turn attention to the 
empirical evidence for social exchange reasoning among individuals.  In the following chapter, 
the main instrument used in the field for testing peoples’ abilities to reason through conditional 
rules is presented—the Wason selection task.  The empirical studies testing for the presence of 
social contract algorithms in the brain are presented after the Wason task is described in detail.   
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 4. THE WASON SELECTION TASK 
 
 This chapter examines the Wason selection task instrument for use in studies about 
human reasoning.  The method, originally developed in 1966, has been adapted for many uses 
and analyzed by psychology researchers for decades.  While its format has changed significantly 
from its original intent, the selection task has been validated and proven reliable across many 
variations.  Here the instrument is described and demonstrated in its original form.  En route to 
discussing the validity and reliability of an adaptation or modification of the instrument, various 
factors that potentially could influence performance on the task are outlined.  Then, the relevant 
adaptations for use in this study are reviewed, focusing mainly on Cosmides and Tooby’s 
utilization of the instrument for identifying the existence of social-contract algorithms.  
Additionally, alternative explanations are briefly discussed.   
 
4.1. The Original Wason Selection Task 
 Cognitive psychologist Peter Wason is credited with founding the British school of 
human reasoning.  His interest in language led to his work in inductive reasoning, and with more 
breadth, in deductive reasoning.  Prior to his invention and development of the selection task in 
1966, the field relied entirely on syllogistic inference mechanisms for research on deductive 
reasoning (Wilkins, 1928; Woodworth & Sells, 1935).  Since then, his selection task is the single 
most studied reasoning problem in psychology (Santamaria, Garcia-Madruga, & Carretero, 
1996).   Initially, he manufactured a logical reasoning test to determine the general ability of 
humans to recognize violations of abstract rules.  The task presents the subject with an If p, then 
q conditional rule.   This paper-and-pencil test asks respondents to discover when the rule has 
been violated over four occasions.  For each instance, respondents are given only partial 
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 information.  Four cards are then shown with values for p, not-p, q, and not-q.  Each occasion is 
represented by one of the four cards.  On one side of the card, the information tells whether or 
not the antecedent (p or not-p) is true, while the other side gives information about whether or 
not the consequent (q or not-q) is true (Wason, 1966).  The respondent can see only one side of 
the card for each occasion.  The task is to ask the subject which card or cards (s)he must turn 
over to determine whether the conditional rule was violated.  Logically speaking, a choice of p 
and not-q would be the correct response because only “the combination on the same card of a 
true antecedent with a false consequent can falsify a conditional rule” (Cosmides, 1989: 197).   
 The standard Wason selection task is an instrument designed to test an individual’s 
ability to reason logically.  In its original form, Wason (1966, 1968) constructed an abstract 
version where only letters and numbers were presented in the conditional rule and on actual 
individual cards.  Four cards were placed on a table each with a single number or letter visible to 
the respondents.  The other side was hidden.  Two letters were visible and two numbers.  
Specifically, Wason asked respondents to decide which cards needed to be flipped in order to 
determine whether the conditional rule, “If there is an E on one side of the card, then there is a 4 
on the other side” is true or false.  Figure 4.1 illustrates Wason’s first selection task.   
 Historically and over multiple iterations over the years, few people ever turn over the 
logically-correct cards.   In this case, the “E” and the “7” are necessary to check the truth of the 
rule.  The “E” needs to be checked in order to determine whether a “4” appears on the other side 
because any number or character other than a “4” would falsify the conditional rule.  It is also 
necessary to verify the other side of the card with the “7” showing.  Respondents should look to 
find an “E” on the opposite side since that would also falsify the rule.  Logically, the rule cannot 
be disaffirmed by turning over either of the other two cards.  In terms of the conditional rule, 
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 there should be no interest in the “D” card because it matters not at all what is on the opposite 
side since the rule says nothing about cards with a “D” on them.  Similarly, choosing the “4” 
card does not prove or falsify the conditional rule because there could be other conditionals 
involving a “4” that are unspecified by the rule.  Fewer than ten percent of respondents turn over 
the p and not-q cards to falsify the rule. 
  
Figure 1 Standard Abstract Logic Structure Wason Task 
You are given the statement: 
“If a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the other side.”  
(If p, then q) 
The cards below have a single number on one side and a single letter on the other.   
 
Which of the cards would you need to turn over to test whether the statement is true or false? 
 
 
  
 P   not-P   Q      not-Q 
E D 4 7 
Source: Manktelow, 1999 
 The Wason selection task has been called the most popular experimental task used in the 
study of reasoning (George, 1991).  The reasons for this stem in part from its unpredictability 
and its many uses.  Ever since his original form, researchers in the field were fascinated by 
people’s inability to logically reason through the task.  Wason (1966) himself speculated as to 
why people were having such difficulty with the task.  It is found that most people choose the p 
and q cards, or only the p card (Evans, 1982).  This finding began a line of inquiry into the 
possible reasons for illogical card choices.  The next section summarizes some of this research 
beginning with Wason’s own interpretation. 
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 4.2. Factors and Biases that Affect Card Choices on the Selection Task 
4.2.1. Confirmation Bias 
 Wason (1966) attempted to account for the performance on his abstract tasks with what 
he termed the confirmation bias.  In this type of bias, subjects tend to search for evidence among 
the card choices that confirms the rule rather than falsifies the rule.  So, for Wason’s abstract task 
in Figure 4.1, respondents influenced primarily by this bias would attempt to find the cards 
which support the rule, which involves a different card choice.  Instead of choosing the “E” and 
the “7” cards, a subject being influenced by the confirmation bias would still choose the “E,” but 
would select the “4” as well.  Thus, the confirmation, or verification, bias causes people to 
choose the p and q cards and ignore the card represented by not-q.  The target, or consequent of 
the conditional rule (q), is sought after to confirm peoples’ belief that the rule is true.   Wason 
claimed that individuals tried to prove the conditional rule true, which accounted for the errors 
on the selection task.   
 Johnson-Laird and Wason (1970) took this belief that there exists a verification bias and 
constructed a theory of insight and a formal model of confirmation.  Their experiments 
demonstrated that subjects have a difficult time understanding the need for falsification on 
selection tasks of a conditional rule.  Even when they enlightened subjects that a p value on the 
flip side of a not-q card would falsify the rule (insight), people generally still did not select that 
card.  This effect was said to account for people’s tendency to ignore the not-q.  Reich and Ruth 
(1982) found an interaction effect between thematic content and verification bias.  Only in 
scenarios with thematic content did subjects tend to choose cards which confirmed the rule.  
When abstract tasks were used, a matching bias was strongly elicited by respondents.  This is 
discussed next. 
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 4.2.2. Matching Bias 
 Another common type of bias that may affect card choices on abstract and thematic 
(discussed in the next section) rule content is matching bias.  Matching bias was a direct 
manifestation of research investigating the verification effect on selection task card choices.  
Evans (1972) first discovered the effect in truth table tasks, but it can be generalized to selection 
type tasks as well.  This phenomenon often occurs in all kinds of reasoning research.   In abstract 
logic tasks, individuals are “more likely to select a card showing a matching item than one 
showing a mismatching item, irrespective of its logical status (Manktelow, 1999: 69).  In other 
words, this effect basically entails respondents “matching” card choices to variables lexically 
mentioned in the conditional rule.  So, the cards chosen tend to be p and q.  Evans (1972) and 
Evans and Lynch (1973) tested this bias on Wason tasks by introducing negatives in their 
conditional statement.  Instead of stating the rule as an “If p, then q” format, they changed it to 
“If p, then not-q.”  They found that respondents most often selected the p and not-q cards.  
Logically speaking, only when the rule was framed as a true antecedent with a false consequent 
did the matching bias cause correct responses.  Incidentally, while both studies showed 
statistically significant support for the matching bias, the verification bias was not confirmed.  
The falsifying effect was much stronger when the rule was framed in a negative context.  
Manktelow and Evans (1979) found that regardless of abstract or thematic content, performance 
was consistent with the matching bias.   
 More recent research on matching bias confirms the phenomenon.  Oaksford and 
Stenning (1992) rotated the negative components of the conditional rules on both the antecedent 
and the consequent.  The matching effect was found on their first experiment which replicated 
Evans (1972).  When asked to verify or falsify the rule, Oaksford and Stenning (1992) found a 
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 substantial matching bias, but they were able to essentially eliminate the bias altogether when 
double-negatives were used in the conditional rule.  This contrasting-class construction of the 
rule (Manktelow, 1999) was thought to be responsible for suppressing the matching effect.  They 
believed that the bias suggested irrationality in human behavior, that the heuristics used to make 
decisions based on matching leads to systematic error.   Evans, Legrenzi, and Girotto (1999) on 
the other hand, ran two experiments which tested various kinds of propositional rules (i.e., 
universal statements, disjunctions, and negated conjunctions) and observed the matching bias 
across every rule type.  The effect was most strongly seen when respondents were required to 
falsify the rule (which is the approach of this dissertation).  In earlier work, Evans (1996, 1998) 
attributed the matching bias effect on Wason tasks to existing heuristic judgments (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1972) of relevant information.  He also claimed that it interfered with the reasoning 
process.   This explanation reflects Evans’ view of the matching bias throughout his career.   
 In opposition to that view, Johnson-Laird (1995) posited that individuals pay close 
attention to cards on the selection task that are present in the rule.  Then, he claims, people pick 
the cards that affirm or disaffirm the rule.  Evans believes no analytic process is involved when 
the matching effect occurs, while Johnson-Laird believes that humans “convince themselves that 
the cards are logically necessary by reasoning” (Evans, Legrenzi, & Girotto, 1999: 191).  Yama 
(2001) also confirmed that the matching effect takes place on selection tasks, but he argued that 
since matching saves cognitive capacity, this kind of relevance judgment indeed is a form of 
rationality (p.310).   
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 4.2.3. Instructional Manipulations 
 Much interest has been taken in facilitating performance on selection tasks of either the 
abstract or thematic type.  While the two aforementioned factors in this chapter generally 
account for decreased probabilities that logical card choices are made, this section briefly 
discusses an effect that is known to raise the likelihood that correct card choices are made.  Early 
work by Wason (1966, 1968) asked respondents to determine whether the conditional rule was 
true or false.  The true-false instruction was later believed to have a negative influence on 
selection task behavior.  Yachanin and Tweney (1982) found evidence that performance on 
abstract selection tasks was enhanced slightly when the instructions asked respondents to choose 
the cards that violated the rule, rather than asking them to determine whether the rule was true or 
false.  Griggs & Cox (1982) did not find this same effect for abstract selection tasks but agreed 
with Yachanin and Tweney’s findings on tasks with thematic material (discussed in the next 
section).  Later studies by Yachanin (1986) confirmed Griggs and Cox’s findings.   
 The language of the tasks can be manipulated in other ways which have historically 
shown facilitation effects.  Possibly the most interesting study of this type was conducted by 
Margolis (1987).  Margolis argued that people have a strong tendency to assume that the contexts 
of the task scenarios are open.  Since Wason selection task scenarios are intended to be closed in 
nature, this was hypothesized to be a potential source of the problem.  Individuals are inclined to 
think of the card choices as categories rather than specific cases.  Margolis’ hypotheses were 
tested by Griggs (1989) and confirmed.  A “misinterpretation of the selection task as an open 
scenario problem” could account for normal card choices of p alone, or p and q (Evans, 
Newstead, & Byrne, 1993: 106).  Finally, Platt and Griggs (1993) found that facilitation on even 
abstract tasks can be fostered when the implication rule was explicated and when respondents 
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 were asked to find violations of the rule rather than to see if the rule was true or false.  Another 
interesting finding in this study came about on a separate experiment asking subjects to provide 
reasons for their card choices.  The authors found that asking respondents to provide reasons 
increased their attention to the task at hand and improved logical card selection.  Thus, there 
exists a strong attentional effect on Wason selection task performance. 
 
4.2.4. Other Effects on Selection Task Card Choices 
 Researchers have paid some attention to intelligence and educational effects on peoples’ 
abilities to reason through Wason selection tasks.  Valentine (1975) reported a positive 
correlation between intelligence measures and selection task performance.  Hoch and Tschirgi 
(1985) also found that level of higher education factored into subjects’ ability to choose the 
correct cards on the tasks.  Masters level students were more likely to select the cards necessary 
to determine violations of the conditional rule than were high school or undergraduate students.  
In fact, this study also reported an increased matching effect by less educated subjects.  
Contradictory results were found by Jackson and Griggs (1988) when they examined 
mathematicians and technical experts, however.  Educational levels had no effect on selection 
task performance in their study.  This led researchers in the field to examine whether training 
specific to logical reasoning would have an effect on individuals’ ability to pick the correct cards 
on these tasks.  Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett and Oliver (1986) found that training in logic had no 
effect on performance.   
 Osman and Laming (2001) examined why errors are so often made on the selection task.  
They proposed that individuals are both incapable of reasoning logically and that they 
“misunderstand the rule they are asked to test, but thereafter respond in logical accord with the 
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 rule as they understand it” (p. 128).  They said that if subjects interpret the rule to be a bi-
conditional, rather than unidirectional, then they are more likely to choose all four cards 
presented to them.  The two sources of error they found were: 1) That subjects did not accurately 
perceive what the task actually consists of, and 2) subjects failed to accurately reason in the wake 
of that misperception (p.129).   
 In the same study, Osman and Laming found that the influence of prior experience is 
significant as well.  So, while logic education had no effect on card selection, prior experience 
with a rule led to “an increased proportion of correct selections” (p.133).  This is a critical factor 
for determining how card choices are made.  An individual’s perspective based on their 
understanding and experience can affect card choices on contextual selection tasks.  Both of 
these factors play an important role in this dissertation’s use of the Wason test.  The content of 
the selection task scenario is discussed next. 
 
4.2.5. Content Effects on the Wason Selection Task 
 Since Wason’s earliest research on abstract logic tasks, there have been numerous studies 
focusing on thematic content effects on card selection.  To obtain a comprehensive picture of the 
various competing interpretations of the Wason selection task card choices, it is desirable to 
provide a short description of this approach.  Moreover, it is useful to have this background in 
order to fully understand Cosmides and Tooby’s approach and what it refutes and builds upon. 
Due to claims that variability in individuals’ card choices in part stems from differences in their 
“experience with different content domains,” it became important to understand what kinds of 
content affected performance (Osman & Laming, 2001: 133). An interesting research venture 
was to figure out if performance could be facilitated on tasks with the injection of thematic 
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 content.  Fittingly enough, the first scholar to undertake such a task was Wason himself.  Wason 
and Shapiro (1971) compared performance on selection tasks between scenarios involving 
abstract content with those involving thematic content.  In its original form, a statement was 
provided about travel: Every time I go to Manchester I travel by train.  On the four cards 
presented to respondents, either the name of a town or a mode of transportation was visible. (The 
cards displayed were: Manchester, Leeds, Train, Car)  In order to find out whether the statement 
was true or false, subjects were asked to turn over the necessary cards.  The falsifying cases (the 
p and not-q cards) are the “Manchester” card and the “Car” card.  Sixty-three percent of the 
subjects were able to choose the two cards which would falsify the statement compared with less 
than ten percent on the abstract logic task.   
 This manipulation of the original task was a critical point in the study of deduction.  In 
the common abstract tasks, the typical response was to omit the not-q card from the decision set 
of choices.  Researchers focused on which manipulations induce “subjects to build explicit 
models which include the not-q card” (Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993: 116).  Researchers 
focused on realistic scenarios from this point forward.  The next step was to transform the claim 
statement into a rule.  Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, & Legrenzi (1972) did exactly that by taking the 
thematic statement and creating an “If, then” rule based on postal services.  In this study, 
respondents were specifically asked to indicate which envelopes would violate the rule, “If a 
letter is sealed, then it has a 50-lire stamp on it.”  About 88% of subjects were able to choose the 
correct p and not-q cards.  Following this seminal study on the postal rule, reasoning researchers 
were convinced that a facilitation effect was occurring based on the added content provided in 
the scenarios; that people were better able to identify the logically correct response when the 
content was familiar and concrete.  Wason and Johnson-Laird commented in their book (1972) 
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 that the conditional in the tasks “takes on the color of its surroundings: its meaning is determined 
to some extent by the very propositions it connects” (p. 92).   
 Holes had been poked in the thematic facilitation effect later that decade.  The reliability 
of the thematic content effect was questioned when Manktelow and Evans (1979), Reich and 
Ruth (1982), and Yachanin and Tweney (1982) were unable to replicate Wason’s early results.  
On these studies, subjects did no better on the content tasks than on the abstract tasks.  Not until 
Griggs and Cox’s (1982) research did new insights in the effect emerge.  Building on the 
experiments of Manktelow and Evans (1979), Griggs and Cox believed that facilitation had 
much to do with long-term memory cues.  They administered Johnson-Laird and Wason’s (1972) 
postage problem to their own subjects who had no experience with the British postal system.  As 
they expected, facilitation did not occur because their American subjects’ memories were not 
cued to the falsifying instance (Griggs & Cox, 1982: 414).  Also in this famous study, the authors 
created a drinking age problem that was very familiar to their Florida college students.  When 
presented with a conditional rule, “If a person is drinking beer, then the person must be over 19 
years of age”, subjects were asked to select the card or cards necessary to determine whether any 
customers in a bar are violating the rule.  They were to imagine that they were the police officer 
responsible for upholding the rule.  Subjects were told that each card had the person’s age on one 
side and what they were drinking on the other.  The four cards displayed the following 
information: “Drinking a Beer,” “Drinking a Coke,” “16 Years of Age,” and “22 Years of Age.”  
(This problem was reproduced and administered to my own subjects in a preliminary stage of my 
research project.  The results are discussed in Chapter 5.)  Again, the falsifying (logically 
correct) responses were the p (“Drinking a Beer”) and not-q (“16 Years of Age”) cards.  
Seventy-four percent of subjects chose the correct cards.  The results of this seminal work have 
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 been proved reliable through several replicated studies (Griggs & Cox, 1983; Griggs, 1984; 
Cosmides, 1989).   
 The memory-cueing hypothesis is usually categorized under the broader title of 
availability theories.  Availability theories of reasoning are characterized by thematic content, 
but this approach “places emphasis on prior beliefs and associations which are evoked by the 
problem content” (Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993: 121).  It was suggested by Evans et al. 
(1993) that individuals may be more motivated to disprove a rule that they already believe to be 
false.  Studies informed by Griggs and Cox’s (1982) piece like George (1991), claim that any 
facilitation on thematic tasks has to do with a person’s ability to remember the solution to the 
problem from past experiences.  Ironically enough, the problem with this memory-cueing 
explanation was that it was illogical.  This was demonstrated by D’Andrade (discussed in Evans 
et al., 1993) when he created a scenario involving a Sears department store sales scheme.  The 
scenario elicited high rates of p and not-q card choices from respondents, but which could not 
possibly have been due to a prior real world experience with the specific task.    
 One of the factors that moderated performance on selection tasks in these thematic 
content scenarios was the transfer effect.  Cox and Griggs (1982) demonstrated that certain 
content-rich rules, when preceded by the Drinking Age Problem, elicited higher rates of logical 
card choices than when the other content-rich rules were presented first.  Although this did not 
seem to increase p and not-q card choices for abstract tasks, a possible transfer of knowledge 
from the first task given was occurring on within-subjects research designs.  This dissertation 
study avoids this type of moderator by administering a between-subjects design.   
 While this early research on thematic content effects was not conclusive by itself to prove 
a general content influence, certain contexts did substantially enhance peoples’ abilities to 
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 choose the falsifying cases.  When referring to the content effect on the Wason selection task, 
Cosmides called it unpredictable (1985) and Griggs and Cox (1982) called it “elusive.”   
My attention to this Wason selection task literature review turns now to the major 
content-dependent theories that have utilized Wason’s instrument as a measure of individuals’ 
reasoning capabilities.  The alternative theories discussed in Chapter 3 are revisited here only in 
terms of their empirical manifestations as a way of showing the sensitive nature of the Wason 
selection task, as well as its versatility.  Another goal of this next section is to demonstrate how 
the domain-specific reasoning processes (discussed in Chapter 3) emerged from the various 
empirical studies.   
 
4.3. Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas in the Wason Selection Task 
 Two main approaches to the content effects on reasoning emerged in response to the 
heuristic and mental model views.  The first one, pragmatic reasoning schemas, stands in stark 
contrast to its main rival, social contract theory (as discussed conceptually in the previous 
chapter).  Popularized by Cheng and Holyoak in 1985, pragmatic reasoning schemas were 
proposed to account for facilitation effects on the selection tasks.   This marked the first major 
attempt to provide additional insight into the effects of realistic content in selection task 
scenarios.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, schemas “contain generalized abstracted 
knowledge which has been learnt or induced from experience in particular domains” (Evans et 
al, 1993: 125).  Within these schemas exist rules for reasoning through particular problems 
reflecting the experience and knowledge obtained in specific contexts.   
For Cheng and Holyoak’s permission schemas, where a precondition must be met (q) 
before an action is performed (p), the card choices necessary to falsify the rule are still p and not-
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 q.  They ran three experiments in total.  The first one was designed to test whether rationale 
aided in peoples’ abilities to identify the falsifying cards.  For the postal rule (discussed in the 
previous section), they added content that described the purpose of the rule (to increase profit of 
private mail).  When they provided this extra information, American students were able to find 
the proper cards.  Their second experiment also manufactured facilitation by transforming an 
abstract rule into a permission rule.  Their new rule, “If one is to take action A, then one must 
fulfill precondition P” added a permission component to abstract, thematic-neutral content.  Over 
60 percent of subjects faced with this task were able to select the falsifying cards.  On the plain 
abstract rule, only 19 percent selected those cards.   
Other studies followed Cheng and Holyoak’s lead with permission schemas and the 
Wason selection task.  Jackson and Griggs (1990) were able to replicate Cheng & Holyoak’s 
work by facilitating their standard abstract problem.  Resembling early research on general 
thematic content tasks (see Johnson-Laird and Wason, 1970), Jackson and Griggs injected the 
use of negatives into the abstract permission rules.  By placing explicit negatives on two of the 
visible cards (“has not taken action A” and “has not fulfilled precondition Q”) performance 
dropped significantly.  Nearly no one was able to choose the correct cards.   
Girotto, Mazzocco, and Cherubini (1992) examined these deontic rule effects more 
closely to find out why respondents chose certain cards on permission conditionals.    They 
concluded that individuals will only choose the seemingly relevant cards visible to them.  
According to Griggs and Cox’s (1993) analysis of Girotto’s study, the not-q card is avoided 
because the “implicit negation…does not clearly represent a potential violator” (p. 640).  In other 
words, the negated q card is too vague for respondents in this particular kind of context because 
people did not necessarily interpret the negation to mean the precondition was not satisfied.  
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 Subtle language differences make quite a bit of difference on the Wason task indeed.  In their 
own more recent study, Griggs and Cox (1993) actually concluded that the standard abstract 
version and the abstract permission schema version are actually different versions altogether.  
They argued that work should cease on examining pragmatic reasoning schemas in order to 
understand facilitation on abstract logic tasks.  They are two separate ventures.  
 
4.4. Social Contract Tasks 
 Building on this previous research on the content-dependent cognitive processes in the 
brain, a group of researchers explored the contexts in which thematic content facilitates 
performance on selection tasks.  As illustrated above, prior studies failed to provide replicable, 
conclusive results of content-dependent effects on task performance.  Wason suggested that there 
were principles dictating how people reason but neglected to discover what precise principles 
would provide consistent results on his task.   In terms of reliability and generalizability of the 
instrument, evolutionary psychologists Cosmides and Tooby have offered a promising approach 
that accounts for thematic content task performance consistently. The theory behind this 
approach is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  Here I merely discuss the intricacies of their version 
of the Wason selection task.   
Cosmides (1985; 1989) adapted the original Wason selection task to reflect social 
contract conditional rules in order to test for the presence of cheater-detection algorithms in the 
brain counter to the availability hypotheses and deductive accounts which claim that humans’ 
past experience and logical capabilities account for the detection of cheaters on tasks.  The 
abstract conditional rule was changed to a cost-benefit structure representative of a social 
contract.  “By presenting one term of a conditional rule as a rationed benefit (p), and the other 
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 term as a cost/requirement (q), one can create a Wason selection task that instantiates a social 
contract” (Cosmides, 1985: 196).  She essentially created a social contract scenario by describing 
a situation where one party is obligated to pay a cost in order to receive a benefit.  Cards were 
changed to indicate “cost paid” or “not paid” and “benefit accepted” or “not accepted”.  A “look 
for cheaters” procedure would cause the subject to choose the “cost not paid” card (not-q) and 
the “benefit accepted” card (p) to find possible cheaters of the conditional rule (p.198) despite 
there being incomplete information (See Figure 4.2). While respondents did very poorly (4 to 
10% correct selection rates) on choosing the cards necessary to locate a violation of the abstract 
logical rule (Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972), individuals have been shown to perform at a rate 
over 10 times that on social contract context tasks.  Cosmides, and later, Cosmides and Tooby, 
posited that since people perform better on the social contract task than on the abstract logic 
version, then it can be inferred that people have cognitive adaptations “specialized for detecting 
cheaters in situations of social exchange” (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000b: 1264).  
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 Figure 2 Standard Social Contract Structure Wason Task 
It is your job to enforce the following law: 
“If you take the benefit, then you pay the cost.” (If p, then q) 
The cards below have information about four people.  Each card represents one person.   One 
side of a card tells whether a person accepted the benefit and the other side of the card tells 
whether that person paid the cost. 
 
Indicate only the card or cards you definitely need to turn over to see if any of these people are 
breaking this law. 
 
  
 P   not-P   Q      not-Q 
Benefit 
Accepted 
Benefit 
NOT 
Accepted 
Cost  
Paid 
Cost 
NOT 
Paid 
Source: Cosmides, 1985: 197 
 
 Arguably, social contract rules are a type of permission rule described by Cheng and 
Holyoak.  One is permitted only to accept a benefit when the cost has been paid. Even though not 
all permission rules are social contracts, Cosmides reconceived certain permission tasks from 
previous studies as social contract rules and offered an alternative account for how performance 
is facilitated.  Take the Drinking Age Problem (described earlier) for instance.  According to 
Cosmides (1985), this problem constitutes a social contract for American subjects because they 
“perceive drinking beer as a rationed benefit that can only be had by waiting until they have met 
an age requirement” (p.45).  In different cultures that are not used to this legal code or norm, this 
rule would not be perceived as a social contract but merely as a descriptive rule.  Thus, any 
social-contract algorithms hypothesized to exist by Cosmides would not be activated in certain 
contexts.  Using American subjects, Cosmides redefined the Drinking Age Problem as a social 
contract and applied her theory.  If we refer back to the section above on the instructional 
manipulations of the task regarding the search for violators versus determining whether the rule 
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 is true or false, then Cosmides’ “cheater detection” scheme is supported.  If facilitation on the 
tasks occurs when respondents are asked to select the necessary cards to determine when the rule 
was violated, then this supports the notion that cheater detection algorithms exist (Evans, 
Newstead, & Byrne, 1993).  Cosmides (1989) argues that all of Cheng and Holyoak’s pragmatic 
reasoning schema tasks were in fact, social contracts, which accounted for their empirical results.    
 The social-contract algorithm theory approach to the Wason task has been used on other 
types of scenarios as well.  In an effort to further refute Cheng & Holyoaks’ contentions that 
their studies contradicted availability theory, Cosmides constructed a series of selection tasks 
involving unfamiliar content to devise a better argument against the availability heuristic.  She 
described a tribe whose members desired cassava root but were permitted only by tribal custom 
to eat the root if they were married.  Other members of the tribe could tell if someone was 
married if they had a tattoo on their face.  The social contract rule she used was, “If a man eats 
cassava root, then he has a tattoo on his face.”  Since this was completely unfamiliar to the 
American subjects to whom she administered the task, the facilitation demonstrated had nothing 
to do with the availability heuristic.  Through several iterations (1989), her results showed rates 
of cheater-detection comparable to those found on the Drinking Age Problem.   
 
4.4.1. Switched Social Contract Rules 
 To strengthen her argument that facilitation on the social contract tasks was due to the 
presence of evolutionary algorithms, she created a switched social contract rule.  The switched 
rule states the conditional rule in the following form: “If you pay the cost then you take the 
benefit.”  Further evidence that a social-contract algorithm exists would be obtained if 
facilitation on the tasks occurred on the switched rule as well.  So, while a p and not-q response 
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 would falsify the rule on the standard social contract, a not-p and q response would falsify the 
rule on the switched social contract.  People taking these switched versions were able to decipher 
that violations of the rule took place when the cost was not paid and the benefit was received.  
Over sixty percent of subjects were able to detect violations of the rule in her 1989 experiments.  
In the face of logical reasoning, Cosmides (1989) and Cosmides and Tooby (1992) witnessed 
facilitation on social contract tasks of any kind. 
 With social contract theory, it seemed that the key element of facilitation on the Wason 
selection tasks was discovered.  Cosmides (1989) ran eight experiments using the social contract 
hypothesis against Cheng and Holyoak’s permission schema theory in both standard and social 
contract form.  All eight studies resulted in facilitation on the social contract tasks.  Gigerenzer 
and Hug (1992) replicated Cosmides’ results by creating conditional rules which were not social 
contracts but permission rules only.  Respondents taking these tasks selected the logically 
falsifying cards at a much lower rate than on tasks framed in a social contract context.  Their 
study also added a perspective change (discussed in Chapter 3) between the parties in the task on 
problems that involved bilateral conditional rules.  For facilitation on the tasks to occur, they 
believed that respondents had to be cued into the perspective of a party in the social exchange 
who can be cheated.  While they did distinguish between social-contract algorithms and ones 
responsible for cheater detection, Gigerenzer and Hug supported the social contract hypothesis 
over three experiments.  Politzer and Nguyen-Xuan (1992) replicated these findings in support of 
Gigerenzer and Hug’s version of the social contract facilitation effect. 
Platt and Griggs (1993) examined Cosmides’ studies and found that when the instructions 
associated with the task were simpler, facilitation occurred to a greater degree.  They also found 
that when cost and benefit information were removed from the conditional rules, facilitation on 
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 the tasks decreased dramatically as predicted by social contract theory.   Cosmides and her 
associates examined the idea of a cheater-detection subroutine in a recent study on Shiwiar 
hunter-horticulturalists of Ecuador (Sugiyama, Tooby, and Cosmides: 2002).  In this study, the 
Wason task was adapted once again in order to be understood by non-literate respondents.  Using 
symbols and pictures, the Shiwiar tribe demonstrated facilitation on tasks which involved social 
contracts with potential cheaters.  Cheater-detection rates among the tribal respondents 
resembled those of Harvard undergraduates (about sixty percent).   
All of these studies taken together demonstrate that facilitation on the Wason selection 
task occurs consistently when conditional rules are framed in terms of a social contract.  
Regardless of culture or familiarity with a particular rule, people are more likely to identify 
violations of the rule when it is framed in terms of costs paid and benefits received.  Results are 
generalizable across populations.  Multiple studies using the social contract lexicon have 
replicated the results of Cosmides (1985) in support of the social contract theory.  Once 
considered an elusive effect on the Wason task by Wason himself (Wason & Johnson-Laird: 
1972), the thematic content phenomenon appears to consistently facilitate logical card choices 
only when the content involves a social contract.  Thus, reliability of the instrument is achieved 
when elements of social contracts are included in the conditional rule.   
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 5. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 Now that the theoretical groundwork outlining the natural science context of this research 
project and the detailed description of evolutionary psychology theory as well as  its empirical 
manifestation used in this research project have all been presented in the preceding chapters, the 
specific hypotheses related to my study are offered.  This chapter first describes the underlying 
assumptions necessary to construct the main effects and interaction effects hypotheses.  The 
independent variables manipulated in the study are discussed individually to build each 
hypothesis.  Then, the logic behind the expected results and posited direction of the hypotheses 
are offered.  Finally, the dissertation’s hypotheses are presented in the milieu of three separate 
categories designed to empirically test the existence of cheater-detection algorithms in a business 
population.   
 
5.1. Exposition 
 If indeed, natural selection has formed humans’ reasoning capabilities “by creating 
specialized, domain-specific cognitive mechanisms designed to solve discrete adaptive problems 
by activating reasoning processes appropriate to the domain encountered, then it can be said that 
the reasoning function in the brain is affected by specific content” (Cosmides, 1989: 190).  In 
other words, the neural circuits capable of solving particular adaptive problems through the 
development stages of the human brain were formed as distinct functions.  Since the form 
followed the function and one of the functions necessary for our ancestors’ survival was entering 
into social exchange relationships, the human brain requires specific cues from social 
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 interactions to activate these neural mechanisms.  The circuits are only useful to human survival 
if they are activated.   
 Hamilton’s rule (1964) discusses the selection pressures that actually affect the 
mechanisms that produce behaviors with survival value for an organism.  The biologically 
successful outcome behaviors in these contexts are defined by his rule.  “These outcomes often 
cannot be reached unless specific information is obtained and processed by the organism” 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1995: 1205).  According to Hamilton’s rule, in a simple dyadic relationship 
between two individuals, cognitive mechanisms will be evolutionarily helpful if they cause an 
individual to engage in social acts when the costs to the individual are less than the benefits 
received, more reliably than any other mechanism.  Hamilton described costs and benefits in 
terms of the reproductive benefit to an individual’s genes.  Mechanisms that follow this rule most 
closely have the greatest chance of being favored by natural selection. 
 Dyadic agency relationships represent one kind of social exchange in businesses today.  
“Delegation of specific tasks to those relatively more suited to perform them leverages…an 
application of comparative advantage” to the firm (Jacobides & Croson, 2001: 203).  
Metaphorically, this follows the same logic as the natural formation of social contracts by our 
Pleistocene ancestors. Tasks that could not be completed individually forced these hominids to 
group together to give bands a comparative advantage over others.  Achieving joint agency value 
becomes a key task for principals and agents in organizations.  In social science, organization 
theorists say that individuals are often constrained by bounded rationality (Simon, 1982) and 
suffer from an inability to have complete information about their environments.  Without perfect 
information, both contracting parties to an agency relationship perform inefficiently, creating a 
situation of moral hazard, “in which the agent can take undesirable actions (e.g., shirk…) that the 
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 principal cannot observe” (Jacobides & Croson, 2001: 203).  Evolutionarily speaking, this too is 
a problem in that if the specific costs and benefits are not recognized by each party in a social 
exchange, the social-contract/cheater-detection algorithms in the neural circuitry will not be 
triggered. 
 
5.2. Background Assumptions of Main Effects Hypotheses 
 Research has shown that a person’s perspective in a social exchange relationship is 
critical for the activation of the brain’s cheater-detection algorithms (Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992).  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, perspective is a key to humans’ ability to spot cheaters in social 
exchanges.  In other words, an individual must observe their contracting partner as having an 
ability to cheat in the relationship.  “If a person represents one person in a social contract, and the 
other party has a cheating option, then a cheater-detection algorithm is activated that searches for 
information of the kind ‘benefit taken and costs not paid’ (requirement not met) by the other 
party” (Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992: 165).  Subjects taking the tasks must be cued into a certain 
party perspective to perceive specific options to be chosen from the point of view of a specified 
actor on the other side of the contract.  The perspective taken by the respondent strongly affects 
the reasoning elicited and verifies the existence of a cheater-detection algorithm.  “The crucial 
issue about social contracts is the cheating option, which in turn is a function of the perspective” 
(p.165).  Unless a person is cued into a particular role in a dyadic social contract and the other 
party has a cheating option, the social-contract algorithms do not necessarily get activated.  
Gigerenzer and Hug posited that a separate cheater-detection algorithm was triggered only when 
the opportunity to cheat by a particular party in the relationship was described in the Wason 
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 tasks.  It was not enough to trigger the algorithms by merely describing a vague social contract 
relationship without cueing the respondent into a particular role. 
 Gigerenzer and Hug’s research is important to the evolutionary psychology approach 
because it provides powerful support for the existence of content-laden social-contract 
algorithms rather than content-free logical reasoning ones.  If social contract conditionals 
activate modules used for noticing violations of logic, then manipulating the perspective taken in 
a task should not have any effect on ability to solve the task, since perspectives do not play a role 
in formal logic.  Their research asked subjects to detect violations of conditional social contract 
rules regarding employee pensions.  Half of the subjects were given stories that cued them into 
the employer’s role and the other half into the employee’s role.  In both conditions, the majority 
of the subjects chose the adaptively correct response based on their perspective regardless of 
errors in logic.  There were no statistically significant differences in cheater detection rates 
between the two groups.   
This dissertation’s empirical study respects the importance of perspective for activation 
of the cheater-detection subroutine.  In each of the tasks, perspective is held constant by telling 
the story in the second person.   A principal and agent were presented in each distributed task, 
but subjects were asked to assume the role of owner in each variation.  Thus, in every task, 
respondents are cued into the role of the principal (owner). The agent was always the one being 
monitored in the scenarios and is always the person in the task having the opportunity to cheat.   
This variable was held constant in order to isolate the effects of intent and benefit received by 
cheating on cheater detection in the agency relationship.  The empirical study did not manipulate 
which party in the exchange relationship has the ability to cheat because the objective is to 
observe the main effects of only these two variables. 
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 5.3. Independent Variables  
5.3.1. Benefit received by cheating 
In addition to there being an ability to cheat by one party in the agency relationship, for 
the evolutionary modules in the brain to be triggered, there must also be a benefit derived by 
defecting from the conditional rule.  Tasks given to respondents must include information about 
the benefit that the other party in the social contract relationship could receive by not obeying the 
conditional rule stated.  Our Pleistocene brains will not recognize a social contract unless there 
are clear benefits and costs evident to the contracting parties.  I posit that a subject’s cheater-
detection algorithms are more likely to be triggered when that subject is aware that the 
contracting partner could receive a benefit by cheating on the social exchange relationship.   
 
5.3.2. Intent to cheat 
Closely related to the benefit derived by cheating in a relationship is the intent to cheat.  
In the dissertation study this variable is the contractor’s clearly stated desire to deviate.  It is 
stated in the evolutionary psychology literature that if a contracting partner either has a 
reputation for cheating or there is evidence of the intention to cheat, the cheater-detection 
algorithms are likely to be activated.   
In the agency theory literature, it is acknowledged that not all agents who misbehave are 
intending to do so.  Even with the utility maximizing, opportunistic assumptions that drive 
agency theory, there could be other intrinsic motivations influencing the agent (Pfeffer, 1997).  
The principal has another problem—honest incompetence of the agent (Hendry, 2002).  In this 
case, the agent is not cheating or violating the principal’s rules out of economic self-interest.  
Rather, the agent is not meeting the principal’s objectives because s/he is not qualified to do the 
job or because an honest mistake is made.  In standard principal-agent relationships, honesty is 
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 contrived by the monitoring and compensation mechanisms set in place by the principal.  Despite 
these mechanisms, however, honest ineptitude can still occur.  In evolutionary social contract 
terms, this can present a problem to the principal for knowing when cheating behavior is going 
on.  When there is no clear benefit to the agent for deviant behavior, the social-contract/cheater-
detection algorithms are not likely to be activated (Cosmides & Tooby, Working paper).  Thus, 
monitoring for cheaters would prove to be quite difficult. 
 
5.3.3. Agency Relationship 
 While intent to cheat and benefit derived by cheating are the two factors identified as 
affecting the activation of cheater-detection algorithms, a third variable is manipulated in the 
dissertation that extends the work of Cosmides and Tooby and others.  Evolutionary psychology 
research has not previously examined the effects of an organization hierarchy on the activation of 
the social-contract/cheater-detection algorithms.  Previous research using the Wason selection 
task to detect cheaters has looked only at direct dyadic social exchanges (Cheng & Holyoak, 
1985; Cosmides, 1987; 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992).  On tasks A 
through D of this dissertation’s research, a third party was imposed on the business scenario to 
resemble a common hierarchical arrangement in organizations—the agency relationship.   
 
5.4. Cheater-Detection Hypotheses 
 The dependent variable in this study is “cheater-detection.”  This variable is simply an 
individual’s ability to identify cheaters in a social contract arrangement.  Proficiency at this task 
is determined by which cards are turned over.  If the q and not-p documents are uncovered, then 
the cheaters can be detected.  Cheater detection was limited to only these two card choices in my 
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 study.  My first stint was to test variations in the rates of cheater detection across the Wason 
selection tasks that manipulate the two independent variables discussed in the previous section.  
Taking the entire sample collectively, differences were expected in the ability to detect cheaters 
across the five tasks.  This led to the null hypothesis which states: 
H0: There will be no significant difference in social-contract/cheater-detection reasoning 
across the tasks. 
 
The alternative hypothesis states there is a relationship between the independent variables and 
the dependent variable in the study at alpha of .05. 
H1: There will be a significant difference in social-contract/cheater-detection reasoning 
across the tasks. 
 
As outlined above, benefit received by cheating and intent to cheat prior research are 
necessary for activating the cheater-detection algorithms, which are a subroutine for entering into 
social contracts.  Thus, the main-effect hypotheses focus on cheater-detection in the adapted 
business context Wason selection tasks, based on the manipulation of these two main 
independent variables. 
 Social-contract/cheater-detection reasoning will vary positively with: 
H2a:  content which specifies that a contracting partner derives some benefit by  
cheating 
 H2b: content which specifies that a contracting partner had the intent to cheat. 
 
In other words, sensitivity to cheaters will vary as a function of intent and benefit, 
operationalized in the agency Wason selection tasks. 
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 5.4.1. Interaction Effect 
 
 Since each of the two factors is hypothesized to positively affect social-contract/cheater-
detection reasoning, the research also examines interaction effects between the independent and 
dependent variable.  A two-way interaction between the cheater-detection criteria is expected.  
Based on the grammar of social exchange (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989) and information necessary 
to activate the cheater-detection algorithms in the brain, performance on the agency Wason tasks 
should be enhanced when content about cheating intent and content about specific benefits 
derived by cheating are included in the scenario.  Cosmides and Tooby (1989) make no judgment 
regarding the relative importance of benefit received by cheating and intent to cheat for the 
activation of the cheater-detection circuit, but cost-and-benefit and intent must be present.  One 
without the other will not activate the social contract algorithm for participation in social 
exchange.  Thus, an interaction effect was predicted as reflected in Hypothesis 3. 
H3: There will be an interaction between intent to cheat and benefit received by cheating on the 
conditional rule on social-contract/cheater-detection reasoning. 
   
5.5. Agency Hypothesis 
 A separate test was conducted that specifically addresses the agency relationship variable.  
In business, a typical organizational arrangement involves an owner hiring a manager (or 
employee) to operate organizational functions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mitnick, 1997).  The 
separation of ownership and control became necessary in business when owners of companies no 
longer were able to manage all of their company’s affairs (Berle & Means, 1932).  This kind of 
hierarchical relationship was not foreign to our Pleistocene ancestors either.  Primitive social 
structures were not necessarily characteristically dyadic.  Hierarchies existed in primitive social 
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 group bands and exchanges often involved more than one contracting partner (Beals, Hoijer, & 
Beals, 1977; Bonner, 1980).  Thus, agency-type social group arrangements should not be 
unfamiliar to our Pleistocene-influenced minds.    
 Recently, a new conception of the social contract has been developed to counter the 
purely philosophical, socially a priori negotiation of parties to an exchange for the fair and just 
distribution of benefits.  The implicit social contract derived from natural law has pervaded the 
political philosophy literature for centuries (Hobbes, 1651; Rousseau, 1762) and also in the 
business and society literature in modern writings (Donaldson, 1989; Donaldson & Dunfee, 
1999).  Evolutionary social contract (ESC) is a much different term, with its roots in 
evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, and cognitive neuroscience.  It is a naturally 
developed tool used to create and sustain mutually beneficial cooperative relationships.  More 
specifically, ESCs are “dynamic social exchange relationships and the biological and social 
processes that produce them, governed by ancestrally shaped neural circuits…keyed to achieve 
individual and/or group advantage in a context of social reciprocity” (Frederick & Wasieleski, 
2002: 290).  Social reciprocity moderates self-serving behaviors in social exchanges.  “Selection 
arising out of the advantages and risks of exchanging favors with our fellows has shaped not only 
our social behavior but also our reasoning abilities” (Gaulin & McBurney, 2001: 166). 
 It is important to emphasize that at no point do ESCs reject the idea that self-interested 
behavior occurs in social exchanges.  One aspect of human behavior is indeed individualistic.  
However, it is not the only explanation of human motives.  Although it is acknowledged that 
seemingly altruistic behavior on behalf of one of the contracting parties is partly due to the fear 
of being penalized for breaching the contract (Binmore, 1994), humans do wish to partake in 
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 social exchanges for long-term mutual benefit.  Reciprocal altruism is responsible for regulating 
and constraining social exchanges (Frederick & Wasieleski, 2002; Trivers, 1971).   
 Unlike the philosophical notion of the social contract, evolutionary social contracts are 
real relationships between contracting parties.  The traditional philosophic concept of abstract 
social contracts is replaced by one that is rooted in biologically-driven individual and 
organizational behavior.  ESCs form in response to, and exist within, ecological challenges and 
are sustained by a need to develop individual and group advantage.  One important feature of 
ESCs is that they exist within a given sociocultural system and the power hierarchies that exist 
therein.  In other words, ESCs can take a variety of forms depending on the cultural origins of a 
particular social class system.  Conceptions of justice and fairness depend greatly on the cultural 
features of the environment in which the relationship exists.   
Principal-agent relationships in business organizations are one such context.  The agent 
acts on behalf of the principal creating a power differential and a context in which social 
reciprocity (Trivers, 1971) and exchanges take place.   The agent’s role in each agency 
relationship is explicitly defined.  “Contractual understandings are consciously deliberated, not 
merely inferred or implied” (Frederick & Wasieleski, 2002: 293).  Distributive justice in this 
context is largely determined by the pragmatic goals outlined by the principal and the society in 
which the business operates.  The obligations of the agent and rules to be followed are originally 
designed by the practical needs of the principal.  Thus, the principal possesses power.  The 
symbiotic-mutualistic impulses are countered by self-seeking, power aggrandizing impulses that 
are conditioned by the organization’s design and prevailing culture.  Principal-agent relationships 
are very much one kind of evolutionary social contract. 
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  This dissertation also examined whether this agency-type arrangement makes a difference 
in individuals’ ability to detect cheaters in a business context by comparing cheater-detection 
rates on two tasks with both evolutionary factors necessary for cheater detection (intent to cheat 
and benefit derived by cheating) present.  Since our Pleistocene ancestors were faced with 
hierarchical social arrangements, I did not expect there to be a difference in cheater detection 
rates between the task with an agency arrangement and the task that has direct dyadic 
relationships.  Thus, Hypothesis 4 states: 
H4: The agency relationship will have no effect on cheater detection rates on the Wason 
selection tasks.    
 
5.6. Populations Hypothesis 
This research also tested two main populations of respondents on the adapted Wason 
selection task: 1) business students enrolled in undergraduate business courses and 2) business 
managers and employees of corporate firms enrolled in graduate business courses.  Prior research 
has tested diverse populations on their ability to detect cheaters in social contract type scenarios.  
Cosmides (1989) adapted the original Wason abstract logic task (Wason, 1966) and Cheng and 
Holyoak’s (1985) general permission schema tests to reflect real-life and fictitious social contract 
scenarios for a population of Harvard University undergraduates.  When faced with both regular 
and switched logic decision rule Wason social-contract tasks, respondents successfully detected 
cheaters 65-75% of the time across all contexts.  Regardless of whether the social contract 
situation described in the task is consistent with the respondents’ past experiences or not, cheater 
detection rates remain high.  As noted, Sugiyama, Tooby, and Cosmides (2002) administered 
similar tests using the adapted Wason instrument to Shiwiar hunter-horticulturalists of the 
Ecuadorian Amazon.  Their study found that “Shiwiar subjects were as highly proficient at 
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 cheater detection as subjects from developed nations” (Sugiyama et. al: 11537).  They 
discovered that cheater-relevant task choices had an indistinguishable frequency from the 
Harvard undergraduates.  These findings suggest that social-contract/cheater-detection 
algorithms are deeply-embedded in human brains and that diverse cultural experiences do not 
significantly affect individuals’ success on the tasks.   
However, as discussed earlier in this section, role perspective makes a difference in the 
detection of cheaters.  The role people assume for the tasks influences how they make choices.  
Gigerenzer & Hug (1992) posited that which party to a social contract a person is cued to will 
determine which cards on the selection task are more likely to be turned over.   So, they added an 
important dimension (perspective) that considers whom a respondent is examining in a social 
exchange (for cheating).  Other important research in the area has examined cross-cultural 
reasoning patterns in humans (Cosmides, 1985; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Hirschfeld & 
Gelman, 1994; Sugiyama, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2002) to determine whether social-contract 
reasoning is universal and how local culturally-differentiated environments influence their 
operation and activation.  This research generally posits that “contrary to the general-purpose 
hypothesis, subjects perform just as well on their very first exposure to culturally unfamiliar 
social contracts as they do on culturally familiar ones” (Sugiyama, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2002: 
11538). 
Consistent with these findings, both the undergraduate students and the business 
practitioner graduate students were expected to be proficient in cheater-detection given the 
necessary ingredients for a social contract situation.  However, their ability to detect cheaters 
should be affected by any type of work experience or organizational socialization even though 
the circuits are deeply embedded in the cognitive architecture.   The role assumed by the 
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 respondent was thought to have a great influence on the card choices for detecting cheaters.  If 
respondents take the perspective of owner in the tasks, then the adaptively correct answer would 
be to choose the Bonus received (q) and the Produced less than 1000 units (not-p) cards.  The 
benefit received and cost-not-paid cards are important to a principal who is seeking to know if 
s/he is being cheated.  On the other hand, respondents taking the perspective of agent (whether it 
was the manager or the employees) would have made significantly different card choices.  
Respondents may look for an employee getting cheated and therefore not look for violations of 
the conditional rule.  In this case, a Bonus not received (not-q) and Produced 1000 units (p) were 
predicted to be the more common choices.   Subjects with work experience were expected to 
reason (variously) through the scenarios.  Organizational socialization could affect the activation 
of the social contract algorithms.  More specifically, individuals with full-time work experience 
in business may be better able to recognize potential cheaters due to their exposure to 
organizational cultures where rules are specified and enforced.   
Psychological contracts are another way of viewing the principal-agent relationship.  
They are based on the concept of social exchange.  The rules of the exchange can be implicit and 
informal, and exchanges usually take place only when the parties perceive their contract partner 
to be cooperative rather than defecting.  Theoretically, psychological contracts “consist of sets of 
individual beliefs or perceptions regarding reciprocal obligations” (Robinson, Kraatz, & 
Rousseau, 1994: 138).  In terms of employee/employer relationships, these beliefs are shaped by 
the organization, which dictates the two parties’ agreement (Van Buren, 2000).  Both the 
employer and the employee believe the other is obligated implicitly to act on behalf of the other 
in their relationship.  The agreement, however, need not be a written, formal contract.  On the 
contrary, it is cognitive and perceptual in nature, and may be quite informal.  Each party 
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 cognitively perceives the other’s obligations in the relationship based on what was agreed upon 
when the relationship was formed.    Despite the fact that this contract is perceptual, “individuals 
act in accordance with what they believe themselves to have agreed to” (Van Buren, 2000: 208).  
Thus, it influences an individual’s behavior.  From the employee’s point of view, the 
psychological contract dictates what they feel they owe to their employer, and what they feel that 
is owed to them by their employer (Robinson, Kraatz, & Rousseau, 1994). 
Psychological contracts add a critical piece to the social exchange puzzle that goes 
beyond the evolutionary psychologists’ discovery that humans’ minds are evolved to detect 
cheaters, thus facilitating social exchange.  Cheater detection cannot be explained by cognitive 
neuroscience alone.  The triggering of cheater-detection algorithms is conditioned and moderated 
by individual perceptions of the environmental context.   In business, this environment is the 
organization, which embodies a culture, functional design hierarchies, and standards of behavior 
of its own.  Since the business environment is changing at such a rapid pace with constantly 
evolving technologies at the helm, perceptions of mutuality in terms of the psychological 
contract are hard to foster and tend “to be fleeting and ephemeral” (Frederick & Wasieleski, 
2002: 298).   
Cosmides and Tooby (in press) admit that this problem exists and attribute it to agency 
relationships.  They recognize that a perceived benefit to the company is not necessarily going to 
be perceived as a benefit to one of the contracting parties to a social exchange.  “Agents who do 
not see the company’s costs and benefits as such are unlikely to spontaneously attend to potential 
cases of cheating by employees or clients” (p.19).   
Thus, it was reasonable in the present study to posit that a respondent’s place in the 
organization would affect perceptions of social contracts and obligations to an organization.  The 
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 knowledge individuals possess and the perspective taken may moderate the cheater-detection 
subroutine of the social contract algorithms.  Hypothesis 5 follows: 
H5:  When presented with a conditional reasoning test in a business context, business 
practitioners will demonstrate higher rates of cheater detection than will undergraduate 
business students. 
 
5.7. Expected Results 
 As previously discussed, social exchange theory from evolutionary psychology predicts 
that a conditional rule framed as a social contract will elicit rates of cheater detection of 
approximately 65-75% when both intent and benefit received are present in the scenario.  These 
expected rates are based on direct dyadic social contract situations, rather than ones with an 
agency relationship.  According to the theory, it should matter little that the scenarios are framed 
in a business context (Cosmides, 1989; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992), although no empirical studies 
have been performed on business agency arrangements.  Thus, it was not a stretch to predict rates 
of cheater detection in this study of 65-75% for task E.  Any other results are speculative.  Since 
no study has ever tried to test the agency arrangement, I was limited by the lack of findings from 
previous research.  However, if both independent variables are present and the conditional rule is 
framed as a social contract, the theory holds that humans are hardwired to detect cheaters despite 
an agency arrangement.  So, I expected cheater detection rates to be as high for task A as for task 
E.  The theory predicts that cheater detection rates should drop by about 20% for each removed 
independent variable (Barrett, 1999).  So, tasks B and C (with one of the two independent 
variables included in the text) should have elicited rates of cheater detection of about 45-55%.  
Task D (with neither independent variable present—the control scenario) should have elicited the 
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 lowest rates (an expected 25-35%) because it did not have the makeup of a social contract in 
evolutionary psychology terms.   
It is also important to realize that there is much variation on rates of p and not-q 
responses, historically.  To replicate Cosmides’ findings from her earlier work, one must strive 
for rates exceeding 67 percent.  Gigerenzer and Hug (1992) achieved rates of over 90 percent 
across four experiments in their study.  Other studies have reported significantly lower rates.  
Barrett (1999) achieved a rate of 63 percent on his social contract task with all cheater conditions 
(intent, benefit, and ability to cheat) present.  Other work by Cosmides (1992) has reported 
cheater-detection rates of around 60 percent on social contract tasks for undergraduate samples.  
While these results may appear to be inconsistent, each of the studies consistently demonstrated 
that rates of “benefit taken” and “cost not paid” cards were higher for social contract tasks than 
other types of scenarios.  Not one study has shown otherwise.  The differences in rates are what 
each study sought to highlight. 
A preliminary study for this research project was run in the spring of 2002, where a group 
of Masters of Business students was surveyed at Carnegie Mellon University.  A convenience 
sample of 61 students in a classroom setting were asked to answer two Wason selection tasks—
both from Cosmides (1989).  The one task, the abstract logic task originally was created by 
Wason in 1966.  The second task, the Drinking Age Problem (see Appendix), was originally 
written by Griggs and Cox (1982).  Only 4 students out of the 61 (.065 percent) correctly 
identified the p and not-q cards on the abstract logic task, which is consistent with previous 
research (Wason, 1966; Cosmides, 1989).  The Drinking Age Problem—framed as a social 
contract—elicited rates of p and not-q card choices among 65 percent of the students sampled, 
which again, is consistent with previous research (Cosmides, 1985; 1989).  This preliminary 
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 study was part of a pretest that was used to construct an adapted business scenario selection task.  
It also served a purpose to determine the expected rates of cheater detection on social contract 
tasks.  By applying these published tasks to a business sample, I felt more comfortable predicting 
similar rates for tasks that included the same independent variables (intent and benefit on social 
contract tasks).   
 
5.8. Toward an Evolutionary Psychology Theory of Organizational Social Contracts  
 
Verification of the aforementioned hypothesized relationships among variables and 
differences between groups may provide insight into why social exchange relationships—
particularly social contracts between two or more individuals in business—are breached.  This 
study is potentially an early major step in understanding what affects the activation of cheater-
detection algorithms in the minds of employees in a business organization.   
The dissertation takes a strong stance that social-contract algorithms and their cheater-
detection subroutine mechanisms are part of the evolved set of neural circuits present in the 
neural architecture of the modern brain.  This implies that someone has much experience in a 
business setting as a manager or an employee has no bearing on the position that these circuits 
exist and are active in negotiating social contract relationships in business.  Since today’s 
humans are products of an evolutionary past, it is plausible that these structures regulate to some 
degree how social contracts in business today are managed.  The only question remaining 
regards what factors influence their activation or suppression in modern business environments.   
Due in large part to the highly interactive relationship of nature and nurture (i.e. biology 
and culture), the precise sensitivity of these algorithms in modern business minds is somewhat 
unclear or uncertain.   The current organizational conditions facing managers may indeed affect 
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 the activation of the algorithms.  Hierarchical relationships in business corporations with power 
conferred to certain positions and relinquished in other job descriptions should manipulate the 
sensitivity of the neural circuits to the trigger variables of intent to cheat and benefit received by 
cheating.  Since this dissertation is the first to empirically examine the brain’s evolutionary 
social contract modules in business, the insights from these various tests will inform a potential 
theory of evolutionary social contracts in organizations.   
Before discussing the results of the hypotheses tests, the following chapter carefully 
describes the methodology and research design used in the dissertation study.   
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 6. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 In this chapter, the research design and methodology for testing the hypotheses are 
described in detail.  First, the adapted version of the Wason selection task used in this project is 
discussed.  Two pilot studies were conducted to aid in the construction of the instrument.  Those 
studies are discussed in this section to show how knowledge obtained through their results 
informed the modification of the instrument and the operationalization of the variables.  Then, 
the rationale behind the determination of the sample size for each cell in the study is outlined.  
From this, the study’s research design is shown as well as a presentation of the process for 
obtaining the respondents and the data for the final study.  Finally, the data collection and 
analysis techniques are identified and justified for the final iteration of the study (results of 
which are given in the next chapter).   
 
6.1. Adapted Wason Selection Task and Test Statistic Development: Pilot Studies 
This dissertation study utilized a switched social contract form of the conditional rule.   
As explained in detail in Chapter 4, this type of configuration reverses the antecedent and the 
consequent of the conditional rule to If q, then p.  Thus, the cost that must be paid is framed as 
the antecedent, and the benefit received if that cost is paid becomes the consequent.  The 
switched conditional rule structure was used to eliminate the possibility that logical reasoning 
procedures explain the results, rather than the intended evolutionarily-stable elucidation. 
Specifically, a single Wason selection task was constructed and varied it five ways.  From 
Cosmides and Tooby’s adaptations (see Chapter 3), this study goes one step further by taking the 
social contract scenarios that involve two contracting parties and injecting a hierarchical three-
party arrangement that is common in modern organizations.  Also, the scenario itself describes a 
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 business context.  The agency arrangement tasks all deal with the owner of a manufacturing firm 
(the principal) who hires a manager (the agent) to manage the salaries of four employees.  Their 
compensation is based on the social contract conditional rule: If an employee produces more than 
1000 units in a week, then that employee receives a pay bonus.  Two dichotomous independent 
variables are manipulated in the tasks—intent to cheat and benefit received by cheating.  
Respondents are told that they are to determine if the manager is breaking the owner’s 
conditional rule by examining four cards each representing one employee.  One side of the card 
shows whether or not a bonus was received and the other tells how much the employee 
produced.  The adaptively correct response in the tasks remains the same for all five—q and not-
p.  For this, the q is Bonus received, and the not-p is Produced less than 1000 units.  If the 
conditional rule is to be obeyed, it is necessary to turn over the card that says, Bonus received, 
because as the person monitoring the actions of the agent, the respondent to the task would wish 
to see if someone falsely accepted a bonus without producing the required units.  Likewise, one 
monitoring the actions of the agent would also need to turn over the card that says, Produced less 
than 1000 units, because the respondent would wish to see if the employee who didn’t meet the 
production quota undeservedly received a bonus.   
 
6.1.1. Pilot Study A: First Iteration 
 Two pilot studies were conducted from the fall 2003 through the winter of 2004.  These 
studies provided preliminary results that were efficacious in determining the wording of the final 
instrument.  Those studies are reported in this section. 
In the fall semester 2003, five separate classes of students were surveyed at the 
University of Pittsburgh and Duquesne University to determine if social contract reasoning with 
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 a cheater-detection subroutine was elicited from a business student population.  Seventy 
undergraduate business students and fifty-nine business practitioners (taken from a Master of 
Business Administration student sample) participated in the experiment.  Each subject was given 
one task as part of a three-page packet including instructions and a demographic survey.  Tasks 
were distributed randomly and counterbalanced to assure that the respondents had a chance of 
receiving any of the tasks.  The instructions requested that the participants read the scenario on 
the second page carefully and answer the question pertaining to the cards at the bottom of the 
page.  Students were told to take as much time as they needed to complete the task but not to 
return to the task once they had reached the survey on page three.  Most respondents completed 
the experiment and survey in about 5 minutes.  The average age of the undergraduate business 
students was 21.2, and was 31.6 for the business practitioner group.  Thirty-two of the seventy 
undergraduate business students were female, while twenty out of the fifty-nine business 
practitioner students were female.   
 
6.1.2. Test Statistics and Procedures for Data Analysis  
For consistency, the pilot studies tested the same hypotheses as described in Chapter 5.  
Data for both pilot studies and the final study were entered into a Microsoft Excel for Windows 
XP spreadsheet for sorting and documentation purposes.  Answers from every subject were 
logged and sorted by class.  Information regarding gender, work experience, natural country of 
origin, and age were entered into the spreadsheet along with a detailed description of which cards 
were chosen on each task.  Instead of simply coding for information regarding the adaptively 
correct response, this additional detail provided richer descriptive information on subjects’ 
thought processes.  Thus, coding was supplied for responses of p, not-p, q, and not-q.   
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 To determine statistical significance, the statistical software package, StatGraphics, was 
used to test the hypotheses of the main and interaction effects. Percentages of adaptively correct 
responses on each of the five tasks were calculated for both populations of subjects—the 
undergraduate students and the MBA business practitioners.  Then, the cheater-detection 
responses were compared to one another to determine statistical significance.  Thus, each cell in 
the 2 x 2 factorial between-subjects design was compared on the percentage of successful cheater 
detection.  Since this study deals with categorical data rather than quantitative data, a chi-square 
test was applicable to test for “comparing observed frequencies with theoretically predicted 
frequencies” (Howell, 1999: 373).  This goodness-of-fit test is useful in determining whether 
there is a reasonable fit between the data reflecting observed frequencies of a response (cheater-
detection) and the theoretical frequencies of a response.  Chi-square statistics are often used “to 
find whether the observed proportions in two or more categories differ significantly from a priori 
or theoretically expected proportions” (Glass & Hopkins, 1996: 330).  A chi-square is a test of 
significance for “the degree of agreement between the data actually obtained and that expected 
under the null hypothesis” (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991: 54-55).   Before I examined which cells 
in the design are statistically different based on the dependent variable, it was necessary to test 
whether cheater-detection was independent from the distributed tasks in order to test the null 
hypothesis.  It was desirable to establish whether the dependent variable used in the studies was 
autonomous from the tasks.  Thus, a chi-square test was used to assess the possibility that the 
dependent variable is independent from the tasks administered in the pilot study.    
Any test for this purpose is acceptable and other methods exist which are interchangeable 
and equally valid.  Previous studies using the Wason selection task in evolutionary psychology 
have used a two-tailed analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test the null hypothesis (Cosmides, 
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 1985; Cosmides, 1989; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992).  ANOVAs are one of the most “widely-used 
statistics in behavioral studies research” (Miller, 1998: 151).  It is useful for testing hypothesized 
relationships of equality of two or more independent groups.  Thus, the analysis of variance 
seeks to determine whether there is a variance between the groups in a 2 x 2 factorial design.  In 
order to discover whether the difference among the means of the cells in the study is larger than 
anticipated from random error, an ANOVA is performed (Glass & Hopkins, 1996).  In this study, 
the five tasks were evaluated against the dependent variable, cheater detection, to see if any such 
variance exists in the sample.  Any variance that was detected by the ANOVA test statistic 
mandated that a more detailed data analysis is needed to pinpoint from where the variation is 
originating.   
Since this study examines dichotomous variables and percentages of a particular 
response, it compared the difference between the rates of cheater-detection responses rather than 
the mean of a response.  In order to test for the significance between rates of cheater detection on 
independent samples, a z-test was performed between all the cells in the factorial design 
(Andrews et. al, 1981; Glass & Hopkins, 1999).  With the use of the z-test, it was possible to 
examine whether social-contract/cheater-detection reasoning on the tasks varies positively with 
the manipulation of the two independent variables, as stated in the hypotheses.   Previous 
research using the Wason selection task for social-contract/cheater-detection reasoning has used 
this type of data analysis to determine if rates of cheater detection were significantly different on 
varied types of task problems (Cosmides, 1985; Cosmides, 1989; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992).  The 
present study uses this test statistic to examine differences between cells on observed results and 
also to examine differences between expected results and observed results.  The z-test is used to 
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 determine whether there are significant differences between the undergraduate sample and the 
business practitioner sample on the cheater-detection dependent variable, as hypothesized.    
To further evaluate where the variance is coming from, comparisons between the rates of 
cheater-detection on each task was necessary.  This is accomplished by running a z-test on the 
percentages of cheater-detection.  Decisions regarding acceptance of hypotheses 2 through 5 of 
this dissertation are based on the probability that sampling error was the reason for the observed 
difference in rates between the tasks if the null hypothesis were true (Glass & Hopkins, 1996).  
P-values of less than .05 indicate between which tasks the variance exists.  Z-tests for 
proportions are calculated using the following formula: 
z = ρ-π/σ at α= .05. 
Since this study looked at proportions rather than means, t-statistics were less appropriate and 
were not used (Andrews et al., 1981).   
 
6.1.3. Pilot Study A: Instrument 
 In the preliminary stages of this research project, multiple tasks were designed to reflect 
the perspective of each party in the agency relationship—the owner, the manager, and the 
employees.  Soon after, in the pretest period of instrument development, it was decided to hold 
the perspective constant so as to isolate only the effects of the manipulation of the two 
independent variables.  Never before in the evolutionary psychology literature had perspective 
been changed in the same study.  The perspective in which respondents were cued always 
remained the same for repeated iterations of the same basic task (Cosmides, 1989).  Since this 
study was designed to be an extension of that research stream, the perspective was not varied. 
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  In the first round of data collection, five tasks were constructed to reflect the 
manipulation of intent to cheat and benefit derived by cheating in the same business scenario.  
All five tasks were placed in a manufacturing, social contract context. The context involved a 
manufacturer of widgets in each task.  The owner of the firm hired a Human Resources manager 
to manage compensation of the employees of the company.  Because of a serious financial 
situation, the owner instructed the manager to award bonuses only to highly productive 
employees, defined by the number of units produced.  All of the tasks were gender neutral and 
all were told in the third person.  While this context did not change from task to task, the terms of 
the scenario did.  The chart below (Table 6.1) illustrates which key statements were manipulated 
from task to task.   Everything else in the tasks, including the card choices and rationale for the 
conditional rule, are held constant.   
 
Table 1 Manipulation of Independent Variable in Pilot Study A: Operationalization 
ID Variable Task A Task B Task C Task D 
Intent to Cheat “The owner 
suspects the 
manager is 
breaking the 
rule…”  
“The owner 
suspects the 
manager is 
breaking the rule 
to undercut the 
owner’s 
approach.” 
“This manager is a 
good team player 
and would do 
nothing to 
intentionally harm 
the owner.  Lately, 
the manager has 
been making 
mistakes.” 
“The manager is a 
good team player and 
would do nothing to 
intentionally harm the 
owner. Lately, the 
manager has been 
making mistakes.” 
Benefit  “…accepting 
kickbacks from 
the employees 
for doing so.” 
“…disagrees with 
the rule and 
believes it is 
unfair to 
employees.”   
“Whenever the 
manager gives an 
employee a bonus, 
the manager 
benefits by 
receiving a 
percentage of it.” 
No text is written to 
reflect the benefit 
derived from 
cheating. 
Presence of 
Variable  
Intent and 
Benefit 
Intent; no benefit No intent; benefit No intent; no benefit 
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  Additionally, each task included a statement of emphasis immediately before the question 
was asked of the respondents.  In the final paragraph, the tasks included the sentences displayed 
below: 
Task A: “The manager may be receiving kickbacks for breaking the rule.” 
Task B: “The manager may be breaking the rule because the manager thinks it is unfair to 
employees.” 
Task C: The distracted manager may have been breaking the rule by mistake, and inadvertently 
benefiting from it.” 
Task D: “The distracted manager may have been breaking the rule by mistake.” 
 
 Task E manipulated the wording of the variables as well as the context of the scenario.  
First of all, to reflect a situation where the manager deals directly with the employees of the 
manufacturing plant, the text omitted any description of the presence of a Human Resources 
manager altogether. Secondly, the independent variables were described as such: “When it 
comes to reporting how many units they produced, the employees are on an honor system.”  
(This statement indicates that some benefit can accrue to the employees.)  “The owner suspects 
that some employees may be breaking the rule.” (Indicating that there is an intent to cheat.)  In 
the final paragraph before the respondent was asked to turn over the cards, the following 
statement was added: “Some of the employees may be cheating.”   
 As the first iteration of the instrument toward final study development, the results were 
unexpected.  The results of Pilot Study A are discussed in the next section.   
 
6.1.4. Pilot Study A: Results 
If mechanisms specialized for cheater detection are universal features of the human brain, 
applicable to a business population, then the expected card choice on the tasks to detect cheaters 
would be benefit received and cost-not-paid, or q and not-p.   All the tasks tested for an 
individual’s ability to detect cheaters of the identical conditional rule even though the 
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 independent variables were manipulated.  This means that the same card choices were necessary 
for cheater detection on all iterations of the tasks.   
Table 6.2 shows the percentage of individuals choosing q and not-p exclusively in the 
pilot study.  Results in the table indicate the percentage of respondents who chose the adaptively 
correct response to the tasks and are broken down by task and by population (undergraduate 
business students and MBA business practitioners).The results are lower than expected based on 
the predicted values (Please refer back to Chapter 5.) for tasks A and E, the tasks with intent and 
benefit received from cheating, although the results are in the predicted direction. When 
evaluating the results, it must be kept in mind that sample sizes were lower than recommended 
by previous studies and by my calculations.   
 
Table 2 Pilot Study A Results: Percentage of Subjects Choosing q and not-p 
 Task A Task B Task C Task D Task E 
ALL 52.2 
n=23 
38.1 
n=21 
36.4 
n=22 
32.0 
N=25 
52.6 
N=38 
Undergrad 63.6 
n=11 
45.5 
n=11 
33.3 
n=12 
38.5 
N=13 
47.8 
N=23 
Graduate 41.2 
n=12 
30.0 
n=10 
40.0 
n=10 
25.0 
N=12 
60.0 
N=15 
Predicted 65-75% 45-55% 45-55% 25-35% 65-75% 
 
In the first pilot study, I chose a chi-square statistic.  For the entire sample of the first 
pilot study, a chi-square value of 4.05 with 4 degrees of freedom was calculated (p=.3999).  The 
p-value is greater than .05, which means I could not reject the null hypothesis that cheater-
detection is independent from the tasks.  This indicated that the observed number of cheater-
detection responses may have no relationship to the manipulation of the tasks themselves.   
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 It was predicted that even on agency-type tasks, subjects would demonstrate high rates 
(65-75%) of cheater-detection when intent and benefit are present in the scenarios leading to the 
task.  Recall that this rate of choosing the adaptively correct response, q and not-p, is based on 
the dyadic social contract rates from previous research.  For each necessary variable extracted 
from the scenarios leading to the task, a .20 drop in cheater-detection is expected (Barrett, 1999).  
The variance in cheater-detection was less than this hypothesized difference.   
As stated, to determine whether the percentages between the tasks were significant, a z-
test was performed to compare observed rates between cells and to compare expected rates with 
observed rates.  Since the sample sizes were so low, and because the chi-square statistic was so 
high, no significant differences between cells was expected at first glance.  Thus, I compared 
only the differences in cheater-detection rates between the two extremes—task A and task D.  
Logically, if this difference showed no significant results, then the remaining pairings would 
reveal nothing significant either.  When the agency social contract task (with intent to cheat and 
benefit received from cheating) was compared to the agency social contract task (with no intent 
and no benefit received), a z-value of 1.41806 was calculated (p=.156174).  Since this p-value 
was above the alpha of .05, Hypotheses 2a and 2b stating that social-contract/cheater-detection 
reasoning will vary positively with scenarios including intent to cheat and benefit received from 
cheating) were rejected.  The same comparison of tasks A and D was repeated individually for 
the undergraduate sample and the graduate sample.   The z-statistic for the undergraduates was 
1.22537 (p=.220436).  For the graduate sample, the z-test was .843264 (p=.399079).  Neither 
group revealed a statistically significant result.  These results also provided no statistical support 
for Hypothesis 3, which states, there will be an interaction between intent to cheat and benefit 
received by cheating on the conditional rule of agency social contract tasks, since cheater-
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 detection rates on the task with both independent variables was not significantly higher than the 
task without either variable. 
To test against the direct social contract task E (Hypothesis 4), which describes a direct 
social contract relationship between owner and employee, rates of cheater detection on task A 
were compared with rates of cheater detection on task E.  Both tasks contained information 
regarding an intent to cheat by one party and benefit received by cheating for the same party.  It 
is no surprise that this pilot study revealed no significant differences in cheater detection between 
the subjects taking task A versus those taking task E (z=.182237; p=.92991).   
Finally, the undergraduate sample was compared to the graduate practitioner sample for 
overall cheater detection in order to test for significant differences as predicted by Hypothesis 5.  
The undergraduates chose the adaptively correct response 45.7% of the time, while the graduates 
chose q and not-p only at a rate of 40.7%.  No statistically significant differences were found in 
this case either as z=.38185 (p=.63512).   
Two manipulation checks for the independent variables were added to the survey on the 
last page for the pilot study to make certain respondents were recognizing the independent 
variables being manipulated.  The first manipulation check asked the students to what extent they 
interpreted there being intent to cheat present in the task they read and completed on the previous 
page.   The second manipulation check asked the students to what extent they interpreted there 
being benefit received by cheating in the task they read and completed on the previous page.   
For tasks A through D, the manipulation check asked the respondents about perceived intent and 
benefit related to the manager of the scenario.  The direct social contract scenario, however, does 
not contain a manager, so the manipulation check asked the respondents about intent and benefit 
related to the employees in the scenario.  Internal manipulation checks of this kind are useful to 
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 determine “the effectiveness of experimental treatments” (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991: 622).  
The instructions requested that subjects not return to the scenario once they had reached the 
anonymous survey page of their packets.  This was to prevent the respondents from learning 
what independent variables are being manipulated and then using that information to correctly 
solve the tasks.     
The manipulation checks (See Appendix A) utilized a 7-point Likert scale, where a “1” 
indicates “Definitely No” and a “7” indicates “Definitely Yes” in terms of there being intent and 
benefit received in the scenario.  Subjects were able to choose a “4” to indicate that they were 
“Not sure” if there was intent or benefit received in the scenario.  To determine whether 
respondents performing the tasks were choosing the necessary cards to detect violations of the 
conditional rule (cheaters) due to the presence or absence of the independent variables, a t-test 
was run on each variable in each of the tasks for both populations.  In other words, the t-test was 
run to see if there were statistically significant differences in cheater detection based on 
respondents’ perceptions of the existence of each independent variable.  So, it was important to 
determine if the respondents who successfully detected the cheaters also perceived there being 
intent and benefit in the scenario when it was indeed there.  The Likert scale means of the two 
manipulation checks were compared on tasks that actually contained the variables to see if the 
differences in cheater detection were related to perceptions of the presence of those independent 
variables.   
There are two possible reasons for the unexpected results.  Even though sample sizes 
were smaller than recommended and the instrument was distributed during finals (period when 
attention may be elsewhere), the focus was then turned to the empirical instrument.  Since the 
results were statistically insignificant, either the theory was wrong or the instrument was flawed.  
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 At the time of these pilot studies, there was little evidence that the problem rested with the 
theory.  Multiple studies have replicated results of cheater detection rates exceeding 65% on 
social contract tasks. (Please see Chapter 4 for a discussion of those studies.)  Based on this 
empirical support, the theory states that individuals are able to choose the adaptively correct 
response on violations of conditional rules framed as a social contract.  This indicates there is 
evidence that a content-dependent neural circuit exists, which tempers reasoning about social 
exchange.     
On the survey page of the packet distributed to students performing the tasks, two 
manipulation checks for the independent variables, intent to cheat and benefit received by 
cheating were administered.  The data analysis of these manipulation checks was quite revealing.  
On the variable, benefit received by cheating, a t-test was run comparing the means of detected 
benefit on tasks containing the benefit variable in the scenario with the means of detected benefit 
on tasks without the benefit variable included.  The mean of the former group was µ=4.96296, 
+/- .414331 (S.D.= 4.54863, 5.37729), and the mean of the latter group was µ=3.97826, +/- 
.474685 (S.D.= 3.50358, 4.45295).  The t-statistic calculated by comparing these values was 
2.99712 (p=.0032).  The p-value was well below the recommended alpha of .05.  Thus, there was 
a significant difference between the means indicating that subjects were indeed detecting the 
benefit received by cheating when it was included in the task.   
Turning to the intent to cheat variable, a very different result was tallied, telling a much 
different story.  When the means of detected intent on the tasks containing the intent variable in 
the scenario were compared to the means of detected intent on the tasks without the intent 
variable included, no significance was found.  The mean of the former group was 3.63415, +/- 
.279455 (3.35469, 3.9136), and the mean of the latter group was 3.40426, +/- .344478 (3.05978, 
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 3.74873).  The t-statistic was 1.01578 (p=.311665).  The extremely high value for alpha indicates 
that subjects are not detecting the intent variable in the tasks.   
I concluded from this data analysis on the first pilot study that the tasks including the 
variable intent to cheat needed to be revised (tasks A, B, and E) to make the variable more 
obvious to respondents.  One possible problem with this set of data was that each task told a 
different context in order to manipulate intent to cheat and benefit received by cheating.  Thus, 
additional variables were being imposed which could have confused the results.  Rather than 
trying to critique the theory driving the empirical research, it made logical sense to revise the 
instrument and run another study. 
 
6.1.5. Pilot Study B 
In this round of data collection, which served as my second pilot study for the dissertation 
project, the language on the tasks was tightened by making the manipulations consistent.  Instead 
of using entirely different scenarios to illustrate intent and benefit, and the lack thereof, this 
round used the same context of “monitoring for employee bonuses” across all five tasks.  But 
still, the reasons for intent and benefit varied from task to task.  In the agency arrangement task 
with intent and benefit for instance, the manager could receive kickbacks as the benefit, but in 
the direct social contract task (task E), s/he was trying to curry favor with the employees.  The 
conditional rule remained the same for all tasks: “If an employee produces more than 1000 units 
in a week, then that employee receives a pay bonus.”  Yet, the reasons for intent and benefit did 
vary across the tasks.   
 As was true in Pilot Study A, Pilot Study B’s scenarios were told in the third person, with 
the respondent not cued into either role.   
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  It was believed that the unexpected results in the first pilot study were due in part to a 
lack of clarity in the text about what the respondent was supposed to do.  Thus, additional 
rhetoric was included in the independent variable paragraph after the conditional rule.  On each 
of the tasks, the statement, “You want to find out if the manager breaks the rule” was added to 
enhance the clarity of the respondent’s task.  However, none of the statements in the final 
paragraph before the task question were changed from Pilot Study A.   
 Task E was revised to a greater extent.  Generally, additional context and rationale were 
injected after the conditional rule to explain the presence of the two independent variables.  
Moreover, content was changed to maintain consistency with the conditional rule.  One of the 
potential problems with task E from Pilot Study A was the confounding of the conditional rule 
with the explanation of the independent variables.  The rule presented the “cost paid” variable as 
the antecedent and the “benefit received” as the consequent (a switched rule).  However, in Pilot 
Study A, the explanation of the independent variable, benefit received by cheating, simply stated 
that the employees operate on an honor system by reporting their production.  Essentially, by 
putting it this way, respondents to the task were drawn to look for cards dealing with production, 
rather than the bonus received.  This second pilot study also changed the card choices from the 
first pilot.  Instead of saying, “Bonus requested,” the new tasks say, “Bonus received.”  It was 
surmised that the bonus request imposed an additional variable in the study needlessly.  The 
conditional rule is broken when an employee receives a bonus without having earned that 
compensation.  This compensation was based on actual number of units produced, not reported.  
Thus, I believe the task had been confusing to respondents.   
 The text on task E of Pilot Study B added the following passage to the paragraph after the 
conditional rule: “Employees are to request a pay bonus only when their production exceeds 
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 1000 units in a week.  Requests are automatically granted.  Lately however, there’s talk that 
some employees may be deliberately breaking the rule in order to receive extra money.”  The last 
sentence describes intent to cheat.  The first two give the rationale for a benefit received by 
cheating.  Table 6.3 summarizes the other changes (shown in boldface font) to the 
operationalized independent variables.   
This time, a convenience sample of 169 undergraduate business students from the 
University of Pittsburgh’s College of Business Administration (with fewer than three years of 
work experience), and 139 business practitioners with more than three years of work experience 
was obtained from graduate business classes at Duquesne University.  Pilot Study B’s data was 
collected from March 2004 through April 2004.  Although the tasks were more consistent in their 
scenario context and in the perspective taken by the respondents, the results were again 
unexpected.  Rates are summarized in Table 6.4. 
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 Table 3 Manipulation of Independent Variable in Pilot Study B: Operationalization 
ID Variable Task A Task B Task C Task D 
Intent to Cheat “The owner 
suspects that 
the manager is 
deliberately 
breaking the 
rule…” 
“There’s talk 
that the manager 
is breaking the 
rule to undercut 
the owner’s 
approach.” 
“This manager is a 
good team player 
and would do 
nothing to 
intentionally harm 
the owner.  Lately, 
the manager has 
been distracted 
from the job due 
to family problems 
at home and has 
been making 
mistakes.” 
“The manager is a 
good team player and 
would do nothing to 
intentionally harm the 
owner.” Lately, the 
manager has been 
distracted from the 
job due to family 
problems at home 
and has been making 
mistakes.” 
Benefit  “…accepting 
kickbacks from 
the employees 
for doing so.” 
“…disagrees with 
the rule and 
believes it is 
unfair to 
employees.”   
“Whenever the 
manager gives an 
employee a bonus, 
the manager 
benefits by 
receiving a 
percentage of it.” 
No text is written to 
reflect the benefit 
derived from 
cheating. 
Presence of 
Variable  
Intent and 
Benefit 
Intent; no benefit No intent; benefit No intent; no benefit 
 
 In some cases, this set of cheater-detection rates was lower than the first round of data 
collection.  While the direction of the cheater detection among graduate practitioner students was 
in line with the theory, few substantive differences were found.  A significant difference was 
found between cheater-detection rates on tasks A and D (z = 1.7794; p = .0376) in the graduate 
sample.  Nevertheless, the cheater detection percentages were lower than the theory predicts.  
The undergraduates with fewer than three years of work experience detected cheaters much more 
effectively than did the more experienced graduate students, although no statistically significant 
differences were detected between any of the cheater-detection rates in the tasks.   Unusually, 
performance (cheater detection) peaked on task C for the undergraduate business students.  
Statistically significant results were also found between the two populations on tasks A and E 
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 only for Hypothesis 5.  On task A, a z-score of 2.23413 (p=.04782) was calculated and on task E, 
a z-score of 3.8371 (p=.01963) was calculated.    
 
Table 4 Pilot Study B Results: Percentage of Subjects Choosing q and not-p 
 Task A Task B Task C Task D Task E 
      
Undergrad 59% 
n=27 
45% 
n=22 
58% 
n=31 
42% 
N=33 
61% 
n=56 
Graduate 41% 
n=22 
36% 
n=25 
35% 
n=23 
21% 
N=24 
33% 
n=45 
Predicted 65-75% 45-55% 45-55% 25-35% 65-75% 
 
In the development of the final version of the instrument, the reasons for the unexpected 
results in the second pilot study were analyzed.   Since evolutionary psychology theory has been 
validated in numerous studies (see Chapter 3), and since those studies often used student 
populations, my focus remained on the instrument. Nothing appeared to be wrong with the 
theory or with the population.  It is still more likely that the problem rested with the instrument.  
The second iteration of the instrument focused on the clarity of the independent variables that are 
responsible for triggering the cheater-detection circuits.  The final iteration was sensitive to the 
fact that respondents may be imposing their own perspectives on the completion of the task.  In 
other words, a respondent was placed in a role where s/he was the one who could potentially be 
cheated.  From this cued viewpoint, the respondents of the study were opposite a person or 
persons with a cheating option.  In response, the final version of the tasks removed that 
ambiguity in addition to making the independent variables more direct.  Although the theory 
does not spurn such a venture, no study in evolutionary psychology has attempted to keep 
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 perspective neutral.  Gigerenzer and Hug (1992) claim that without cueing a subject into a 
particular perspective, cheater detection algorithms are unlikely to be activated.  Perspective did 
matter to our Pleistocene ancestors when they engaged in social exchanges.  When they 
calculated the costs and benefits of entering into a particular exchange, a perspective (their own) 
had to be taken.  Otherwise, reasons for each of the other card choices could always be made.  
This may be the reason that the second iteration did not support the theory.   
 
6.2. Main Study Methods 
6.2.1. Operationalization of Variables: Main Study 
This section describes instrument changes from the pilot studies as the last stage in the 
evolution of the methodology for the main study.  (Appendix C displays the adapted Wason 
selection task instrument for this dissertation’s main study.)  Once again, the language in the 
tasks was tightened and revised to emphasize the potential violations of the conditional rule.  The 
rule itself, the context, and the card choices remained unchanged.  The independent variable 
paragraph immediately following the conditional rule was altered, as well as the rationale behind 
the scenario.  Each task is broken down below and the operationalized variables are summarized 
in Table 6.5.   
Perspective 
As in the pilot studies, there are three main perspectives presented across the five 
selection tasks—owner, employee, and manager.  The principal in the tasks is represented by the 
owner of the company.  The agent for the four agency tasks is the manager, who reports directly 
to the owner.  For the fifth scenario, however, the agent is represented by the employee.  In this 
task, four employees individually report directly to the owner.  Respondents are told that the 
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 owner (principal) is concerned that the manager (tasks A through D) or the employees (task E) 
are cheating.   In each case, an opportunity to cheat by the other party in the social contract 
agency relationship was clearly stated.  In other words, the owner in each task was faced with the 
problem of moral hazard in that the contracting partner cannot be monitored until after the task 
has been performed.  The role taken by the subject was not manipulated.  In each case, 
respondents were cued into the perspective of the owner who is to check up on the manager 
(tasks A through D) or the employees (task E).  The purpose here was to isolate who is in charge 
of enforcing the rule and to set up the conditions necessary for a social contract to be recognized 
by the neural mechanisms in the brain. 
Benefit received by cheating 
 Participants were given content in the tasks that either clearly explained the benefit to be 
received by breaking the conditional rule, or omitted such information.  In one scenario the 
benefit received from cheating takes the form of the contracting partner (the manager) getting a 
percentage of bonuses paid to the employees (task A), while another stated that that same 
manager unintentionally receives a percentage of the bonus (task C), even though s/he would 
never consciously do anything to harm the owner.  In the direct dyadic relationship scenario (task 
E), benefit received by cheating was described as the employees taking an undeserved pay bonus. 
(Please see the Appendix for the tasks.)  Tasks B and D, the ones without this independent 
variable, had no information regarding possible benefit to the agent for cheating.  The specific 
manipulation of these variables is displayed in Table 6.5. 
Intent to cheat 
 Two variations of intent are demonstrated in the adapted selection tasks.  One scenario 
explains the other contracting party’s intention to cheat in order to receive a monetary benefit.  
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 The intent to cheat in task A, for instance, is identified by the statement, “you fear the manager is 
deliberately awarding bonuses to employees who have not earned them …;” task B also refers to 
the manager’s objective of breaking the rule with the same statement as in task A.  Task E claims 
the employees wish to break the rule in order to receive the pay bonus.   Honest incompetence is 
ascribed to a person who has no intent to break the conditional rule but rather does not possess 
the skills to do the job properly.  This will be treated as a no intent situation since it does not 
demonstrate a misalignment of interests, but rather a mistake.  In tasks C and D, the manager is 
simply “making mistakes.”   
 
6.3. Main Instrument 
 The main change from Pilot Study B to the final instrument used for data collection in the 
main study was that perspective was injected into the text of the scenarios.  Instead of keeping 
the respondent’s perspective constant as a third-party observer, the revised instrument cues the 
respondents into the owner perspective for all five tasks.  Perhaps the third-party view was too 
nebulous and led to varied card choices.  It should be reemphasized that no Wason instruments in 
the literature had ever used the third-party approach, although no objections to that approach had 
ever been raised in the evolutionary psychology literature.  Since this dissertation claims that the 
activation of cheater-detection algorithms in the brain is moderated by cultural experiences, it is 
logical to deduce that respondents’ backgrounds may influence card choices.  Therefore it was 
decided to keep the perspective constant in all the tasks by cueing respondents into the owner 
(principal) role.  As a result, the final tasks do not tell the scenario in the third person, but rather 
the second person.  In each task, respondents are told, “You are the owner of DMW Company.”     
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  In task A, with scenario content reflecting both intent and benefit, an additional statement 
was included to clarify the rationale behind the rule.  To highlight the fact that the manager is 
paid on a commission basis, the following statement was added immediately before the 
conditional rule: “The manager earns a percentage of each bonus paid.”  This statement was 
designed to increase the salience of the independent variable, benefit received by cheating.  
Because there is no benefit included in the text of tasks B and D, that statement was omitted from 
those tasks.  Task C, with benefit but no intent, also describes this compensation arrangement 
with the manager.   
 In the paragraph following the conditional rule, the rest of the manipulation of the 
operationalized independent variables was presented to respondents.  As with all Wason 
selection tasks, card choices are expected to be influenced by the presence or absence of 
information regarding the independent variables.  Table 6.5 describes the difference in detail.   
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 Table 5 Manipulation of Independent Variable in Final Study: Operationalization 
ID Variable Task A Task B Task C Task D 
Intent to Cheat “Now however, 
you fear the 
manager is 
deliberately 
awarding 
bonuses to 
employees who 
have not earned 
them…” 
“Now however, 
you fear your 
manager is 
deliberately 
awarding bonuses 
to employees who 
have not earned 
them.” 
“You do not believe 
the manager would 
deliberately award 
unjustified bonuses, 
but could make an 
honest mistake.” 
“You do not believe 
the manager would 
deliberately award 
unjustified bonuses, 
but could make an 
honest mistake.” 
Benefit  “…in order to 
get unjustified 
additional 
compensation.” 
No text is written 
to reflect the 
benefit derived 
from cheating. 
“As owner, you 
want to check to 
see if the manager 
is breaking the rule 
and thus earning 
more than the 
manager deserves.” 
 
No text is written to 
reflect the benefit 
derived from 
cheating. 
Presence of 
Variable  
Intent and 
Benefit 
Intent; no benefit No intent; benefit No intent; no benefit 
  
Task A specifically describes the owner’s fear that bonuses are being awarded by the 
manager to employees who have not earned them (intent).  As shown in the chart, it also 
specifies benefit by claiming that additional compensation can be achieved by cheating.  Task B 
omits text regarding benefit received by cheating completely, but still conveys the owner’s fear 
that the manager is awarding bonuses to employees who have not earned them.  Tasks C and D 
do not include intent to cheat and claim that the manager may be capable of making honest 
mistakes.  Using honest incompetence as a means to describe the manager’s unwillingness to 
knowingly cheat the owner was designed to show respondents that no intent exists.  However, on 
task C, the manager can still unwittingly receive a benefit by breaching the conditional rule as 
described in the owner’s fear that the manager is earning more than deserved.  The control task D 
has neither variable and omits any language describing benefit.  Lack of intent to cheat is 
described in the same manner as in task C.  While consistency in the operationalization of the 
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 independent variables is achieved to a fuller extent in the final iteration of the instrument, full 
consistency is not critical for the validity of the instrument in general (see Chapter 4 for a 
discussion of this issue).  The independent variables can be described in any way as long as they 
indicate intent to cheat and benefit received by cheating by one party in the social exchange 
relationship.   
For the final hypothesis, task E was adjusted to make the presence of the two independent 
variables more apparent.  Before the conditional rule, text describing the context of the 
relationship between the owner and the four employees is included.  Employees are to receive a 
pay bonus when they self-report that their personal production exceeded 1000 units of 
production in one week.  After the rule it is suggested that the owner (the role in which the 
respondent is cued) is concerned that some employees may be deliberately over-reporting their 
production in order to receive extra money.  No longer is it ambiguous about the employees’ 
intention, nor the owner’s concern.  Placing respondents into the role of owner would also make 
it more clear as to what they are to be looking for in terms of actions that would break the 
conditional rule.   
 
6.4. Sample Size Determination 
Previous studies using social contract Wason selection tasks have used sample sizes of 30 
per condition (Evans, 1996; Fiddick, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2000).  Using a conventional and 
recommended alpha level of .05 (Christensen, 2001) and a recommended power level of .8 
(Cohen, 1988), a medium effect size requires a sample size of 28 per treatment (Christensen, 
2001: 311).   
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  Because cheater-detection rates on dyadic social contract Wason selection tasks are well-
documented and similar across replicated studies (Cosmides, 1985; Cosmides, 1989; Gigerenzer 
& Hug, 1992; Barrett, 1999; Sugiyama, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2002), only one direct social 
contract scenario was used in this study, the direct social exchange scenario (Task E).  To 
increase statistical power for this group, sample size was doubled (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991).  
With the same number of respondents for the direct social contract group, there was risk that the 
test might incorrectly conclude that the difference between cheater detection on the agency task 
with intent and benefit received by cheating (task A) and the cheater detection on task E was not 
significant (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002), thereby increasing Type 1 error (Christensen, 
2001). 
 Another approach for determining the proper and appropriate sample size for this study is 
based on a formula of predicted values for each condition.  The rule, n x 100-p >= 5, provides 
verification that the number of subjects required in each cell for a recommended alpha level of 
.05 does not need to be greater than 28.  (Please refer back to Chapter 5 for expected rates of 
cheater detection based on previous research and my own preliminary study.)  As illustrated by 
Table 6.6, a sample size of 28 is acceptable at p = .05 (level of significance) when the predicted 
rate of cheater detection exceeds 18%.  The probability in column 3 is based on values obtained 
from prior research predictions on normal social contract tasks (Tooby & Cosmides, 2000; 
Barrett, 1999)  Since the number in the final column exceeds five in each treatment, a sample 
size of twenty-eight is sufficient. 
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 Table 6 Verification of Sample Size per Treatment 
Task N P 100-p >=5 
A 28 .65 .35 9.24 
B 28 .45 .55 14.84 
C 28 .45 .55 14.84 
D 28 .25 .75 20.44 
Control E 56 .65 .35 18.48 
 Source: Keller & Warrack, 2000: 374 
 
6.5. Research Design 
Subjects were randomly assigned to each condition mandating an experimental research 
design rather than a quasi-experimental design (Spector, 1981).   A quasi-experimental design 
typically matches particular subjects to specific conditions (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).  
Since the purpose of this empirical project was to study only the effects of the manipulation of 
the independent variables on cheater detection, it qualified as an experiment.   
A between-subjects research design was used in this experiment.  This type of research 
design has each participant “exposed to only one level…” of the independent variable (Martin, 
2000: 152).  So, each subject provided data about one level of each independent variable in the 
study.  The reason for this choice of design was to avoid any transfer effects and contamination 
that may result from respondents seeing all variations of the independent variables.  Prior studies 
using versions of the Wason selection task have utilized this similar design (Cosmides, 1985; 
1989; Sugiyama, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2002) and give the present study face validity. (See the 
complete discussion of validity and reliability of the Wason selection task in Chapter 4.)  Within-
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 subjects designs in which participants are “exposed to all levels of the independent variables” 
were not desirable here because of the risk of learning effects on the dependent variable from 
repeated iterations of the same scenario (Martin, 2000: 352).  This threat to internal validity was 
minimized by using a between-subjects design (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).  While 
between-participants designs provide a less sensitive test of the independent variables in the 
study, an unconfounded measure of the effects of each independent variable was most desirable 
(Christensen, 2001).  To most accurately test for the existence of social-contract/cheater-
detection algorithms in the brain, one task per participant was used. 
More specifically, a 2 x 2 factorial design was used.  In this simple kind of design, “every 
level of one independent variable is crossed or associated with every level of the other” (Spector, 
1981: 54).  For Hypotheses 1 through 4, there are four main treatments or cells within the agency 
context that vary the two other independent variables—intent to cheat and benefit derived from 
cheating.  This design allowed me to display the joint effects of the independent variables in one 
cell, as well as their independent effects. (Please see Table 6.7.)  Task D involves an agency 
social contract relationship in a business context with neither intent to cheat nor benefit derived 
by cheating present in the scenario.  The direct scenario, task E, involves “no intent” and “no 
benefit” in a normal dyadic social contract form.  This task was compared against cheater 
detection for task A to specifically test for the effects of the agency arrangement. 
 
Table 7 2 x 2 Factorial Design for Agency Tasks 
 Intent to Cheat No Intent to Cheat 
Benefit Derived from Cheating Task A Task C 
No Benefit Derived from Cheating Task B  Task D 
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 6.6. Subjects and Data Collection 
Student convenience samples were used for this phase of the research project.  Previous 
research using the Wason selection task used student convenience samples for testing the 
existence of content-dependent algorithms (Cosmides, 1985; Cosmides, 1989; Gigerenzer & 
Hug, 1992; Price, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2002).  As an extension of that research stream, it was 
appropriate to use a student population for the empirical test.  Moreover, since social-contract 
algorithms with a cheater-detection subroutine are thought to be universally hardwired in the 
species (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000b), type of population matters little.   
Since a between-subjects research design was used, large numbers of respondents were 
needed to achieve the desired number of subjects in each cell.  Given that the pilot studies 
sampled MBA students at three universities in Pittsburgh (Carnegie Mellon University, 
Duquesne University, and the University of Pittsburgh) data had to be found elsewhere.  
Permission was granted by member of the Social Issues in Management Division at the Academy 
of Management to sample their MBA students.  Packages with the instrument were shipped via 
FedEx with instructions and disclaimers included. All classes were in the Management divisions 
of the business schools.  For the sample of undergraduates with no work experience, two classes 
in Business Ethics at Duquesne University were sampled.   
The order of the tasks was counterbalanced and distributed to students so as to avoid 
possible differences in performance based on classroom factors, which is one of the main 
disadvantages of using a between-subjects experimental design (Martin, 2000).  
Counterbalancing the order of the tasks distributed to the students randomizes the samples so that 
each student in the room has an equal chance of receiving a task.  The class size was entered into 
the following algebraic formula to calculate the number of tasks to be mailed per condition: 
  x + x + x + x + 2x = number of students in a class   
116 
  Although no cash incentive was offered to subjects for their participation in the study, 
both undergraduate and graduate students were given the option not to participate.  Instructors of 
each of the courses who gave consent to use their students during class time read a disclaimer 
aloud to assure students that their participation was completely voluntary and would not affect 
their grade in the course (See Appendix B).  The statement also promised the students that their 
responses were to be kept anonymous and that their performance on the tasks was not to be 
tracked or traced back to them.  Table 6.8 lists how many business practitioners came from each 
university sampled, as well as the rates of usable tasks.   
 
Table 8 Sample Demographic: Business Practitioner Sample (Final Study) 
Institution Surveys Returned Usable Surveys Usability Rate 
Boston College 35 26 74% 
Carnegie Mellon University 14 11 79% 
Eastern Connecticut State 40 36 90% 
Northwestern University 105 52 50% 
Suffolk University 89 67 75% 
University of Central Florida 21 18 86% 
University of Delaware 31 21 68% 
University of Minnesota 121 99 82% 
University of New Mexico 35 31 89% 
Virginia Polytechnic 22 17 77% 
Winthrop University 33 25 76% 
 
 
 For the business practitioner population, 72 percent (393) of the surveys returned were 
usable for this study ranging from fifty to ninety percent across the schools.  The business 
practitioners had varied and diverse work experience ranging from military service to business 
ownership.  Typically, their experience was that of middle- to upper-level managers.  The 
average age was 31.3 years.  Thirty-eight percent of this group were female (n= 149), and a large 
majority were American (79%).  Years of full-time work experience ranged from three years (the 
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 minimum accepted for this study) to thirty years, with the average being 8.76 years.  The average 
number of years of full-time business work experience at their current job was 3.93.   
 For the undergraduate business student group, 189 respondents’ tasks were usable out of 
the 212 distributed (89%).  The average age of the usable sample was 20.1 years, with the 
majority being male (59%) and from the United States (92%).  The average number of years of 
full-time professional work experience was about 1 year.  Average time spent at their current 
place of employment was also about 1 year.   
 
6.6.1. Materials and Procedure 
 Respondents were given a pencil-and-paper version of the adapted Wason selection task.  
The first page of their booklet provided the students with instructions about the task.  The second 
page presented the business scenario and selection task to the subjects.  Students were asked to 
circle the boxes that are necessary for detecting violators of the conditional rule.   On the last 
page of the packet, subjects were asked to provide demographic information regarding their age, 
gender, and work experience (Please see Appendix C for complete final instrument).   The 
manipulation check was omitted from the final version of the instrument because it potentially 
risked having students refer back to the task and change their answer, thus compromising the 
validity of the final results.  Subjects were given as much time as they need to complete the task, 
but took approximately 5 to 6 minutes on average.   Instructors of each class in which data was 
obtained were told to read a disclosure script (see Appendix B) assuring students of their 
confidentiality and explaining the task at-hand.     
The results of the experiment in this dissertation project are presented in the next chapter.  
The data analysis and evaluation of the hypotheses are laid out in detail.   
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 7. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
This dissertation research project was executed in three phases. Two pilot studies were 
conducted prior to the main study.  The results of the pilot studies (reported in the preceding 
chapter) were useful in refining the instrument and informing the main study.  Three separate 
studies with independent datasets were conducted in order to verify the differences in cheater-
detection rates across tasks and between populations.  The results of the main study are reported 
in the next section. 
 
7.1. Test Results for Cheater-Detection Hypotheses 
 
 As described in Chapter 5, this dissertation tested variables necessary for the activation of 
cheater-detection algorithms in business social contract scenarios.  Rates of cheater-detection 
were expected to vary across the four agency-type arrangement tasks.  To assess the rates of 
cheater-detection in each of the tasks, a percentage of the subjects who chose the not-q and p 
cards only was calculated (See Table 7.1).  (Remember that these are switched social contracts.  
Therefore, the cheater-detection choices are reversed.) Once the percentages were determined, 
tests for statistical significance of differences between the rates of cheater-detection within and 
between the groups were performed.  
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Table 9 Cheater-Detection Rates for Agency-Type Tasks  
(Percentage of not-p & q responses) 
 Task A Task B Task C Task D 
All subjects  
n= 389 
48.1% 
50/104 
54.3% 
51/94 
42.3% 
41/97 
28.7% 
27/94 
Undergraduates 
n= 120 
46.9% 
15/32 
45.2% 
14/31 
48.4% 
15/31 
42.3% 
11/26 
Business 
Practitioners 
n= 269 
48.6% 
35/72 
58.7% 
37/63 
39.4% 
26/66 
23.5% 
16/68 
Expected 65-75% 45-55% 45-55% 25-35% 
(Note: Boldfacing indicates values that fall within the predicted range.) 
Hypothesis 1, the alternate hypothesis, states that there is a relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables in the tasks.  Thus, as the independent variables (intent to 
cheat and benefit received by cheating) are manipulated, the dependent variable (cheater 
detection) is predicted to be affected.  First, a one-way analysis of variance was run on the entire 
sample to determine whether there are statistically significant differences among the means in 
the tasks.  The rates of cheater-detection are easily translated into decimal mean scores since the 
dependent variable is dichotomous.  Table 7.2 illustrates the analysis of variance for the sample 
at a 95% confidence level and 4 degrees of freedom.  The F-test (F= 5.21), a ratio of the 
between-groups estimate to the within-groups estimated yielded a p-value of .0004, which is well 
under the recommended alpha of .05.  Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported by the data.  Cheater 
detection was indeed affected by the independent variables manipulated across the tasks.    
 
 
 
 
121 
 Table 10 One-way Analysis of Variance for Entire Sample 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F-ratio P-value 
Between 
groups 
4.81126 4 1.20281 5.20805 .0004 
Within 
groups 
89.1478 386 .230953   
Total 93.9591 390    
 
In order to isolate the source of the variance indicated by the ANOVA, cheater-detection 
rates for each task were obtained between the groups and within the groups.  Table 7.1 illustrates 
that there is indeed a difference in cheater-detection rates across the agency tasks as proposed by 
Hypothesis 1.  The boldface font in the boxes for tasks B, C, and D indicates that the percentages 
fell within the expected theoretical range of cheater detection.  To check for significance 
between the rates, a series of z-tests were used to compare the four percentages in both samples.  
The results, shown in Tables 7.3a-c, provide partial support for the hypothesis. The boldface font 
in tasks C and D boxes indicates statistically significant differences at α = .05 between the 
agency-arrangement tasks.  
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 Table 11 Significant Differences in Cheater-Detection Rates—Entire Sample (n= 389) 
Task A B C D 
A compared 
with 
 z = -.8684 
p = .8074 
z = .8268 
p = .2042 
z = 2.7900 
p = .0026 
B compared 
with 
z = .8684 
p =.1926 
 z = 1.6576 
p = .0487 
z = 3.5526 
p = .0002 
C compared 
with 
z = -.8268  
p = .7958 
z = -.1.6576 
p =.9513 
 z = 1.9545 
p = .0253 
D compared 
with 
z =-2.7900 
p =.9974 
z =-3.5526 
p = .9998 
z = -1.9545 
p = .9747 
 
 
Table 12 Significant Differences in Cheater-Detection Rates— 
Business Practitioner Sample (n= 269) 
Task A B C D 
A compared 
with 
 z = -1.1757 
p = .8802 
z = 1.0891 
p = .13806 
z = 3.0822 
p = .00102 
B compared 
with 
z = 1.1757  
p = .1199 
 z = 2.1962 
p = .0140 
z = 4.1014 
p = .0001 
C compared 
with 
z = -1.0891  
p = .8619 
z = -2.1962 
p = .9860 
 z = 1.9792 
p =.0239 
D compared 
with 
z = -3.0822 
p =.9990 
z = -4.1014 
p = .9999  
z = -1.9792 
p = .9761 
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 Table 13 Significant Differences in Cheater-Detection Rates— 
Undergraduate Business Student Sample (n= 120) 
Task A B C D 
A compared 
with 
 z = .1364 
p = .4457 
z = -.1201 
p = .5478 
z = .3478 
p = .3640 
B compared 
with 
z = -.1364  
p = .5543 
 z =-.2545 
p = .6005  
z = .2162 
p = .4144 
C compared 
with 
z =.1201  
p = .4522 
z = .2545 
p = .3995 
 z = .4590 
p = .3231 
D compared 
with 
z =-3478 
p =.6360 
z =-.2162 
p =.5856   
z = -.4590  
p = .1107 
 
 
When the entire sample of both business practitioners and undergraduate business 
students was combined (see Table 7.3a), statistically significant differences in cheater detection 
were found to exist between tasks A and D (z = 2.7900; p = .0026), B and D (z = 3.5526; p = 
.0002), and, C and D (z = 1.9545; p = .0253).  A statistically significant difference was also 
found between tasks B and C (z = 2.1962; p = .0487), although this is not predicted by the 
theory.  No difference was expected between tasks each containing one independent variable 
necessary for activation of the cheater-detection algorithms.  There appears to be a weak 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable across the agency 
tasks for the entire population.  
The results look slightly different when the sample is broken down by group (see Table 
7.3b).  For the MBA business practitioner group, at α = .05 (two-tailed), significant differences 
in cheater-detection rates were found between tasks A and D (z = 3.0822; p = .00102), B and D 
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 (z = 4.1014; p = .0001), and C and D (z = 1.9792; p = .02390).  These statistically significant 
results were in the predicted direction as well.  In addition, a statistically significant difference 
was found in cheater detection between tasks B and C (z = 2.1962; p = .0140), but this was not 
predicted by the hypothesis.  Since tasks B and C each possess one of the independent variables 
manipulated in this test, expected rates of cheater-detection are not proposed to vary between 
these two tasks.   Within this sample of MBA business practitioners, there appears to be a slight 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable.   
A much different result is found when the significant differences in cheater detection 
between the tasks are tallied for undergraduate business students only (Table 7.3c).  When 
cheater-detection rates are compared across all four agency tasks, no statistically significant 
differences occurred.  The undergraduate business student sample performed at a relatively 
consistent rate across all those tasks.  Within this sample of undergraduate students, there 
appears to be no relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable.  
Thus, any variation in cheater detection across the agency tasks is influenced only by the 
business practitioner group.  The implications and possible explanations for these results will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter.   
Hypothesis 2 states that social-contract/cheater-detection reasoning will vary positively 
with task content that specifies intent to cheat and benefit received by cheating (the two 
independent variables).  In other words, the activation of the algorithms will be affected by the 
presence of these two independent variables.  Social-contract/cheater-detection reasoning should 
be greatest for tasks specifying content with both independent variables.  The activation of the 
circuits for the cheater-detection subroutine should decrease as independent variables are 
removed.  Thus, this is a directional hypothesis.  Cheater-detection reasoning should be lowest 
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 for tasks specifying neither independent variable in the content of the scenario according to the 
hypothesis.  To determine if social-contract/cheater-detection reasoning did indeed vary 
positively with the presence of intent to cheat and benefit received by cheating, we refer back to 
Tables 7.3a-c.  Detection of cheaters was highest in task B, which contains intent but no benefit.  
Despite this unexpected result, no statistically significant difference exists between task A and 
task B across the entire population.   
Since both tasks B and C contain only one independent variable in the text of the 
scenarios, it is reasonable to collapse cheater-detection rates for the two tasks.  In the single 
independent variable condition, cheater-detection rates fall within the predicted range.  Table 7.4 
shows the comparison of cheater-detection rates between the three conditions.  As illustrated, 
when the results of tasks B and C are combined, both samples fall on the low end of the 
predicted theoretical range of cheater-detection values.  Values appearing in boldface indicate 
rates that fall within the predicted range of cheater detection.  Tables 7.5a-c exhibit the statistical 
significance tests of cheater-detection rate comparisons when the tasks are broken down by 
presence or absence of the independent variables.  Boldface values indicate statistical 
significance.   A similar story is told when the single variable tasks are combined.  Significant 
differences were found when the single independent variable tasks were compared with task D (z 
= 3.1294; p = .0008) for the entire sample.  No statistical significance was found for the 
undergraduate business student group, however.  The variance appears to be originating from the 
business practitioner sample between the single independent variable tasks and the task 
containing neither independent variable (z = 3.4457; p = .0003).   Even though for the entire 
population there is a statistically significant variation in cheater-detection rates between tasks A 
(containing content describing both independent variables) and D (containing content describing 
126 
 neither independent variable), none was found when considering only the undergraduate business 
student sample.  Thus, only weak support for Hypothesis 2 was found. 
Table 14 Cheater-detection Rates by Presence or Absence of Independent Variables 
 
 Task with both 
independent 
variables  
(A) 
Tasks with 1 
independent 
variable  
(B & C) 
Task with no 
independent 
variables  
(D) 
48.1% 
50/104 
48.2% 
92/191 
28.7% All subjects  
 N= 389 27/94 
46.9% 
15/32 
46.8% 42.3% Undergraduates 
       29/62 N= 120 11/26 
  48.6% 
35/72 
48.8% 
63/129 
23.5% Business 
Practitioners 16/68 
 N= 269 
Expected 65-75% 45-55% 25-35%  
 
Table 15 Significant Differences in Cheater-Detection Rates—Entire Sample (n= 389) 
 A D 
B & C compared with z = .0149 
p = .4941 
z = 3.1294 
p = .0008 
 
 
Table 16 Significant Differences in Cheater-Detection Rates— 
Undergraduate Business Students (n= 120) 
 A D 
B & C compared with z = -.0093 
p = .5037 
z =.3839  
p = .3505 
 
 
Table 17 Significant Differences in Cheater-Detection Rates— 
Business Practitioners (n= 269) 
 A D 
B & C compared with z = .0307 
p = .4877 
z = 3.4457 
p = .0003 
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 Similarly, no support was found for Hypothesis 3, which proposes an interaction effect 
between the two independent variables.  An interaction effect means there should be higher rates 
of cheater-detection when both variables are present in the content of the scenarios.  Translated 
to the tasks, this suggests that task A should elicit higher rates of cheater-detection than any of 
the other tasks.  This clearly was not the case (See Table 7.1).  Task A only elicited 48.1% of 
not-q and p responses for the entire population.  (Business practitioners detected cheaters on this 
task 48.6% of the time, while undergraduate business students chose not-p and q 46.9% of the 
time.)  Compared with rates of choosing p and not-q on the other tasks, this rate is second-
highest among the four agency tasks, with only a significant difference found with task D 
(containing content specifying neither independent variable) (z = 2.7900; p = .0026).  Moreover, 
task B (containing content specifying only intent to cheat) elicited the highest rate of cheater-
detection for the entire population (54.3%).  This was significantly higher than task C (z = 
1.6576; p = .0487) and task D (z = 3.5526; p = .0002).  Therefore, Hypothesis 3 cannot be 
supported by these results. 
 
7.2. Test Results on Agency Hypothesis 
 The second empirical test involves comparing the rate of cheater-detection on tasks with 
content specifying an agency-type organizational arrangement against tasks with content 
specifying only a dyadic social contract relationship with no hierarchical relationship described.  
This is the agency hypothesis which states that there should be no difference in cheater-detection 
rates due to the agency variable.  In this part of the study, only tasks A and E were compared 
because they contain content that specifies both intent to cheat and benefit received by cheating.  
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 To run statistical tests on the other tasks would not have served much purpose since one or both 
variables were omitted in tasks B, C, and D.   
 
Table 18 Comparison of Cheater-Detection Rates--Manipulating Agency Variable 
 Entire 
Population 
Undergraduate 
Students 
Business 
Practitioners 
Task A  
Cheater Detection 
48.1% 
50/104 
46.9% 
15/32 
48.6% 
35/72 
Task E  
Cheater Detection 
37.1% 
66/178 
39.0% 
23/59 
36.1% 
43/119 
Task A  
Compared with Task E 
z = 1.8109 
p = .0351 
z = .7289 
p = .2330 
z = 1.7000 
p = .0446 
 
Table 7.6 shows the rates of cheater-detection (rows 2 and 3) and the corresponding z-
tests for this part of the study (row 4).  The boldface font in the boxes indicates statistically 
significant results at α = .05 (one-tailed).  Hypothesis 4 posits that there should not be a 
statistically significant difference in cheater-detection rates between tasks containing content that 
describes an agency relationship and tasks containing content that describes a direct dyadic 
social contract relationship (with both intent and benefit) present.  This was true only for the 
undergraduate business student population (z = .7289; p = .2330).  The entire population yielded 
statistically significant results at α = .05 (z = 1.8109; p = .0351).  The MBA business practitioner 
group also demonstrated a statistically significant difference on cheater detection between the 
tasks (z = 1.7000; p = .0446).  These significant results were not predicted by the theory.  Thus, 
only partial support could be given for Hypothesis 4.  It should also be noted that the rates of 
cheater-detection on the direct dyadic social contract task (E) were below the predicted levels by 
the theory (65-75%) for both groups.  The implications for this unexpected result are discussed in 
the next chapter. 
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 7.3. Test Results on Populations Hypothesis 
The final hypothesis in this study compared the ability to detect cheaters across 
populations.  A significant difference in ability to choose the not-p and q documents between the 
undergraduate business student population and the MBA business practitioner population was 
proposed by Hypothesis 5.  More specifically, the practitioner group was hypothesized to detect 
cheaters more often than the undergraduate group. 
 
Table 19 Comparison of Cheater-detection Rates between Populations 
 Task A Task B Task C Task D Task E All Tasks 
Undergraduate 
Students 
46.9% 45.2% 48.4% 42.3% 39.0% 43.6% 
78/179 
Business 
Practitioners 
48.6% 54.3% 42.3% 28.7% 36.1% 40.5% 
157/388 
Significance 
Test 
z = .1636 
p = .4350 
z = 1.2415 
p = .1072 
z = .8361 
p = .2015 
z = 1.8000
p = .0359 
z = .3704 
p = .3555 
z =.6990 
p =.2423 
 
 As illustrated in Table 7.7 above, the MBA business practitioner group detected cheaters 
at a higher rate than the undergraduate business students only on tasks A and B.  On the 
remaining tasks, the undergraduate students chose not-p and q more often than the business 
practitioners.  Substantively, however, the z-tests yielded no significant results at α = .05 (single-
tailed) on these two tasks (A and B).  The only statistically significant result was found on task D 
(z = 1.8000; p = .0359), but this was the opposite of the predicted direction.  Overall, across all 
five tasks, there was no significant difference in cheater-detection rates between the two 
populations (either direction).  Therefore, Hypothesis 5 is rejected.   
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 7.4. Summary 
 The results of the hypothesis tests in the main study of this dissertation project provided 
some verification of the hypotheses.   
• Hypothesis 1 was supported when tests of statistical significance were run.  Therefore, 
cheater-detection rates did vary from task to task when the two independent variables 
were manipulated.  Most of the statistical variance was caused by the business 
practitioner sample.   
• Hypothesis 2, however, was not supported.   Cheater detection did not vary positively 
with the presence of the two independent variables in the text of the scenarios in this 
study.   
• Hypothesis 3, proposing an interaction effect between the independent variables was 
rejected.  The variables intent to cheat and benefit derived by cheating together did not 
lead significantly to the activation of the cheater-detection algorithm.   
• The statistical tests of significance yielded partial support for Hypothesis 4.  This 
hypothesis compared cheater-detection rates for the agency task with both independent 
variables included in the text of the scenario with the dyadic social contract task with 
both cheater-detection variables included in the text of the scenario.  The variance 
originated in the business practitioner group.   
• Finally, Hypothesis 5, which compared the cheater-detection rates between the two 
populations was not supported.    
 To understand the meaning of the results described in this chapter, a closer examination 
of document choices within the tasks and possible influences upon the social-contract/cheater-
detection algorithms for both populations is warranted.  This additional analysis is conducted in 
131 
 the following chapter, which sheds light on some interesting patterns from which to make 
important conclusions. 
 
 Given the unexpected results from the dissertation’s main study discussed in this chapter, 
additional efforts were made to gain insight into the findings.  One more study was conducted as 
a way of further verifying the main study’s validity.  This final empirical test was not originally 
planned and thus is considered a follow-up study.  So as not to confuse the findings of the main 
study the description and results of the follow-up study are reported in the subsequent chapter.  
The added study is presented within the context of my interpretation of the broader consequences 
stemming from the dissertation’s main study.  Although any data results would typically appear 
with the other findings, the follow-up study’s data analysis gains greater significance when 
discussed within the context of the dissertation’s theoretical contributions to evolutionary 
psychology and social exchange behavior in corporations.  Therefore, in order to interpret and 
understand the findings of the main study, the follow-up study is included in the discussion and 
implications chapter.   
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 8. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 In this final chapter, the results of the main study testing the main effects and interaction 
effect hypotheses are discussed in detail.  Here lessons are deduced from the empirical study, and 
implications for the Cosmides-Tooby approach to evolutionary psychology and its usefulness in 
the business paradigm are presented.  From this line of enquiry, future directions for research in 
business using evolutionary psychology are identified. 
The chapter is organized as follows: The academic reasons and possible explanations for 
my results are outlined and classified into three categories: explanations centering around the 
theory, the methodology, and the population.  A follow-up study is presented that replicates the 
tasks administered by Cosmides in previous research in order to determine whether similar rates 
of cheater-detection can be achieved with a business sample.  As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, reporting of the additional empirical test was saved for this chapter because it was 
conducted solely for the purpose of gaining insight into the main study’s major findings.  It 
makes more sense to include the results within a discussion of the validity of the evolutionary 
psychology approach to social contracts in business.  Finally, suggestions consistent with the 
evolutionary psychology approach are offered, which are used to reconcile the nature-nurture 
debate and to bridge the fields of business ethics and evolutionary psychology together.     
 This dissertation expands on the existing assumptions of human behavior from the social 
sciences by integrating insights from the natural sciences and evolutionary theory to increase 
understanding of managerial behavior in business social contract situations.  By bridging 
disciplines, this study is a positive step toward comprehending how culture and biology may 
interact to influence managers’ abilities to recognize business social contracts and detect cheaters 
in an organizational setting.   
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  The main study described earlier yielded statistically significant support for Hypothesis 1 
and partial support for Hypothesis 4 but none for the other hypotheses.  At first glance, these 
results do not present a healthy diagnosis for Cosmides’ theory of social contract reasoning in a 
business context.  However, a closer look is warranted and yields a much brighter prognosis for 
the usefulness of the evolutionary psychology approach in organizational theory and business 
ethics.  To understand why evolutionary psychology is a promising endeavor for the business 
and society field, further investigation into the reasoning tendencies of the research subjects and 
into the possible factors influencing their decisions was conducted.   
 
8.1. Analysis of Main Study Results 
As stated in the previous chapter, Hypothesis 1 stating that “there will be a significant 
difference in social-contract/cheater-detection reasoning across the tasks” was supported by my 
empirical study.  This finding means that the independent variables, intent to cheat and benefit 
received by cheating, do have an effect on performance on the adapted Wason selection task.  It 
is critical to be careful about the language used here, however.  As stated in chapters 2 and 3, the 
driving theory utilized in this study does not operate at the level of analysis of displayed 
behaviors.  Rather, it operates at the level of cognitive machinery.  By supporting Hypothesis 1, 
this dissertation demonstrates that among business students and MBA business practitioners, 
manipulation of the independent variables affects the activation of the cheater-detection 
algorithms as a subroutine of the larger set of social-contract circuits.  Thus, Cosmides’ theory of 
social-contract reasoning is applicable to a business population.  Granted, support for this 
hypothesis was not as robust as previous studies conducted by Cosmides and her colleagues.  
There may be several reasons for this.   It is possible that my adapted Wason selection task 
134 
 instrument did not replicate ancestral conditions of a social contract as previous studies had 
done.  Another possible reason for the variation between my results and previous results is 
located in the population itself.  Perhaps there is something about the culture of a business-
oriented group of adults that affects the sensitivity of the cheater-detection algorithms.  Finally, 
the theory itself will have to be examined as well to see if its assumptions and predictions are 
relevant to a business population.  I begin with a discussion of the theory. 
 
8.1.1. Re-Examining the Theory  
 This dissertation research project involved three iterations (2 pilot studies and the main 
study) of data collection and analysis.  Each time though, the instrument used to obtain the data 
was a version of my adapted Wason selection task.  Each task given to subjects described a 
business context.  Since the rates of cheater-detection across both populations of subjects did not 
match the predicted levels of Cosmides’ studies, it was desirable to isolate the business context 
variable from the social contract tasks.  Toward this end, I replicated their social contract tasks 
from Cosmides’ research and gave them to undergraduate business students and business 
practitioner MBA students.  If rates of cheater-detection similar to Cosmides’ studies were 
achieved, then further support would be gathered for social-contract algorithm theory and the 
existence of cheater-detection modules in the brain.  If such rates were not approximately 
achieved, then the focus of my investigation would need to shift to the characteristics of the 
population.  Thus, to narrow the range of possible explanations for the data results, this further 
study was conducted to gain insight into whether the population was responsible for the variation 
from previous evolutionary psychology research results. 
 
135 
  
Follow-Up Study 
 
 In November, 2004, I conducted one additional empirical study to further certify the 
results of the main study.  Twenty-eight undergraduate business students enrolled in a required 
accounting course at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh were surveyed.  Additionally, thirty-
eight business practitioners enrolled in two Master of Business Administration courses (a 
required business ethics course and a required public affairs management course) at Duquesne 
University were surveyed.  The same criteria for determining the demographics of each group 
were used in this follow-up study as for the pilot studies and the main study.  The business 
practitioner sample required a minimum of three years of full-time work experience in business 
from each person, while only undergraduate students with fewer than three years of full-time 
work experience in business were tested.  Twenty-four undergraduate students met this 
qualification, and twenty-one MBAs were counted in the business practitioner sample.  The 
average age of the undergraduate sample was 20.4 years (14 females and 10 males), and the 
average age of the business practitioners was 32.3 years (11 females and 10 males).   
 The tasks used for this follow-up study were taken from Cosmides (1985 and 1989).  In 
those studies, Cosmides compared performance on social contract tasks with performance on 
abstract tasks, permission rules, and descriptive problems.  She gave subjects four tasks at a time 
across her experiments (in a within-subjects approach) and included just one social contract-type 
scenario in each group.  My follow-up study replicated the social contract tasks she used but did 
not replicate the order of the tasks.  My study does not test p and not-q card choices for 
descriptive rules or permission rules.  Since I am only concerned with social contract tasks, I 
chose only those tasks from Cosmides’ research that dealt with social exchange scenarios.  
However, I did include an abstract logic scenario in each subject’s task packet.   
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  Specifically, I selected two standard social contract tasks and one switched social 
contract task (For the complete tasks used in this final experiment, please consult Appendix F.).  
The first standard social contract task is the drinking age problem, originally conceived by 
Griggs and Cox (1982), but used by Cosmides (1985; 1989).  Consistently, subjects taking this 
task have performed quite successfully in terms of “benefit-accepted” and “cost-not-paid” card 
choices.  Cosmides’ studies demonstrated cheater-detection rates exceeding 60% across multiple 
experiments.  The conditional rule and scenario in this case describes an underage drinking law 
from which it is specified that individuals at a bar drinking beer must be over age 21.  
Respondents are cued into the perspective of the owner of the bar enforcing this rule.  This 
context is thought to be familiar to subjects taking the task because it resembles laws in our own 
culture.  The task is also framed as a social contract because individuals described in the task 
must be 21 years of age or older (cost paid) in order to legally receive the benefit—drinking beer.  
The conditional rule is in the form of If p, then q.  In other words, the benefit can be taken 
(drinking beer) only when the cost is paid (exceed age 21).  Thus, the scenario is believed to be a 
familiar standard social contract.   
 The second social contract task from Cosmides’ research (Cosmides wrote this task) is 
also in the standard form, but it is framed in an unfamiliar context.  Respondents taking the task 
are cued into the role of a third-party anthropologist observing the propensity to obey laws in an 
African hunter-gatherer tribe.  The conditional rule is still framed in the standard, If p, then q 
form, but the content is nothing with which anyone taking the task would necessarily be familiar 
since it is fictitious.  As part of a ritual ceremony, members of the tribe must find an ostrich shell 
in order to eat duiker meat (a form of antelope).  The benefit, eating duiker meat, is to be granted 
only when tribespeople find an ostrich shell.  Cosmides constructed this task to determine 
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 whether the familiarity of the context in the task facilitated correct card choices for detecting 
cheaters on the conditional rule.  Repeatedly, Cosmides found that undergraduates at Harvard 
were able to choose the p and not-q cards over 60% of the time. 
The final task that Cosmides wrote for her dissertation (1985) is a social contract framed 
in an unfamiliar context and presented in the form of a switched conditional rule.  Here the story 
is told about a fictitious Polynesian warring band of people.  Again, subjects taking the task are 
cued into an observing role of anthropologist.  But this time a very desirable sustaining food, the 
cassava root, is awarded only to those people in the band who get a tattoo printed on their face.  
The tattoo is the cost to be paid for the benefit of the cassava root.  The main difference in this 
task is the order of the conditional rule.  The cost is presented first.  The rule is in the form of If 
q, then p.  In other words, if the cost is paid, then the tribespeople will receive the benefit.  
Cosmides added this task to see if respondents were able to find the falsifying responses to the 
rule (not-p and q).  Her social contract predictions (much like my predictions in this dissertation) 
were that respondents having social contract algorithms should ignore cards that describe cost-
paid and benefit-not-accepted actions.  She found in her research that subjects still selected the 
cards which falsified the rule at a much higher rate than on tasks which did not reflect a social 
contract (over 60%) although the rates were lower on this type of task than on standard social 
contract forms.   
 For the follow-up replication study of Cosmides’ previous work, I utilized a within-
subjects research design (for a description, please see Chapter 6).  Although a between-subjects 
design is more desirable because of a possible learning effect when more than one task is given 
per subject, within-subjects designs are common in work with the Wason selection task.  
Moreover, in the study I wished to replicate, Cosmides (1989), a within-subjects design was 
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 used.   To limit the transfer effects of the within-subjects design, the tasks were counterbalanced 
using a balanced Latin Square method.  Table 8.1 illustrates the Latin Square order used for the 
replication study.  The balanced Latin Square method (Christensen, 2001) switches the order of 
the tasks given to students so that no task precedes one of the other tasks more than a quarter of 
the time.  This method is considered a complete counterbalancing effort (Martin, 2000). There 
was an equal chance that a respondent received one of the four orders illustrated in Table 8.1.  
Thus, the effect that one task had on teaching respondents to correctly choose cards on the other 
tasks were minimized.   
 
 Table 20: Balanced Latin Square Order used for Follow-Up Study 
A B C D 
B D A C 
D C B A 
C A D B 
  Source: Christensen, 2001 
 Otherwise, the convenience samples of respondents were administered the tasks in the 
same manner that all other subjects were sampled from the previous studies in this dissertation 
project.  Students were asked to volunteer to take the survey and were given no cash incentive or 
extra credit to participate.  Everyone was given as much time as they needed to complete the 
packet of tasks, but most subjects finished in about 11 minutes.  Subjects were told not to refer 
back to any task upon completion.  Following the four tasks, respondents were asked to answer 
six demographic questions, which were taken verbatim from the main study’s instrument.  
Responses were numbered and coded afterward.   
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  The results of the replication study are illustrated in Table 8.2.  As shown, once again, the 
undergraduate business student population correctly chose the “benefit- accepted” and “cost-not-
paid” cards at a higher rate than the business practitioners on each of the three social contract 
tasks from Cosmides’ previous research.  While the unfamiliar standard social contract task 
(duiker meat) yielded the only statistically significant result (z = 1.9166; p = .0276), there was a 
substantive difference in cheater detection on all three social contract tasks.  In fact, for 
undergraduates, on both standard social contract tasks, rates of cheater detection resembled rates 
achieved in previous research.  Only on the familiar standard social contract task (drinking age 
problem) did the rates of cheater detection resemble those from previous research for the 
business practitioner sample.  Statistical significance likely would have been achieved with a 
larger sample of both groups.  Statistical power increases with greater sample size (Rosenthal & 
Rosnow, 1991).  Sample sizes for each group were smaller than in my main study.   
 
Table 21 Follow-Up Study Results (Replication Study) 
  
Abstract 
 Familiar 
Standard Social 
Contract 
Unfamiliar 
Standard 
SC 
Unfamiliar 
Switched SC 
Content Logic  Drinking Age Duiker Meat Tattoo 
Undergraduate 
 
0/24= 
0% 
 15/24= 
63% 
16/24= 
67% 
12/24= 
50% 
Graduate 
 
0/21= 
0% 
 13/21= 
61% 
8/21= 
38% 
7/21= 
33% 
Predicted 4-10%  65-75% 65-75% 65-75% 
 
 The follow-up study’s results show that cheater-detection algorithms are activated at 
nearly the rate achieved by Cosmides for undergraduate students only.  This further verifies that 
indeed the cheater-detection subroutine mechanism is present within a business population.  The 
findings indicate that undergraduate business students are not adept at choosing the logically 
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 correct response on abstract, formal logic tasks but are able to choose the cards that violate the 
conditional rule in social contract-type scenarios.  Therefore, for this group of individuals, a 
content-effect is definitely present when the context of the tasks and conditional rules is switched 
to a social contract.  A content effect is even evident for the MBA business practitioner group 
when performance on the social contract tasks is compared with the abstract logic task (z =2.898; 
p= 0.00187 for switched social contract task rate versus the abstract logic task rate).  But even 
though statistical significance was found between the social contract task performance and the 
abstract logic task performance for the business practitioner group, substantively, the rates were 
much lower on my sample compared with Cosmides’ sample.   
 The replication study also adds emphasis to my consistent findings that MBA business 
practitioners detect cheaters in social contract situations at a lower rate than inexperienced, 
undergraduate business students.  Had the business practitioner group elicited rates of cheater-
detection statistically similar to the rates elicited from the undergraduate student group, the 
adapted selection task instrument could possibly be flawed. 
Sensitivity to Independent Variables   
 Hypothesis 2 states that social-contract/cheater-detection reasoning will vary positively 
with content which specifies that a contracting partner derives some benefit by  
cheating and with content which specifies that a contracting partner had the intent to cheat.  
Although rates of cheater-detection fell within the predicted range when one independent 
variable was removed (tasks B and C), no statistical significance was found.  Barrett (1999) 
suggests that perhaps the neural algorithms are incrementally activated, meaning that the cheater-
detection algorithms do not simply get turned on and off but can be partially activated.  Barrett’s 
research describes the algorithmic activation process as a kind of dimmer switch.  He considers 
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 the possibility that the circuits are not necessarily turned on and off but could be activated at 
varying degrees.  Recall that when rates of cheater-detection on tasks B and C (combined) are 
compared with task D, there is a statistically significant difference.  This means that a higher 
percentage of respondents correctly identified the cheaters on the tasks with one independent 
variable than with neither variable.  Since Hypothesis 3, predicting an interaction effect between 
the two manipulated independent variables in my main study was also not supported, the 
presence of both intent to cheat and benefit received by cheating does not seem to raise the 
ability to detect cheaters significantly.  When the data are examined more closely, it was 
apparent that the business practitioners elicited the highest rate of cheater-detection on task B, 
which had intent but omitted benefit.  Compared with the percentage of cheater-detection on task 
C, the business practitioners substantially (but not significantly) did better at detecting cheaters 
when intent was present than on the task when only benefit was present (59% to 39% 
respectively).   The difference was not very pronounced for the undergraduate student 
population, where cheater-detection rates were flat across all tasks (agency and dyadic).  
The variables which are theoretically necessary for algorithm activation appear to have an 
effect on the ability to detect cheaters but not to the extent predicted.  It is reasonable to consider 
the possibility that incremental activation was taking place in my study but that other factors may 
be intervening that mitigate full activation.  Activation of cheater detection mechanisms can be 
incremental rather than absolute (Barrett, 1999).  I will revisit this possibility later in the chapter. 
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 8.1.2. Research Design and Methodology 
 Chapter 4 provides an in-depth account of the various facilitation effects that have been 
studied on multiple versions of the Wason selection task over the years.  It is important to revisit 
the possible factors that have been shown to affect performance on these tasks and acknowledge 
that this may be a source of variation in my samples.  My purpose in this dissertation has been to 
extend Cosmides and Tooby’s research to the business sector.  Perhaps only the spirit of their 
research was extended.   
 While all of her subjects were undergraduate students, Cosmides did use paid volunteers 
for her studies.  Because I was using a between-subjects design this was not an option for me due 
to the extremely high number of total subjects obtained in my study.  What effect would paying 
the subjects have on task performance?  Platt and Griggs (1993) concluded that an attentional 
effect exists. They found performance to rise on tasks that were succeeded by follow-up probe 
questions.  This is a key finding and one that I will return to later on in this chapter.  It seems to 
make a difference in selecting the necessary cards on the task when subjects exercised greater 
care on the test.  Although time spent on the actual task does not appear to have a significant 
effect on performance (Feeney & Handley, 2000), the amount of care people take to answer the 
task may be noteworthy.  Perhaps students paid to take the test were more inclined to read the 
scenario more carefully and notice the independent variable manipulation. 
 Another factor in Cosmides’ (1985, 1989) research design which could have had an effect 
on card selections involved her instruction sheet for respondents.  My instruction sheet (see 
Appendix C) simply asks respondents to read the scenario on the next page of the packet and 
answer the question at the end of the page.  Cosmides went further into detail by actually giving 
subjects an example of how to perform a selection task.  This additional type of instruction, 
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 while time consuming, may have led to facilitation on her tasks compared to my tasks.  Osman 
and Laming (2001) posited that incorrect card choices on selection tasks (in their case it involved 
a type of permission rule) could be caused in part by the respondents’ misinterpretation of the 
actual task-at-hand.  If subjects do not clearly know what is being asked of them, then they may 
not perform as well as would be expected.  So, understanding the conditional rule and the 
question is important in facilitation on this instrument.  Out of respect for the instructors’ class 
time, I kept the instructions short and simple.  Had I walked respondents through an example, my 
results may have been different.   
 Clarity of task can be achieved on the actual scenario page, however.  A pretest was 
administered early in the main study’s design, using various business context versions of the 
scenarios.  The instrument was given to several doctoral students at the University of Pittsburgh 
who were asked to rate the clarity of the question at the end of the task.  All respondents rated 
clarity of task very high.  In a follow-up interview, none claimed they had any trouble 
deciphering what it was they were asked to do.  Moreover, in the paragraph immediately 
following the conditional rule on the selection task (see Appendix C), the purpose of the task is 
emphasized with the statement: “As owner, you want to check to see if the manager is breaking 
the rule.” Then, they are asked which document(s) they have to uncover to find out who is 
breaking the conditional rule.  The conditional rule is repeated in the question for additional 
clarity.  These precautions should have been sufficient to overcome the effect that Osman and 
Laming (2001) discovered.   
 One of the other factors that is cited in the literature on the Wason selection task as 
having an effect on card choice is the matching bias (as discussed in Chapter 4).  There is 
evidence that the subjects from my main study did choose the cards that were stated in the 
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 conditional rule (“produced more than 1000 units” and “bonus received”).  For the undergraduate 
student group, 18% chose the q and p cards (and, nothing else) across all tasks.  Twenty-four 
percent of respondents chose the matching item cards on task E alone.  The graduate student 
business practitioner group chose the lexically mentioned cards 14% of the time overall but 24% 
on task E.  This bias, which has been acknowledged in the psychology literature (Evans, 1972; 
Oaksford & Stenning, 1992), could be responsible for a part of the variance in my study. 
 This dissertation tested the hypothesis that the agency relationship will have no effect on 
cheater detection rates on the Wason selection tasks (Hypothesis 4).  This prediction was refuted 
because a strongly significant difference was found on cheater-detection rates between the 
agency task (A) with both independent variables present and the dyadic task (E) with both 
independent variables present.  The variance can be accounted for by the business practitioner 
group.  The undergraduate students did not demonstrate any differences in social-contract 
reasoning between the two types of task, but the MBA students with significant work experience 
were greatly more adept at detecting the cheaters on the agency-type arrangement.  While there 
may be theoretical reasons for this, which are discussed in the final section, there could be 
methodological reasons for it too.   
 When examining the card choice tendencies of the business practitioner sample, a very 
interesting discovery was made.  I compared the card choices of this group on tasks A and E, on 
which the fourth hypothesis is based.  The rates of single card selection between these tasks was 
statistically similar for the “not-q,” “p,” and “not-p.”  In other words, the percentage of 
respondents choosing those three cards was not different between tasks A and E when evaluated 
with a test statistic.  There was, however, a statistically significant difference in the percentage of 
respondents who chose “q” between the tasks.  Over thirty-nine percent (47 out of 119 business 
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 practitioners) of subjects taking task E chose the “Produced more than 1000 units” card, and 
only twenty-five percent (18 out of 72 business practitioners) of subjects taking task A chose that 
card (z = 2.0490; p = .0202).  The undergraduate business student population demonstrated the 
same tendency to choose the “cost-paid” card at a higher rate on task E than on task A.  The rate 
was just less pronounced (37% on task E versus 31% on task A).  No statistically significant 
difference was found, although that could have been a function of the sample size of the 
undergraduate group.  For some reason, the MBA-student business practitioners were drawn to 
the “cost-paid” card. 
 It is quite plausible that the attraction of the “q” card to the business practitioners was 
due to the wording of the scenario that accompanied the conditional rule in task E.  The sentence 
immediately following the rule (see Appendix C) says, “Now however, you think that some 
employees are deliberately over-reporting their production to get a pay bonus.”  By highlighting 
the fact that employees (represented by the documents at the end of the task) are motivated to 
over-report their units of production, respondents may be looking for specific cases where 
production exceeds the 1000 unit threshold.  Essentially, this phenomenon resembles the 
verification bias (Reich & Ruth, 1982) in that respondents may look for information in the cards 
that confirms the information provided in the scenario.  Previous research defined the 
verification bias in terms of confirming information in the conditional rule, but since this 
information is supplementary to the rule, it is not difficult to believe subjects may be verifying 
that additional information.    
By running the replication study, another interesting piece of information surfaced that 
sheds some light on the possible reasons for the lower rates of cheater-detection.  Both groups 
achieved the lowest rates of cheater-detection for social contract tasks on the tasks that had 
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 switched conditional rules.  Cosmides (1989) reports rates that are statistically as high on the 
switched social contract rules as on the standard social contract rules regardless of familiarity.  
But although these rates are statistically similar to the rates on the standard tasks, they were 
lower in every experiment in Cosmides’ study.  She reported rates at least 8 percentage points 
lower for the switched content.  This is an important discovery because all five of the social 
contract tasks from my main study are in the switched form.  Can some of the variance between 
the rates of cheater-detection on my tasks and the ones achieved from Cosmides’ tasks be 
accounted for by virtue of the structure of the conditional rule?  
 This possibility warrants a further look.  When a z-test is run between rates of cheater-
detection on the direct social contract task from my study (Task E—see Appendix C) and the 
switched unfamiliar social contract from the Cosmides (1989) replication study, no statistically 
significant differences are found at the alpha .05 level.  So, on tasks both dealing with a switched 
direct social contract relationship between two parties, the cheater-detection rates were similar.  
Recall that standard social contracts take the form, “If p, then q.” Switched social contracts take 
the opposite form, “If q, then p.”  On standard contracts, a violation occurs when the antecedent 
(p) is provided but the consequent (q) is not.  Selecting cards that show the cost-not-paid and 
benefit-accepted are necessary to see if the rule was violated.  This happens also to be the 
logically correct response.  On switched social contract rules, the cards or documents that reflect 
cost-paid and benefit-not-accepted need to be selected in order to detect violations of the rule.  
This is NOT logically correct.  Were subjects choosing the logically correct response instead? 
 When the actual card choices from my main study are examined, subjects are not 
choosing the logically correct response of cost-not-paid and benefit-accepted.  Tables 8.3 and 8.4 
illustrate the rate of card choices on each of the five tasks in my main study.  As is shown, 
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 neither the MBA business practitioner group nor the undergraduate business student group chose 
the cards that would lead to the logically correct response very often.  In fact, the most common 
response from both groups of respondents on ALL of the tasks was the “not-q and p” response.  
Under no circumstance in my tasks are any of my subjects adept at logical reasoning.   
 
 
Table 22 MBA Business Practitioner Frequency of Card Choices on Main Study (n=269) 
 Q not-q P not-p q and not-p 
Task A 18  48 57 8 1 
Task B 12 44 55 6 1 
Task C 19 41 49 10 2 
Task D 35 41 50 24 3 
Task E 47 54 102 13 1 
 
Table 23 Undergraduate Frequency of Card Choices on Main Study (n=120) 
 Q not-q P not-p q and not-p 
Task A 10 23 28 9 0 
Task B 7 22 22 3 1 
Task C 8 19 25 4 0 
Task D 9 17 20 6 0 
Task E 22 31 50 6 1 
 
 Regardless of other card choices, the “p” card (received a bonus) was the most popularly 
chosen card in BOTH groups.  This means that respondents were drawn toward the “benefit 
received” card when trying to detect cheaters.  Less often, the “not-q” card (did not produce 
more than 1000 units) was selected. 
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  These are possible explanations for the significant difference in card preferences of the 
business practitioner subjects on tasks A and E.  If the follow-up study supports the notion that 
social-contract/cheater-detection algorithms in the brain exist in a business population, thereby 
lending support to the Cosmides theory, then attention must be given to the population itself.  
What makes my sample of respondents different from those sampled by Cosmides and her 
colleagues?  My remaining discussion concentrates on the two sampled groups in my main study 
and what could be influencing the activation of their evolutionary algorithms and thus 
suppressing their ability to detect cheaters in social contract situations. 
 
8.2. Organizational Factors on Cheater Detection in a Business Population 
 It is particularly interesting and perhaps significant that undergraduate business students 
with little or no full-time work experience consistently demonstrated higher rates of cheater-
detection than the business practitioner MBAs.   Hypothesis 5 predicted that “when presented 
with a conditional reasoning test in a business context, business practitioners will demonstrate 
higher rates of cheater detection than will undergraduate business students.” As the results 
demonstrate, quite the opposite occurred.    
 Why do the business practitioners not seem to be as sensitive to the variables that activate 
the cheater-detection algorithms as the undergraduate students?  The next step in searching for 
the answer is to investigate what factors are influencing the activation of the algorithms in this 
population. 
 
 
 
149 
 8.2.1. Revisiting Social-Contract Algorithm Theory 
 A plausible reason for the difference in cheater detection between the two samples in the 
main study lies within the nature-nurture debate.  Recall from Chapter 3 the Integrated Causal 
Model (ICM) of the human mind.  The phenotypic design features of the brain gradually evolved 
as a product of genetic variation and cultural influences.  An organism’s genes determine, in 
part, the effective environment of the organism “by establishing the way in which external 
physical systems become incorporated into actions” (Lewontin, 2000: 64).  An organism’s 
environment is transformed by the organisms that live within its boundaries.  But the 
environmental conditions also transform the organism.  Together, they are “both causes and 
effects in a coevolutionary process” (p. 126).  Behavior is the outcome of the interaction between 
an organism’s embedded programs for interpreting its surroundings and the physical conditions 
that act upon those genetically formed programs.   
This view is consistent with Cosmides’ conception of the ICM in which culture is part of 
the environment.  Cosmides’ theory hypothesizes that social-contract algorithms are present in 
every person in every culture on the planet.  At the same time, her theory acknowledges that 
cultural institutions exist and accumulate and change over time.  These cultural institutions 
coexist and coevolve with the brain’s algorithms (Cosmides & Tooby, 2004).  Naturally formed 
cultural conventions create the rules and conditions by which we perceive cheating and unethical 
behavior.  This profound influence of culture may be partially responsible for the lack of 
replication of Cosmides’ results in the dissertation’s main study.  Since Cosmides’ theory of 
social-contract algorithms does not appear to work in a business population, some key aspects of 
culture in business firms are identified as a possible pathway for future research in the next 
section. 
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 8.2.2. Future Research Avenues 
 In business firms, organizational culture is “the pattern of basic assumptions that a given 
group has invented, discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external 
adaptation and internal integration…”(Schein, 1985: 9).  These assumptions are taught to other 
members of the cultural group as the way the environment should be perceived.  The conditional 
rules of the group—deontic and permission—are generated by culture.  Beliefs and values are 
learned from the group and spread to all the new members of the group.  Over time these norms 
are passed down, as memes (Blackmore, 1999).  The culture of an organization affects the 
perceptions of reality of its members.  In Jones’ (1991) ethical decision-making model, the 
organization’s culture has a profound influence on how people make ethical decisions in the 
workplace.  Cheating on social contracts in any context is an ethical issue.  How employees of an 
organization are socialized to perceive the ethical issue greatly influences behavior.   
 Schein described three levels of cultural depth that can be witnessed in all cultures 
including collectivities like organizations.  These three levels include the artifacts (i.e., rituals), 
values, and basic assumptions of the culture (1985).  Each one of these levels is critical to the full 
understanding of how a culture operates.  He admits that among the critical aspects of any 
organization’s culture is the perception of who can be trusted within the group.    
One potential problem with studying culture in organizations becomes understanding the 
boundaries of overlapping cultures (Martin, 2002).   Individuals participate in various 
collectivities that overlap and interact to influence behavior.  In which culture individuals 
perceive themselves to be placed at a given moment can influence perceptions of a particular 
situation (p. 335).  Martin claims that the boundary-spanning of cultures permits exchanges of 
information among cultures.  Crossing boundaries from one culture to another is to be expected 
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 in the modern-day business environment but this can often blur the perceived culture by the 
individual.  For instance, an MBA business practitioner asked to perform a Wason selection task 
in a classroom setting after having spent the day at their business firm could potentially be 
mixing cultures.  Future research on the Wason selection task using business practitioners may 
gain insights from testing a population that is not involved in a university institutional culture. 
Organizational culture also influences how employers and employees perceive their role 
with each other in the organizational relationship.  “Socialization events…can have pervasive 
effects over time on beliefs that a worker holds about employment relationships” (Rousseau, 
2004: 124). Employees in a corporation have their own perceptions about the nature of their 
contractual relationship with their managers (Barnett & Schubert, 2002).  These perceptions 
relate to the entitlements felt by either party.  Thus, despite the social contract rules set by the 
employer, both parties to an exchange relationship in an organization may perceive their rights 
and obligations to be different than what is explicitly stated.   This could have significant 
implications on the reasoning process for social contracts.  If what constitutes cheating varies 
from organizational culture to organizational culture, then perhaps the way the MBA business 
practitioner sample was socialized in their corporations moderated the activation of their cheater-
detection algorithms.   
Organizational culture affects perceptions of relationships and the assumptions about 
reality and human nature (Schein, 1985).  The shared perceptions of how to deal with an ethical 
issue like cheating on social contracts has a moderating influence on behavior.  The MBA 
business practitioner sample in this dissertation’s main study had a significant amount of full-
time business work experience.  According to the corporate culture literature, organizations 
socialize their employees to deal with problems in a particular way.  It is possible that the reason 
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 for the variation of cheater-detection rates between the undergraduate business students and the 
business practitioners was due to the influence of company culture on the way each group 
perceived the conditional rule in my instrument.   
  Future studies using the adapted business Wason selection task should also ask follow-
up probe questions of all the respondents regarding their perceptions of the issue in the scenario.  
Since social-contract algorithm activation is reliant on perceptions of contextual cues, an exit 
interview may be desirable to understand what the respondents are actually perceiving in the 
scenarios.  Moral intensity involves the degree to which individuals perceive an issue as a moral 
imperative (Jones, 1991).  Jones breaks down the moral intensity construct into six 
characteristics of a moral dilemma.  The perceived severity of an issue is dependent on these 
characteristics.  For instance, one of the characteristics of an ethical issue according to Jones is 
social consensus.  Social consensus is the degree to which there is cultural agreement that a 
proposed act is evil or good (Jones, 1991).  The higher the degree of social consensus that the 
behavior is unacceptable, the higher degree of perceived moral intensity of the issue (all other 
factors being equal).  Perceptions are very sensitive to organizational influences.  Thus, if the 
organizational culture advocates and enforces the norm that cheating is unacceptable, then 
cheating would be viewed by the people in that corporate culture as being a more morally intense 
issue (all other factors being held constant).  
Is it possible that these culturally created perceptions of the severity of the moral issue 
will actually affect whether or not the social-contract/cheater-detection algorithms in the brain 
are activated?  Barrett (1999) offers the possibility that the cheater detection mechanism accepts 
“as input the output of other mechanisms, or the other mechanisms could merely be increasing or 
decreasing the ‘level of activation’ of the cheater detection mechanism” (p.8).  The evolutionary 
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 psychologists posit that the brain is composed of an interlinked web of neural circuits, each 
responsible for a particular adaptive function (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000b).  A person who views 
cheating in the scenario to be a moral imperative may be better at detecting cheaters on the tasks.  
The levels of vigilance for cheating will vary based on an individual’s perception.  Perhaps the 
business practitioners in my sample detected cheaters at a lower rate than expected because of 
their culturally formed perceptions of the intensity of the issue, thus warranting future research.  
The agency hypothesis addresses another cultural influence on Pleistocene circuits.  As 
stated in Chapter 3, hierarchical relationships should be familiar to our minds since social groups 
were organized along power lines back in our hunter-gatherer days.  Corporations are organized 
in terms of agency-type relationships, where one person acts on another’s behalf.  Cosmides and 
Tooby (2004) acknowledge that even though these hierarchical relationships are familiar to our 
anciently formed minds, the agency relationship in particular may suppress the triggering of the 
cheater-detection algorithms because who is being cheated is often not clear.  Agents “who do 
not see the company’s costs and benefits as such are unlikely to spontaneously attend to potential 
cases of cheating by employees or clients” (p. 108).    
The social structure of the corporation may be a possible factor affecting the cheater 
detection.  Reciprocity in evolutionary theory is typically analyzed in terms of equitable 
relationships.  Kin selection (Trivers, 1971) is usually not thought of in terms of social status.  
Cosmides’ evolved algorithms for reciprocity do not take into account the true context of an 
agency relationship—one based on a difference in power and social status.  Recall that the 
respondents in the main study were all cued into the perspective of the owner of the 
manufacturing firm.  This owner has the power to award bonuses and was the person responsible 
for constructing the social contract conditional rule, on which the exchange relationship is based.  
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 Future studies should attempt to cue respondents into the subordinate role to examine whether 
the change of perspective has an effect on cheater detection.   
 The social norms discussed above are a part of corporate culture that often constrains the 
behavior of individuals.  Cummins (1999) proposed a deontic theory of reasoning called, 
dominance theory.  She posits that social regulations and differences in rank in social groups 
affected the evolution of cognitive functions in the brain.  Her deontic reasoning theory “reflects 
the operation of primitive cognitive functions involved in monitoring compliance with social 
norms” (Fiddick & Cummins, 2001: 153).  The social norms include the structuring of social 
groups along power and dominance lines.  “Augmenting and preserving the power of individual 
managers” are central goals of a corporate culture (Frederick, 1995: 92).  Due to the highly 
interactive nature of the neural algorithms, Fiddick and Cummins (2001) studied whether 
individuals in a position of power would perceive cheating to be a less severe issue than 
individuals who do not possess power.  In a ledger task, they cued respondents into roles of boss 
or subordinate (but did not use a business population) and evaluated their tolerance to cheating.  
They found that people cued to the higher rank were more tolerant of cheating than people cued 
to a lower rank.  Individuals in the higher ranking role even felt that they are more fairly treated 
than the individuals cued to the lower-ranking role.   
This finding certainly provides some insight into why psychological contracts deteriorate 
over time, but what does it tell us about cheater detection?  Future research in this evolutionary 
psychology field should test these findings against Barrett’s (1999) claim that the cheater-
detection algorithms are activated incrementally.  If there is an interaction among different 
circuits in the brain and that these circuits are influenced by cultural factors, then the effects of 
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 perceptions of role power differentials on the activation of cheater-detection mechanisms need to 
be examined.   
 
8.3. Concluding Remarks 
 This dissertation is based on the notion of consilience of the natural and social sciences.  
For a “united system of knowledge” to form, a select number of natural laws need to be 
identified and drawn upon to construct an understanding of phenomena (Wilson, 1998: 298).   I 
suggest that the point at which this interdependence of nature and nurture exists is at the level of 
evolved psychological mechanisms in the brain.  The Cosmides-Tooby social contract algorithm 
theory is a useful tool for business research on ethical breaches of social contracts.  The social-
contract/cheater detection algorithms examined in this study operate in business organizations 
but are vulnerable to social and cultural forces which may moderate their activation.  When the 
brain is viewed as a symphony of interacting brain circuits subject to perceptions of 
environmental cues and cultural forces, insights into human behavior can be fostered.  Business 
ethicists should embrace the insights from evolutionary psychology about the mind’s design.  
Explanations of human behavior must begin at the genetically based algorithm level of analysis.  
Knowing that the cheater-detection brain circuits are active in the corporate mind is an important 
early step in the understanding unethical behavior in the workplace.  If ethical rules in 
organizations can be reframed with respect to the natural capabilities of the human mind, then 
perhaps social contracts are more likely to be honored. 
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 APPENDIX A 
Manipulation Check Questions for Pilot Study 
 
1) Without going back to the scenario on the previous page, please indicate if you think the manager intended to violate the rule (A 
“1” indicates “Definitely no”.  “7” indicates “Definitely yes”.  “4” indicates “Not sure”.)? 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   
Definitely No           Not Sure     Definitely Yes 
 
2) Without going back to the scenario on the previous page, please indicate if you think the manager could benefit by violating the rule 
(A “1” indicates “Definitely no”.  “7” indicates “Definitely yes”. “4” indicates “Not sure”.)?   
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Definitely No            Not Sure     Definitely Yes 
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 APPENDIX B 
Institutional Review Board Script for Administering Instrument 
 
Script for David Wasieleski 
 
The purpose of this research study is to assess individual’s ability to detect cheaters in business situations.  To accomplish that goal, 
please read the scenario in front of you and answer the question asked at the end of the text.  Following the case, please turn the page 
and answer a few demographic questions.  But please do not indicate your name.    
 
There are no foreseeable risks associated with this project, but completion of the task is completely voluntary anyway.  Results are to 
be kept completely anonymous and will not be tracked, so your responses will not be identifiable in any way.  This study is being 
conducted by David Wasieleski, Ph.D. candidate at the University of Pittsburgh.  He can be reached at 412-661-2581 if you have any 
questions.  
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 APPENDIX C 
Adapted Social Contract Wason Selection Task Instrument: Main Study 
 
Exercise 
 
Please read the scenario on the next page first.  Then choose among the documents presented.  
Indicate your choice by circling the appropriate document or documents.  Take as much time as you 
need to complete this task.  When you are finished, please turn to the last page and fill out the 
anonymous survey form.  Please do not go back or re-read the scenario in filling out the survey.   
 
Thank you very much for your participation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Note: Respondents received only one task with headings omitted.) 
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 Task A: Intent and Benefit (Agency) 
You are the owner of DMW Company, a manufacturer of cell phones.  Your company’s financial situation is dire and you are on the 
edge of going out of business.  You hired a manager to keep production up.   To attain that goal, you and the manager agreed to pay 
bonuses to highly productive employees.  The manager earns a percentage of each bonus paid. 
 
So, you and the manager agreed to the following rule: 
 
If an employee produces more than 1000 units in a week, then that employee receives a pay bonus. 
 
Now however, you fear the manager is deliberately awarding bonuses to employees who have not earned them in order to get 
unjustified additional compensation.  As owner, you want to check to see if the manager is breaking the rule.    
   
The documents below tell about four workers in DMW’s plant.  But some papers fell on top of them, so you can only see half of each 
document.   
 
Each document tells about one person. The top tells whether or not the manager gave that person a bonus, and the bottom tells how 
much that employee actually produced. 
 
Which document(s) would you, as owner, definitely need to uncover to find out if your manager has broken the rule: “If an employee 
produces more than 1000 units in a week, then that employee receives a pay bonus.”? (Don't choose any more documents than are 
absolutely necessary.) 
 
Answer by circling your choice or choices below. 
 
 
 
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Produced 
more than 
1000 units 
Bonus 
given 
Bonus not 
given 
 
 
 
 
Produced 
fewer than 
1000 units 
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 Task B: Intent; No benefit (Agency) 
You are the owner of DMW Company, a manufacturer of cell phones.  Your company’s financial situation is dire and you are on the 
edge of going out of business.  You hired a manager to keep production up.  To attain that goal, you and the manager agreed to pay 
bonuses to highly productive employees.  
 
So, you and the manager agreed to the following rule: 
 
If an employee produces more than 1000 units in a week, then that employee receives a pay bonus. 
 
Now however, you fear your manager is deliberately awarding bonuses to employees who have not earned them. As owner, you want 
to check to see if the manager is breaking the rule. 
 
The documents below tell about four workers in DMW’s plant.  But some papers fell on top of them, so you can only see half of each 
document.   
 
Each document tells about one person. The top tells whether or not the manager gave that person a bonus, and the bottom tells how 
much that employee actually produced. 
 
Which document(s) would you, as owner, definitely need to uncover to find out if the manager has broken the rule: “If an employee 
produces more than 1000 units in a week, then that employee receives a pay bonus.”? (Don't choose any more documents than are 
absolutely necessary.) 
 
Answer by circling your choice or choices below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Produced 
more than 
1000 units 
Bonus 
given 
Bonus not 
given 
 
 
 
 
Produced 
fewer than 
1000 units 
162 
 Task C: No intent; Benefit (Agency) 
You are the owner of DMW Company, a manufacturer of cell phones.  Your company’s financial situation is dire and you are on the 
edge of going out of business.    You hired a manager to keep production up.  To attain that goal, you and the manager agreed to pay 
bonuses to highly productive employees.  The manager earns a percentage of each bonus paid. 
 
So, you and the manager agreed to the following rule: 
 
If an employee produces more than 1000 units in a week, then that employee receives a pay bonus. 
 
You do not believe the manager would deliberately award unjustified bonuses, but could make an honest mistake.  As owner, you 
want to check to see if the manager is breaking the rule and thus earning more than the manager deserves. 
  
The documents below tell about four workers in DMW’s plant.  But some papers fell on top of them, so you can only see half of each 
document.   
 
Each document tells about one person. The top tells whether or not the manager gave that person a bonus, and the bottom tells how 
much that employee actually produced. 
 
Which document(s) would you, as owner, definitely need to uncover to find out if the manager has broken the rule: “If an employee 
produces more than 1000 units in a week, then that employee receives a pay bonus.”? (Don't choose any more documents than are 
absolutely necessary.) 
 
Answer by circling your choice or choices below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Produced 
more than 
1000 units 
Bonus 
given 
Bonus not 
given 
 
 
 
 
Produced 
fewer than 
1000 units 
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 Task D: No intent; No benefit (Agency) 
You are the owner of DMW Company, a manufacturer of cell phones.  Your company’s financial situation is dire and you are on the 
edge of going out of business.   You hired a manager to keep production up.  To attain that goal, you and the manager agreed to pay 
bonuses to highly productive employees.  
 
So, you and the manager agreed to the following rule: 
 
If an employee produces more than 1000 units in a week, then that employee receives a pay bonus. 
 
You do not believe the manager would deliberately award unjustified bonuses, but could make an honest mistake.  As owner, you 
want to check to see if this has happened. 
 
The documents below tell about four workers in DMW’s plant.  But some papers fell on top of them, so you can only see half of each 
document.   
 
Each document tells about one person. The top tells whether or not the manager gave that person a bonus, and the bottom tells how 
much that employee actually produced. 
 
Which document(s) would you, as owner, definitely need to uncover to find out if the manager has broken the rule: “If an employee 
produces more than 1000 units in a week, then that employee receives a pay bonus.”? (Don't choose any more documents than are 
absolutely necessary.) 
 
Answer by circling your choice or choices below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Produced 
more than 
1000 units 
Bonus 
given 
Bonus not 
given 
 
 
 
 
Produced 
fewer than 
1000 units 
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 Task E: Intent and Benefit (Dyadic) 
You are the owner of DMW Company, a manufacturer of cell phones.  Your company’s financial situation is dire and you are on the 
edge of going out of business.  To encourage production in your plant, you agreed to award pay bonuses to highly productive 
employees.  Employees receive a bonus when they self-report that their production exceeds 1000 units in a week.   
 
So, you and the employees agreed to the following rule: 
  
If an employee produces more than 1000 units in a week, then that employee receives a pay bonus. 
 
Now however, you think that some employees are deliberately over-reporting their production to get a pay bonus.  As owner, you 
want to check to see if the employees are breaking the rule. 
 
The documents below tell about four workers in DMW’s plant.  But some papers fell on top of them, so you can only see half of each 
document.   
 
Each document tells about one person. The top tells whether or not that person received a bonus, and the bottom tells how much that 
employee actually produced. 
 
Which document(s) would you, as owner, definitely need to uncover to find out if any of your employees are breaking the rule: “If an 
employee produces more than 1000 units in a week, then that employee receives a pay bonus.”? (Don't choose any more documents 
than are absolutely necessary.) 
 
Answer by circling your choice or choices below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Produced 
more than 
1000 units 
Bonus 
received 
Bonus not 
received 
 
 
 
 
Produced 
fewer than 
1000 units 
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 Anonymous Survey 
 
 
1) What is your age?  _________ 
 
 
2) Please indicate your gender. M  F 
 
 
3) What is your natural country of origin?   _________________________________  
 
 
4) What is your current or most recent job title or job function? _______________________________________ 
 
 
5) How many years of full-time work experience in business do you have? ______ 
 
 
6) How many years of full-time work experience in business do you have at your current or most recent job title or job function? 
 
                 ______ 
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 APPENDIX D 
Follow-up Study Tasks 
 
From: Cosmides (1985, 1989) 
 
Familiar Standard Social Contract 
In its crackdown against drunk drivers, Pennsylvania law enforcement officials are revoking liquor licenses left and right.  You are a 
bouncer in a Boston bar, and you’ll lose your license unless you enforce the following law: 
 
If a person is drinking beer, then he must be over 21 years old. 
 
The cards below have information about four people sitting at a table in your bar.  Each card represents one person.  One side of a card 
tells what a person is drinking and the other side tells that person’s age.   
 
Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if any of these people are breaking this law.   
 
 
 
 
  
drinking beer 
 
drinking coke 
 
25 years old 
 
16 years old  
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 Abstract Problem 
Part of your new clerical job at the local high school is to make sure that student documents have been processed correctly.  Your job 
is to make sure the documents conform to the following alphanumeric rule: 
 
If a person has a “D” rating, then his documents must be marked code “3.” 
 
You suspect the secretary you replaced did not categorize the students’ documents correctly.  The cards below have information about 
the documents of four people who are enrolled at this high school.  Each card represents one person.  One side of a card tells a 
person’s letter rating and the other side of the card tells that person’s number code. 
 
Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if the documents of any of these people violate the rule.   
 
 
 
  
D 
 
F 
 
3 
 
7  
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 Unfamiliar Standard Social Contract 
You are an anthropologist studying the Namka, a hunter-gatherer culture living in the deserts of southwest Africa.  You are 
particularly interested in whether Namka boys obey the laws of their people.   
 
Every full moon there is a special feast in which a duiker—a small antelope—is slaughtered and eaten.  Duiker meat is quite scarce 
and delicious—a real treat.  Eating duiker meat is a privilege that must be earned. 
 
For boys, this privilege is governed by the following law:  
 
If you eat duiker meat, then you have found an ostrich eggshell. 
 
Finding ostrich eggshells is a sophisticated and difficult task which takes a boy years to learn.  Having found an ostrich eggshell on 
your own is therefore a sign that you have mastered the most difficult skills of hunting.  For the Namka, it represents a boy’s transition 
into manhood. 
 
You wonder if Namka boys cheat on this law when nobody is looking.  You decide to hide behind some bushes and watch.  During 
the course of the feast of the full moon, you see four different boys approach the roasted duiker while no one else is looking. 
 
The cards below have information about these four boys.  Each card represents one boy.  One side of a card tells whether a boy has 
ever found an ostrich eggshell and the other side tells whether that boy took any of the roasted duiker meat. 
 
The smell of the roasting duiker is truly tempting to the boys.  You want to know if any of them cheated on the law.  Indicate only 
those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if any of these boys have broken the law. 
 
 
  
eats some duiker meat 
 
has never found an 
ostrich eggshell 
 
does not eat any duiker 
meat 
 
has found an ostrich 
eggshell 
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 Unfamiliar Switched Social Contract 
You are an anthropologist studying the Kaluame, a Polynesian people who live in small, warring bands on Maku Island in the Pacific.  
You are interested in how Kaluame “big men”—chieftains—wield power.   
 
“Big Kiku” is a Kaluame big man who is known for his ruthlessness.  As a sign of loyalty, he makes his own “subject” put a tattoo on 
their face.  Members of other Kaluame bands never have facial tattoos.  Big Kiku has made so many enemies in other Kaluame bands, 
that being caught in another village with a facial tattoo is, quite literally, the kiss of death.   
 
Four men from different bands stumble into Big Kiku’s village, starving and desperate.  They have been kicked out of their respective 
villages for various misdeeds, and have come to Big Kiku because they need food badly.  Big Kiku offers each of them the following 
deal:  
 
If you get a tattoo on your face, then I’ll give you cassava root. 
 
Cassava root is a very sustaining food which Big Kiku’s people cultivate.  The four men are very hungry, so they agree to Big Kiku’s 
deal.  Big Kiku says that the tattoos must be in place tonight, but that the cassava root will not be available until the following 
morning.   
 
You learn that Big Kiku hates some of these men for betraying him to his enemies.  You suspect he will cheat and betray some of 
them.  Thus, this is a perfect opportunity for you to see first hand how Big Kiku wields his power.  The cards below have information 
about the fates of the four men.  Each card represents one man.  One side of a card tells whether or not the man went through with the 
facial tattoo that evening and the other side of the card tells whether or not Big Kiku gave that man cassava root the next day. 
 
Did Big Kiku get away with cheating any of these four men?  Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if Big 
Kiku has broken his word to any of these four men.   
 
 
  
got the tattoo 
 
Big Kiku gave him 
nothing 
 
no tattoo 
 
Big Kiku gave his 
cassava root 
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